Abstract
In Chap. 2 we presented mathematically rigorous proofs of the conjectures (cf., [1]) concerning the behavior of the semi-public company and private firm of a semi-mixed duopoly of a homogeneous good. The main difference of this work from the classical duopoly models is in the presence of one producer who maximizes not its net profit, but the convex combination of the latter with the domestic social surplus.
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References
Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., Watada, J., Hernández-Rodríguez, D.J.: Analysis of consistent equilibria in a mixed duopoly. J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform. 18(6), 962–970 (2014)
Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., Castillo-Pérez, F.J.: Mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 210(3), 729–735 (2011)
Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., López-Ramos, F.: Consistent conjectures are optimal Cournot-Nash strategies in the meta-game. Optimization 66(12), 2007–2024 (2017)
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Flores Muñiz, J.G., Kalashnykova, N., Kalashnikov, V.V., Kreinovich, V. (2021). Conclusions and Future Research. In: Public Interest and Private Enterprize: New Developments. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58349-1_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58349-1_5
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