Abstract
Federated learning (FL) is an emerging paradigm for distributed training of large-scale deep neural networks in which participants’ data remains on their own devices with only model updates being shared with a central server. However, the distributed nature of FL gives rise to new threats caused by potentially malicious participants. In this paper, we study targeted data poisoning attacks against FL systems in which a malicious subset of the participants aim to poison the global model by sending model updates derived from mislabeled data. We first demonstrate that such data poisoning attacks can cause substantial drops in classification accuracy and recall, even with a small percentage of malicious participants. We additionally show that the attacks can be targeted, i.e., they have a large negative impact only on classes that are under attack. We also study attack longevity in early/late round training, the impact of malicious participant availability, and the relationships between the two. Finally, we propose a defense strategy that can help identify malicious participants in FL to circumvent poisoning attacks, and demonstrate its effectiveness.
Keywords
- Federated learning
- Adversarial machine learning
- Label flipping
- Data poisoning
- Deep learning
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Acknowledgements
This research is partially sponsored by NSF CISE SaTC 1564097 and 2038029. The second author acknowledges an IBM PhD Fellowship Award and the support from the Enterprise AI, Systems & Solutions division led by Sandeep Gopisetty at IBM Almaden Research Center. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or other funding agencies and companies mentioned above.
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A DNN Architectures and Configuration
A DNN Architectures and Configuration
All NNs were trained using PyTorch version 1.2.0 with random weight initialization. Training and testing was completed using a NVIDIA 980 Ti GPU-accelerator. When necessary, all CUDA tensors were mapped to CPU tensors before exporting to Numpy arrays. Default drivers provided by Ubuntu 19.04 and built-in GPU support in PyTorch was used to accelerate training. Details can be found in our repository: https://github.com/git-disl/DataPoisoning_FL.
Fashion-MNIST: We do not conduct data pre-processing. We use a Convolutional Neural Network with the architecture described in Table 6. In the table, Conv = Convolutional Layer, and Batch Norm = Batch Normalization.
CIFAR-10: We conduct data pre-processing prior to training. Data is normalized with mean [0.485, 0.456, 0.406] and standard deviation [0.229, 0.224, 0.225]. Values reflect mean and standard deviation of the ImageNet dataset [13] and are commonplace, even expected when using Torchvision [25] models. We additionally perform data augmentation with random horizontal flipping, random cropping with size 32, and default padding. Our CNN is detailed in Table 5.
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Tolpegin, V., Truex, S., Gursoy, M.E., Liu, L. (2020). Data Poisoning Attacks Against Federated Learning Systems. In: Chen, L., Li, N., Liang, K., Schneider, S. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2020. ESORICS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12308. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58951-6_24
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