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Breaking the Cyber Kill Chain by Modelling Resource Costs

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Graphical Models for Security (GraMSec 2020)

Abstract

To combat cybercrime, a clearer understanding of the attacks and the offenders is necessary. When there is little available data about attack incidents, which is usually the case for new technology, one can make estimations about the necessary investments an offender would need to compromise the system. The next step would be to implement measures that increase these costs to a level that makes the attack unattractive. Our research method follows the principles of design science, where cycles of research activities are used to create artefacts intended to solve real-world problems. Our artefacts are an approach for creating a resource costs model (RCM) and an accompanying modelling tool implemented as a web application. These are used to find the required attacker resources at each stage of the cyber kill chain. End user feedback show that structured visualisation of the required resources raises the awareness of the cyberthreat. This approach has its strength and provides best accuracy with specific attacks, but is more limited when there are many possible attack vectors of different types.

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Acknowledgment

The research leading to these results has partially been performed by the Cyber Security in Merchant Shipping Service Evolution (CySiMS-SE) project, which received funding from the Research Council of Norway under Grant No. 295969.

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Correspondence to Per Håkon Meland .

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Appendices

A Tool screenshots

See Figs. 4 and 5.

Fig. 4.
figure 4

A screenshot from the first three stages; Reconnaissance, Weaponization and Delivery.

Fig. 5.
figure 5

A screenshot from the last four stages; Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control and Actions on Objectives

B Cybercriminal profiles

  Script kiddie (SK) has a low level of motivation, thus time consuming attacks are not attractive to this profile. The technical skills are limited to minimal and the profile only accepts a minimal cost. Script kiddies will only utilize resources that can be realized legally and have external access.

  Hacktivist (H) has a medium to high level of motivation anchored in the political cause they represent, thus they may conduct time consuming, targeted attacks. The technical skills of a hacktivist is limited to minimal. In order to fight for their cause, the hacktivist accepts some expenses. The hacktivist is willing to require resources illegally and have external access level.

  Vandal (V) has a low to medium motivation and will only invest a limited amount of time in attention seeking attacks. The technical skills of the vandal is limited to minimal and the profile accepts a low cost. Vandals will only utilize resources that can be realized legally and have external access.

  Petty criminal (PC) has a medium motivation level, willing to invest some time in attacks that bring financial gain. They possess operational technical skills and accepts a medium cost. The petty criminal is willing to require resources illegally and has external access level.

  Mobster (M) has a medium to high level of motivation given that financial gain is possible, thus they may conduct time consuming attacks. The technical skills are operational and the profile accepts costly attacks. Mobsters won’t second guess illegal resources and have external access level.

  Cyberwarrior (CW) is a state-sponsored actor with a high motivation level, thus will conduct persistent, highly time consuming attacks. The cyberwarrior has adept technical skills for launching any attack. In addition, the cyberwarrior is not limited by any costs and disposes resources that may be required illegally. As an immediate result of the adept skill level, the cyberwarrior has internal access.

  Terrorist (T) tends to be highly motivated and well-funded, thus can conduct time consuming and costly cyberattacks to front beliefs. The technical skills are limited to minimal. The Terrorist is willing to require resources illegally and have external access level.

  Internal - Hostile (IN-H) has a medium motivation level and may launch attacks that require some time. The profile knows the system well, which yields an operational technical skill. Some expenses are acceptable, limited to legally acquired resources. Internals have internal access level by default.

  Internal - Non-hostile (IN-NH) launces cyberattacks by accident, thus not motivated at all to invest any time or money in a cyberattack and will only possess resources that can be legally realized. Given that accidental cyberattacks are possible yields an operational skill level and an internal access level.

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Haga, K., Meland, P.H., Sindre, G. (2020). Breaking the Cyber Kill Chain by Modelling Resource Costs. In: Eades III, H., Gadyatskaya, O. (eds) Graphical Models for Security. GraMSec 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12419. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62230-5_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62230-5_6

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