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International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

SAGT 2020: Algorithmic Game Theory pp 163–177Cite as

Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 12283))

Abstract

We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several “desirable” manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable solution, and this may be achieved by the manipulative action of reordering some agents’ preference lists. We present a comprehensive study of the computational complexity of all problems arising in this way. We find several polynomial-time solvable cases as well as NP-hard ones. For the NP-hard cases, focusing on the natural parameter “budget” (that is, the number of manipulative actions), we also perform a parameterized complexity analysis and encounter parameterized hardness results.

N. Boehmer—Supported by the DFG project MaMu (NI369/19).

K. Heeger—Supported by DFG Research Training Group 2434 “Facets of Complexity”.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Algorithmics and Computational Complexity, TU Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger & Rolf Niedermeier

Authors
  1. Niclas Boehmer
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  2. Robert Bredereck
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  3. Klaus Heeger
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  4. Rolf Niedermeier
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Niclas Boehmer .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, Augsburg University, Augsburg, Germany

    Tobias Harks

  2. Institute of Mathematics, Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Max Klimm

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Boehmer, N., Bredereck, R., Heeger, K., Niedermeier, R. (2020). Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage. In: Harks, T., Klimm, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12283. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-57979-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-57980-7

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