Abstract
Adolf Reinach began his education in phenomenology with the teachings of Theodor Lipps before encountering Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1902. What attracted Reinach to the Logical Investigations was the philosophical realism he saw accompanying Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and discussions of the formal structures of meaning therein. However, shortly after Reinach and a number of the Munich Circle members began studying with him in Göttingen, it became clear that the position Husserl espoused was shifting into transcendental idealism. Reinach maintained a theoretical independence from Husserl while embarking on the richest kind of dialogue with his revolutionary texts and teachings. By bringing out the strengths of some of Husserl’s ideas and finding ways to repair the weaknesses of others, Reinach discovered new applications for the realism he found so attractive and significant in the Logical Investigations. I argue that this was how Reinach’s response to Husserl took shape and grew, and set the foundation for the version of phenomenology that Reinach would continue to build upon with his own students until he left for the battlefield of World War I. This article sets forth and explores Reinach’s realist response to Husserl by focusing on his expansion of the a priori, and his ontological work on essence and states of affairs – including his original contributions to jurisprudence.
Consider the case, where we become cognizant [erkennen] of being filled with a feeling of delight, or that we see [something] red, or that sound and colour are distinct, or something like that. The individual cases of cognition [Erkennens] and their existence do not matter here, however it is in them that we intuitively discern [erschauen], in every instance, the What, the essence of the cognition , which consists in taking in [Aufnehmen], in a receiving [Empfangen] and making one’s own, what offers itself. It is towards this essence that we must move, it is what we must investigate; but we must not substitute for it anything foreign to it.
~ Adolf Reinach, Über Phänomenologie (1914)
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Notes
- 1.
Smid 1985, 268.
- 2.
“[…] man eigentlich bezweifeln könne, ob die eigentliche Phänomenologie, wie man sie in München betreibe, bei Husserl ihre Wurzel habe.” Correspondence from Reinach to Conrad can be found at the Bavarian State Library under the signature Ana 379 C I 1. The lines preceding this statement reference a conversation Reinach had with Daubert about matters that he and Conrad had already discussed, mainly issues they both had with Husserl’s work.
- 3.
In his chapter “Contents of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Marty and Daubert,” Schuhmann writes: “The early Munich phenomenologists, in contrast, adopted a much more favourable stand toward Brentano and his followers. This attitude (which is of course in line with their general opposition to all that is of a transcendental bent) was no doubt inspired by Johannes Daubert.” (Mulligan 1990, 198) In this chapter, Schuhmann also states that Daubert’s criticisms of Husserl’s Logical Investigations have roots in his positive attitude towards the Brentanists: “And as early as 1904 he was criticizing Husserl for his ‘partially misguided interpretations of Brentano’ in the Logical Investigations. And concerning his own projects Daubert noted that his investigations ‘are in large measure to follow Brentano.’” (Mulligan 1990, 199) Later, in his introduction to the translation of “Johannes Daubert’s Lecture ‘On The Psychology of Apperception and Judgment’ From July 1902”, when speaking about the familiarity of the Munich Circle students with the adjectival and adverbial forms of ‘phenomenological,’ Karl Schuhmann writes: “At the same time, however, it also indicates that Daubert must have already familiarized Lipps’ students to some degree with Husserl’s Logical Investigations and phenomenology before July 1902. This is also suggested by the fact that the title of Husserl’s work is not mentioned a single time in the lecture […] One of the preconditions for that is to be sought, of course, in the fact that the constant background of Husserl’s thought, the ideas of the Brentano school, were also very much present in the Munich Circle. In Daubert’s lecture this is manifest above all in his insistence on the distinction between intentional content and intentional object, as well as in his reference to a book by Alexius Meinong that had just appeared (probably in March 1902), On Assumptions.” (Schuhmann 2002, 340–341) To bring the point back to Reinach, the intellectual biography of Reinach that Schuhmann and Smith assembled indicates that, “It was Daubert who was to be of most significance for Reinach’s later philosophical development. Already in this period [1901–1903] Daubert was working on just those topics – positive and negative judgments, impersonalia, dispositions, Sachverhalt and Gegenstand – which were later to play a central role in Reinach’s work.” (Schuhmann and Smith 1987, 5)
- 4.
