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Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures in the Standard Model

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Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12238))

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Abstract

A double-authentication preventing signature (DAPS) scheme is a digital signature scheme equipped with a self-enforcement mechanism. Messages consist of an address and a payload component, and a signer is penalized if she signs two messages with the same addresses but different payloads. The penalty is the disclosure of the signer’s signing key. Most of the existing DAPS schemes are proved secure in the random oracle model (ROM), while the efficient ones in the standard model only support address spaces of polynomial size.

We present DAPS schemes that are efficient, secure in the standard model under standard assumptions and support large address spaces. Our main construction builds on vector commitments (VC) and double-trapdoor chameleon hash functions (DCH). We also provide a DAPS realization from Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs that builds on a generic construction by Derler et al., which they instantiate in the ROM. The GS-based construction, while less efficient than our main one, shows that a general yet efficient instantiation of DAPS in the standard model is possible.

An interesting feature of our main construction is that it can be easily modified to guarantee security even in the most challenging setting where no trusted setup is provided. It seems to be the first construction achieving this in the standard model.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In [19] these two parts are referred as subject and message, and in  [20] as context and statement. Here we are following the terminologies from  [18].

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Acknowledgments

The first author is supported by the Programma ricerca di ateneo UNICT 2020-22 linea 2. The second author is supported by the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) through project VRG18-002. The third author is supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Project FENTEC (Grant Agreement no. 780108).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica – Università di Catania, Catania, Italy

    Dario Catalano

  2. TU Wien, Vienna, Austria

    Georg Fuchsbauer

  3. Inria de Paris, Paris, France

    Azam Soleimanian

  4. École normale supérieure, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France

    Azam Soleimanian

Authors
  1. Dario Catalano
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  2. Georg Fuchsbauer
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  3. Azam Soleimanian
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Correspondence to Azam Soleimanian .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Università degli Studi di Salerno, Fisciano, Italy

    Clemente Galdi

  2. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    Vladimir Kolesnikov

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Catalano, D., Fuchsbauer, G., Soleimanian, A. (2020). Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures in the Standard Model. In: Galdi, C., Kolesnikov, V. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12238. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_17

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