Abstract
This chapter examines the specific character of the market order in Bulgaria by employing theoretical tools related to research on neopatrimonialism. The central assumption is that the neopatrimonial type of political dominance shapes a hybrid social order in Bulgarian society. It involves informal rules and practices penetrating into formal institutions in all areas of public life. A core feature of this hybrid social order is institutional uncertainty, which results in low levels of institutional trust. It is claimed that under the conditions of such a neopatrimonial social order, an institutional lock-in effect is taking place which hybridises market institutions and makes them dependent on the political regime. The manifestations of market hybridisation are studied through secondary analysis of comparative data related to the ambiguity of formal market institutions and the dominance of systemic corruption as a key informal institution.
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Notes
- 1.
According to Weber, “Patrimonialism (…) tend[s] to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master” (Weber 1978: 231).
- 2.
- 3.
The other two indicators are Voice and accountability and Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (World Bank 2020).
- 4.
The CPI ranks countries in terms of their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys, on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Use of the CPI should be considered carefully as it is derived from perception-based data. Nonetheless, they have a strong impact on expectations and, correspondingly, on the decisions and behaviour of ordinary people and businesses.
- 5.
The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism of the EU was set up in 2006 to ensure the progress of judicial and anti-corruption reforms at the time of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007.
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Chavdarova, T. (2021). Institutional Uncertainty: The Hybrid Market Order in Bulgaria. In: Faghih, N., Samadi, A.H. (eds) Legal-Economic Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and Management . Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60978-8_2
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