- 5.
Smid 1985, 270.
- 6.
The specific character of Husserl’s realist position in Logical Investigations has been adequately treated elsewhere. For instance, see Willard 2012 and Cobb-Stevens 2002. See also, Ingarden 1975. However, I will not be discussing the realist reading of the Logical Investigations here. Rather, I will simply echo the statements of James DuBois: “But whatever the stance one takes towards the Logical Investigations, we must insist that, whether Husserl intended to develop a phenomenological realism within these investigations is to some extent irrelevant to our understanding of Reinach. In any case, the Logical Investigations inspired a philosophical realism.” (DuBois 1995, 146)
- 7.
During the summer term of 1905, a conversation took place between Daubert and Reinach where the two shared an objection to how Husserl had in several instances described the object by reflecting on the signification. Daubert used as an example the relation of similarity, and how the relation changes when the objects involved do. Another example the two men used to illustrate their point involves Kaiser Wilhelm: If I think of Kaiser Wilhelm, the son of Kaiser Fredrich III and the grandson of Queen Victoria, the object “Kaiser Wilhelm” does not imply the significations “son of Kaiser Fredrich III” and “grandson of Queen Victoria.” (For further details, see Smid 1985, 278.) Daubert also criticized Husserl along Meinongian lines: he argued that Husserl showed a bias in favour of real existing objects when distinguishing between signification and object, failing to take into consideration possible objects or significations.
- 8.
Spiegelberg 1994, 168.
- 9.
Hildebrand 1991, 222–223.
- 10.
Husserl 2001, Vol. I, 166 (translation modified).
- 11.
Husserl 2001, Vol. I, 312, translation modified.
- 12.
Husserl 2001, Vol. II, 292, translation modified.
- 13.
To illustrate, in Ideas I Husserl writes: “On the other hand, the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and human Ego as subordinate single realities, is, according to its sense, merely intentional being, thus one that has the merely secondary, relative sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences [Erfahrungen] which is in principle intuited and determined only as something identical, motivated by manifolds of appearances: beyond that it is a nothing” (Husserl 1983, 112, translation modified).
With the appearance of Ideas I, Husserl was subjected to a concerted pushback by many of his Göttingen students against what they perceived as a serious drift toward a radical form of idealism. These charges against Husserl may well be made compelling – but they must be fair. Husserl was not impervious to these objections, as evidenced by changes he made to the text in his personal copies of the book in order to mitigate these reproaches. To mention two such changes in the passage I have cited, which apply to single words, among other more extensive ones, Husserl encloses the word ‘for’ in quotation marks and replaces the word ‘nothing’ [Nichts] with ‘absurdity’ [Widersinn] – changes that arguably dampen the thrust of the arguments against him. Curiously, I have yet to see these acknowledged in the critical literature, even though F. Kersten cites them in footnotes (Husserl 1983, 112, notes 29–31) of his translation (they cannot have gone unnoticed, despite his translation having fallen into disfavor).
- 14.
“Das scheint Husserls schließliche Auffassung zu rechtfertigen, daß Reinach in einen Ontologismus zurückgefallen sei. […]. Vergleicht man Reinach’s Gang von der Urteilstheorie zum Rechtsbuch mit Husserls Weg von den Logischen Untersuchungen zu den Ideen, so fällt auf, daß beide sich nicht so sehr parallel zueinander als vielmehr in entgegengesetzter Richtung entwickelten.” He adds, “ Reinachs philosophisches Hauptproblem war offenbar der Versuch, mit jener ‘Bewußtseinsseite’ ins Reine zu kommen. Auch wenn ihm der Weg zu einer endgültigen Lösung dieser Frage durch seinen Kriegstod abgeschnitten war, so war er sich doch von Anfang an darüber im Klaren, daß eine kantianisierende Antwort auf das Bewußtseinsproblem ausgeschlossen blieb, da sie mehr Schwierigkeiten schüfe als löste.” (Mulligan 1987, 252)
- 15.
In Concerning Phenomenology – Reinach’s last work before leaving for war – only Husserl’s Logical Investigations is mentioned.
