Abstract
Can it make sense to speak of radical moral changes and revolutions? And if it can, is it then possible to morally evaluate radical moral changes or are they incommensurable? These are the issues debated in this chapter.
The debate contains two opposing views: one that there are historical breaks, which render before and after in every aspect incommensurable, and the other that there are no radical moral changes. It is argued that both views are untenable. Using Lear’s description of the Crow case allows for a more complex image to be drawn. In this image there is room for both meaningful evaluation of some aspects of radical changes and aspects of the change that are incommensurable.
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Notes
- 1.
As mentioned earlier, the term ‘incommensurable’ is often associated with Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts (Kuhn 1970). The term means ‘to have no common measure’. For a critique of the use of Kuhn to understand moral revolutions, see Palmer and Schagrin (1978). For a positive use, consult, for example , Baker (2019), Pleasants (2018), Kitcher (2011) or Appiah (2010).
- 2.
This position sounds like a version of strong moral realism in the tradition from Plato, but Moody-Adams criticises moral realism. She labels herself an ‘anti-relativist’ and advocates for ‘a limited critical pluralism’ (see, e.g. Moody-Adams 2002: 8, 203).
- 3.
Lear (1984: 165) makes a similar argument for the concept of ‘human flourishing’ in different societies.
- 4.
As mentioned, Lear is presenting us with a narrative inspired by historical events and is not claiming to present the historical truth about the matter (Lear 2008: 7–8). Nonetheless it can cast light on what acting well or not so well during radical changes can entail. The moral judgement here is thus on ‘possible ways of acting’, and not the Crow and the Sioux as such.
- 5.
“What if something really unheard-of happened?—If I, say, saw houses gradually turning into steam without any obvious cause; if the cattle in the fields stood on their heads and laughed and spoke comprehensible words; if trees gradually changed into men and men into trees. Now, was I right when I said before all these things happened “I know that that’s a house” etc., or simply “that’s a house” etc.?” (Wittgenstein 2016: § 513).
- 6.
I believe this way of illustrating a meaningless question, just with different questions, stems from Peter Hacker’s work, but I have not been able to locate the reference. I know for certain to have also learned it from the engaging lectures by Jørgen Husted.
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Eriksen, C. (2020). Moral Revolution. In: Moral Change. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61037-1_16
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