Abstract
This chapter sets forth the anthropological roots of the conception of phenomenological psychopathology defended in this book. The anthropology that underpins this undertaking is expressed in the study of the conditions of possibility of experience. Every experience is based on and rooted in the world through these conditions. The fundamental conditions of possibility of existence here examined are temporality, spatiality, interpersonality and intersubjectivity, embodiment, identity, historical self and ipseity. This chapter is complemented by an overview of the structure of existence. This part–whole dialectic between the conditions of possibility of existence is a distinguished feature of this work, which can be understood as a dialectical-proportional contribution to phenomenological psychopathology.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For Husserl, protention is the future to which an immediate state of consciousness is directed, while retention is the web of themes which sustains that state.
- 3.
Sometimes, panic attacks will disappear without therapeutic intervention, although in many others they will become dangerously chronified if they are not treated, obstructing the transition to the subsequent stage, flourishing.
- 4.
Completeness of life should not be mistaken for anthropological plenitude, which I will examine in the second and especially third part. The completeness of the phase of iconisation is an experience of fulfilment which does not reject the dialectics of existence, as occurs in plenitude.
- 5.
The endowment of objects means the way the self-pole experiences objects. Endowment is a common philosophical term. Although it may be unfamiliar to the reader, I have decided to keep it because it is still the best way to indicate that what we perceive is “given” by the conditions of possibility that structure us pre-reflexively.
- 6.
In order to highlight the essentially dialectic and interdependent relationship between self, other and world, I have added the suffix “pole” to the three nouns whenever this interdependence is central to a precise comprehension of the meaning I wish to express.
- 7.
This wholeness does not exclude the typical indeterminacy of the endowments of temporality . When referring to the integrity of temporal things, we should understand that everything that can be actualised in a given period of time is endowed.
- 8.
Nor, indeed, is there in the main languages in which psychopathology and phenomenological philosophy developed.
- 9.
- 10.
We are indebted to Hippocrates and Jaspers (especially his existential philosophy) for, refusing an abstract generalisation of anthropology, reminding us that the human can only be known partially and in a mutating perspective that never ends.
- 11.
I will disregard here, due to its rarity, the case of amaurosis, in which the other makes their presence and integrity felt by other sensory means, where collectivity is smaller and therefore individuality is greater.
- 12.
Later in the text, I designate this the historical self . As this concept has not yet been presented, I use it only in its trivial sense.
- 13.
- 14.
Up to this point, I have treated the notion of self non-specifically, sometimes indicating it as a pole (self-pole), sometimes only pronominally, like myself. From now on, with the introduction of the historical self, every mention of the pronoun self will receive a technical meaning.
- 15.
The historical self is the owner of its own narrative, constituting its own narrative self (Parnas and Zahavi 2002). The narrativity of the historical self is, however, secondary to its constitution as a dimension of existence and I do not see how it can be considered an autonomous variant of self. Narrativity serves an identity that is previously embodied constituted, pre-reflexively, and which guides its articulation as narrative (Køster 2017, p. 163), although narrativity also has value as a regulator of one’s own identity experience.
- 16.
I use “existential structure” and “structure of existence” interchangeably.
- 17.
These factors external to consciousness, responsible for its delimitation and final form, are not covered in this book, as ultimately they fall within the realm of philosophy. The transcendentality of the constitution of the structure of existence should not be confused with the neurological mechanisms on which consciousness depends. These are merely its physiological basis. For more details on the relationships between the neurological bases and the structure of consciousness, I refer to the work of Fuchs (2018).
- 18.
In the ontological philosophical tradition (especially in medieval thinking), the essence of an object that appears as such only in its concrete reality (in re) is called moderate; it is different from an essence that can be grasped irrespective of reality, which is said to be absolute, as occurs, for example, in geometry (ante rem). This contrasts with nominalism, which is the knowledge that, sceptical as to the possibility of identifying the essence of reality, grants the status of reality only to the names that represent it (post rem).
- 19.
This concept will be demonstrated in detail in Parts II and III, given over to pathologies.
- 20.
It is important to highlight that this apprehension of the essential in the particular, which will be seen in Parts II and III of this study in several clinical examples and in patients’ own words, should not be confused with the original intuition of an individual existence, which is outside the scope of a science, as stated above (Sect. 2.6). The act of apprehending the essence of a pathology through its existential examples is in fact the only genuine way of practising the nomothetic science of psychopathology without resorting to nominalist abstraction.
- 21.
Depraz et al. (2011, p. 139) describe definitively this relationship between intersubjective imprecision and access to objectivity: “therefore the presence of contradictory or opposing descriptions may very well be indicative not of any theoretical aporia as to the nature of the universal truth of experience, but of an invitation to produce a more nuanced description, one that is more fine-tuned, more differentiated, taking into account additional dimensions. In other words, the conflict of validation in the intersubjectivity of the act of descriptive practice leads to a deepening of both the description and the quality of validation”.
- 22.
We will see the conditions of possibility of this shattering in the section on structural disorders (Chap. 4).
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Messas, G. (2021). The Conditions of Possibility of Existence. In: The Existential Structure of Substance Misuse. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62724-9_2
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