- 16.
These two fundamental positions of a phenomenological realist are the first two in a list of seven characteristics that summarize the “Austrian Aristotelianism” of the Brentano School. Reinach’s phenomenology exhibits all of them, and this sometimes renders his work more in the spirit of Austrian phenomenology than Husserl’s. For further elaboration on these characteristics, see Smith 1996.
- 17.
Meinong 1960, 76–117. When we delve into the ontological jungle of Meinong we get another kind of being, one that is beyond existence and subsistence: absistence [Außersein]. According to Meinong, there is more than the simple disjunction between real and ideal being. There is also ‘being-thus’ [Sosein], which is properly distinct from ‘being’ [Sein] and ‘non-being’ [Nichtsein]. The being-thus of an object refers to the characteristics it has, such as the blackness of the cat or the largeness of the tree, and these characteristics are not affected by the object’s being or non-being. For example, in the judgment “round squares do not exist” the object whose being is denied has characteristics – roundness and squareness – but these characteristics are not affected by its non-being.
- 18.
Reinach 1989, 114–115.
- 19.
Wenisch 1988, 108–109.
- 20.
Intuition and insight are related but not the same. To possess or acquire insight [Einsicht] we must invoke discerning intuition [Erschauung]. Reinach speaks of the discerning intuition of essence [Wesenserschauung]: we grasp or lift the ‘whatness’ from the material object and bring it to ultimate givenness. That which we grasp through such intuition is amenable to the strongest sense of Evidenz. When we do this, we can also apprehend the subsisting states of affairs and the a priori connections that obtain. Apprehension is a special kind of intuition for Reinach, and this is performed with respect to states of affairs: it is as if I read them off the material objects.
- 21.
Reinach distinguishes between two types of insight: formal and essential. The difference boils down to that of form (purely logical) and material content. If we take a simple syllogism (P → Q, P ⊢ Q), looking only to the form of the argument, we can see it is valid. This insight that we gain concerns the formal connections only and has nothing to do with content – they are insightful all by themselves, and the evidence is directly there. There is also necessity and universal validity, and this means they are also a priori. If we flesh out the syllogism with content (e.g., If a woman floats in water then she must be made of wood. Abigail floats in water. Therefore she is made of wood.), then the truth or falsity we arrive at is not formal, but material – we know something about the ‘things’ or the natures of what P and Q stand for, which is how we know Abigail floats for reasons other than being made of wood. There are also instances of universality and necessity within the material realm but, when they pertain to the content, Reinach would call them material a priori truths. Essential insight, unlike formal insight, requires knowledge of the essences that ground the obtaining state of affairs. Confusion and/or conflation of these two types of insight have caused many misinterpretations of Reinach. For a brief discussion of this, see DuBois 1995, 108–110.
- 22.
Wenisch 1988, 109.
- 23.
Husserl 2001, Vol. I, 16–17.
- 24.
Vandervort Brettler, Lucinda Ann 1973, 116.
- 25.
Reinach 1989, 543.
- 26.
In the notes compiled by Schuhmann and Smith under the title “Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs” [The Ambiguity of the Concept of Essence], taken from Reinach’s seminar notes from winter 1912/1913, we see a brief comment about eidetic reduction, a rare example of Reinach referring to Ideas I, but, once again, without naming it: “{Thus becomes clear the} ambiguity of the expression “essence”. {Is the concept of essence in phenomenology perhaps an} idea that plays a role but to which nothing {really} belongs? Phenomenology and eidetics {are following} Husserl to be distinguished. Eidetics is supposed to investigate relations of essences. {But the} sciences of essences of jurisprudence or national economy {would} never {become} accessible without phenomenological methodology. {Nevertheless it would not} be right to call all propositions achieved in this manner phenomenological. Mathematics {for example, possesses equally well} eidetic propositions as synthetic propositions a priori” (Reinach 1989, 362; Baltzer-Jaray 2016b, 137).
- 27.
Reinach 1989, 534.
- 28.
Reinach 1989, 546.
- 29.
Reinach 1989, 545–546.
- 30.
