Aristotle on Perception as Representation

Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 26)


Aristotle speaks of perception as having a content that is assessable in terms of truth and falsity. Why might Aristotle have been drawn to a view of perception as representational (as opposed to presentational) in nature? That is the question I aim to address in this paper. I am inclined to think that Aristotle takes perception to be representational rather than presentational because perception sometimes involves having in mind things which are not, strictly speaking, present.


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© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Oberlin CollegeOberlinUSA

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