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Applications and Developments of the Lattice Attack in Side Channel Attacks

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Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops (ACNS 2020)

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Abstract

Partial key exposure attacks have become a growing threat to the cryptographic system, as the side channel attacks can usually obtain the partial information easily, which makes the partial key exposure attacks much more practical. The lattice attack is the most common method to process the partial key information to recover the secret key. In this paper, we systematically analyse the developments of the lattice attacks and its use in side channel attacks. First, we divide the lattice attack into three categories based on the lattice construction. Then we investigate the lattice attacks on each algorithms and the way different side channel data is processed by. Finally, we summary the development trend of the lattice attack in side channel attacks.

This work was supported by the Open Subject of the State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences (No. 2020-MS-08 and No. 2020-ZD-05).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Engineering, Ningxia University, Yinchuan, China

    Ziqiang Ma & Jun Yang

  2. School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University, Beijing, China

    Bingyu Li

  3. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Ziqiang Ma, Bingyu Li & Quanwei Cai

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  1. Ziqiang Ma
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  3. Quanwei Cai
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  4. Jun Yang
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Correspondence to Quanwei Cai .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

  2. University of Padua, Padua, Italy

    Mauro Conti

  3. Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

    Chuadhry Mujeeb Ahmed

  4. The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Man Ho Au

  5. ICIS, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Lejla Batina

  6. University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

    Zhou Li

  7. University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China

    Jingqiang Lin

  8. University of Padua, Padua, Italy

    Eleonora Losiouk

  9. University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA

    Bo Luo

  10. CIISE, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Suryadipta Majumdar

  11. Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark

    Weizhi Meng

  12. AppGate Inc., Bogotá, Colombia

    Martín Ochoa

  13. Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

    Stjepan Picek

  14. Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, USA

    Georgios Portokalidis

  15. City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

    Cong Wang

  16. Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong

    Kehuan Zhang

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Ma, Z., Li, B., Cai, Q., Yang, J. (2020). Applications and Developments of the Lattice Attack in Side Channel Attacks. In: Zhou, J., et al. Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops. ACNS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12418. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61638-0_24

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