It is interesting to note, as Spiegelberg does, that the famous song from 1907, Phänomenologenlied, written by Alfred von Sybel, was a piece of satire aimed at Husserl and his new innovations. That summer Husserl first presented his lectures on “The Idea of Phenomenology,” and the song reflects the skeptical attitudes of the early members (Spiegelberg 1994, 258). The lyrics are as follows: Wie blüht doch die Philosophie, / Seit sie Phänomenologie, / Man reduziert sich diese Welt / Und Existenz in Frag’ man stellt. / Man hält sich an Essenzen, Essenzen, [Essenzen] – bis / Essenz von Punsch und von Likör / Gehören freilich nicht hierher. / Die Essenz, die man brauchen kann, / Die trifft man ganz wo anders an, / Da geht man zu den Müttern, den Müttern, [den Müttern] – bis / Die Mütter sitzen still and stumm, / Wohl um ein Klärbassin herum; / Drin muss man rühren früh und spat, / Bis man Essenz gefunden hat, / Und ziemlich ausfiltrieret, filtrieret, [filtrieret] – bis / Sie bilden dann die DingStruktur, (scil. Die Essenzen) / Grad wie bei einer Perlenschnur; / Die Schichten stecken an ‘nem Speer, / Der geht wohl mitten durch sie quer, / Und das ist die Intentio, Intentio, [Intentio] – bis / Schon wächst empor das neue Haus, / Da plötzlich stürzt es ein, o Graus, / Denn auch, die Schichten in der Tief’ / Sie lagen alle gänzlich schief, / Weil vag die Evidenzen, Videnzen, [Videnzen] – bis / Von neuem sich die Arbeit regt, / Die Schichten werden umgelegt, / Die Reihenfolg hat keened Sinn, / Und alles muss wo anders hin, / Und so geht’s immer weiter, Ja weiter, [Ja weiter] – bis. (Bavarian State Library, Conrad, Ana 378 C I 3)
- 31.
Although Reinach was rather vigilant not to show directly that he is at odds with Husserl, the following citation from Dorion Cairns attests to the growing divide between them: “Husserl […] soon saw that the group did not progress with him. Already when he first read on the phenomenological reduction, many did not come along. After the publication of the Ideen, Reinach and, following him, others broke away from the new developments” (Cairns 1976, 10).
- 32.
Although Husserl’s characterization has been provided above, from the Second Investigation, another take on this act concludes the book at the end of the Sixth Investigation, §66: “the peculiarity of pure ‘ideation’ [is] the adequate intuitive discerning of essences and of valid generalities lawfully grounded in essences” (Husserl 2001, Vol. II, 319, translation modified).
- 33.
Reinach 1989, 535.
- 34.
Kant 1996, 45 [B2–B3].
- 35.
Kant 1996, 49–50 [A4/B8–A5/B9].
- 36.
Kant 1996, 55–55 [B14–B18].
- 37.
Reinach 1989, 145–146.
- 38.
Reinach 1989, 543.
- 39.
Reinach 1989, 545
- 40.
Reinach 1989, 543.
- 41.
An important way in which Reinach differentiates objects from states of affairs is to refer differently to their modes of being: physical objects exist; states of affairs obtain or subsist (Reinach 1989, 118).
- 42.
I have modified Don Ferrari’s translation of characteristic 6. The original German from which Ferrari gleans characteristic 6 reads: “Indem ich die rote Rose sehe, ‘erschaue’ ich ihr Rotsein, wird es von mir ‘erkannt’. Gegenstände werden gesehen oder geschaut, Sachverhalte dagegen werden erschaut oder erkannt” (Reinach 1989, 118). Ferrari translates erschaue as “observe,” and I don’t agree with this choice. It does not capture the meaning accurately. His choice of translating erkannt as “apprehended” is acceptable but it should be noted that Reinach’s notion of apprehending as applied to states of affairs is not the same as applied to concepts. For example, to apprehend the concept ‘man’ is not the same as to apprehend the state of affairs ‘being-man’. The way intuition apprehends states of affairs differs from the way concepts are apprehended because in the former what is grasped or discerned are essential connections but in the latter it is abstract ideas. Intuition must operate differently when apprehending states of affairs because these are not necessarily static, but rather occur in connection and participation with other entities.
