Abstract
After studying markets with only one firm in Chap. 1, we now turn to industries with two or more firms (oligopolies) either compete in quantities (Chap. 2) or in prices (Chap. 3). In this chapter, we assume that every firm chooses independently and simultaneously its output level, yielding an equilibrium output for each firm and an equilibrium aggregate output for the industry. Given this aggregate output, the equilibrium price is determined by the demand function entailing equilibrium profits for each firm.
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References
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Choi, PS., Dunaway, E., Munoz-Garcia, F. (2021). Simultaneous Quantity Competition. In: Industrial Organization. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57284-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57284-6_2
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