Gradual GRAM and Secure Computation for RAM Programs

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12238)


Despite the fact that the majority of applications encountered in practice today are captured more efficiently by RAM programs, the area of secure two-party computation (2PC) has seen tremendous improvement mostly when the function is represented by Boolean circuits. One of the most studied objects in this domain is garbled circuits. Analogously, garbled RAM (GRAM) provide similar security guarantees for RAM programs with applications to constant round 2PC. In this work we consider the notion of gradual GRAM which requires no memory garbling algorithm. Our approach provides several qualitative advantages over prior works due to the conceptual similarity to the analogue garbling mechanism for Boolean circuits. We next revisit the GRAM construction from [11] and improve it in two orthogonal aspects: match it directly with tree-based ORAMs and explore its consistency with gradual ORAM.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bar-Ilan UniversityRamat-GanIsrael

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