- 43.
The choice of preposition here – ‘participate with’ – is a deliberate one and is intended to reflect the idea that an individual thing or being is not static, but rather is engaged in essential activity: “the activity in and through which its matter was being informed” (Mitscherling 2010, 83). This should more clearly capture the sense of Aristotle’s Formal Causality and Plato’s notion of Participation. My hope is to avoid the confusion or conflation of participation with imitation, which happens when phrasing like ‘participate in’ is used – as if the essence preexisted the thing or entity. To subsist or obtain at all, essence must do so through participation. See Baltzer-Jaray (2016b).
- 44.
In a set of rough notes, Reinach writes that the form of states of affairs can be either temporal or atemporal, and it is their content or ‘matter’ that determines this. See Reinach 1989, 351.
- 45.
Reinach 1989, 144.
- 46.
Reinach 1989, 535
- 47.
Reinach 1989, 535.
- 48.
Reinach 1989, 535–536.
- 49.
Reinach 1989, 543.
- 50.
See Baltzer-Jaray 2016a.
- 51.
Reinach 1989, 144. Reinach’s denotation for the word ‘claim’ [Anspruch] is not the conventional one. It takes on a legal significance for him when it is linked to promise: it is a demand or request for something considered one’s due, a right to something as part of an oral or written contract. It is a bond formed between two parties where, “the one can demand something and the other is obliged to fulfill it or grant it. This bond shows up as consequence or product (as it were) of the promising.” (Reinach 1989, 147) Claim and obligation are causally linked when a promise is made. Once the promise is fulfilled, the claim is waived and the obligation is cancelled by being satisfied.
- 52.
Berkowitz (2010) describes Leibniz’s lifelong involvement with attempting to write a science of justice (ius): “What does it mean that ius is knowable and measurable by a science of justice? What does it mean that ius comes to be an object of scientific knowing?” are questions that preoccupied Leibniz (Berkowitz 2010, 28). The first is an epistemological question, and the second is an inquiry into the essence of ius itself. The latter is what preoccupied Leibniz, and later also Reinach.
- 53.
Reinach 1989, 146.
- 54.
Ewige: Reinach’s use of the term – which I translate literally – is unfortunate because it may imply some sort of Platonist bent to his thinking. Reinach was not a Platonist!
- 55.
Reinach 1989, 143–145.
- 56.
“Als Rechtsstudenten wies er mich auf Adolf Reinach hin. Doch fügte er bei, daß noch etwas ganz anderes benötigt sei als Reinachs Ontologie, eine Phänomenologie des Rechtsbewußtseins, von der er improvisierend ein mich damals faszinierendes Bild entwarf” (Spiegelberg 1959, 59).
- 57.
Husserl 1975, 571.
- 58.
Husserl 1975, 572.
- 59.
Spiegelberg 1994, 171–172. Spiegelberg adds that in the 1920s Husserl was also disappointed in Pfänder’s apparent disinterest in the problems of the transcendental reductions and constitution that were absorbing Husserl at the time. The distance between these two grew, and by 1931 Husserl and Pfänder stopped communicating altogether.
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Acknowledgements
I dedicate this article to the memory of Professor Dr. Fritz Wenisch (1944–2020), who sadly passed away during its preparation for print. Fritz received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Salzburg in 1968, with a dissertation on Die Objektivität der Werte, and was awarded his habilitation in 1975 for Die Philosophie und ihre Methode. He was a professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Rhode Island from 1971 until 2019. He was also highly instrumental in the inauguration of NASEP. He considered himself a phenomenological realist in the tradition of the Munich Circle, and a follower of Dietrich von Hildebrand. I dedicate this paper to him in honour of the wonderful and enlightening discussions we had about Adolf Reinach, Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, and all the other early phenomenologists we both so greatly admired. Fritz was a brilliant and generous colleague, a talented poet, and a dear friend. He will be sorely missed – but never forgotten.
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Baltzer-Jaray, K. (2021). Bogged Down in Ontologism and Realism. Reinach’s Phenomenological Realist Response to Husserl. In: Parker, R.K.B. (eds) The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_8
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