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What is Autonomy Anyway?

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Theories of the Self and Autonomy in Medical Ethics

Part of the book series: The International Library of Bioethics ((ILB,volume 83))

Abstract

Autonomy is an important concept for numerous disciplines. Besides philosophy, it occupies an important place in sociology, psychology, biology, computer sciences, etc. Within philosophy, the concept of autonomy is central to a range of philosophical areas such as metaphysics, ethics, social and political philosophy. And within ethics, questions regarding the nature and value of autonomy have important consequences for questions of moral responsibility and free will, in addition to a variety of concerns in practical ethics. This is why there is no unique conception of autonomy, but rather a variety of conceptions, shaped around on the concerns and questions in the field in which it is utilized.

This paper is funded by The Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, as a part of the project “Dynamic Systems in Nature and Society: Philosophical and Empirical Aspects”, no. 179041.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I thank the editors of this volume, Michael Kühler and Veselin Mitrovic, and Lucie White for their helpful comments and suggestions on the first version of this paper.

  2. 2.

    Beauchamp and Childress explicitly invoke both Kant’s deontology and Mill’s liberalism in their formulation of the principle of autonomy in the first edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, but in subsequent editions, the Kantian view of autonomy became less important than the Millian view.

  3. 3.

    For a discussion of other various contemporary conceptions of autonomy and the ways in which they differ from Kant’s conception see Hill (2013, 15–32) and Schneewind (2013, 146–169).

  4. 4.

    Nevertheless, one might point out that Kant emphasizes the autonomy of persons in speaking of our capacity to act autonomously. According to him, all finite rational beings have the capacity to give themselves a law for action, which can only be the moral law. This certainly speaks in favor of Kant’s conception of autonomy as characteristic of agents, i.e. personal autonomy. However, Kant speaks of autonomous persons in the sense only of moral, not personal autonomy. For him, persons have the capacity to act autonomously if and only if they have the capacity to act morally. Therefore, autonomous persons are only those able to take the categorical imperative as their fundamental law.

  5. 5.

    This is the reason why Onora O’Neill uses the term principled autonomy when referring to Kant’s conception of autonomy (O’Neill 2002, 85). Some other references to Kant’s conception of autonomy include terms such as will autonomy (Dan-Cohen 2002, 135) and metaphysical autonomy (Gracia 2012, 58–59).

  6. 6.

    Although Mill never uses the term “autonomy” in On Liberty, contemporary authors often use it in reviewing and explicating his position. See, for example, Donner (2008), Gray (1996) and Turner (2013).

  7. 7.

    For the phrase “first among equals” used in this context see Gillon (2003).

  8. 8.

    For more on nature and different types of coercion, persuasion and manipulation see: Faden and Beauchamp (1986, 337–368).

  9. 9.

    Discussion on adaptive preferences stems from John Elster’s work on social choice theory (Elster 1983). Besides in discussion on end-of-life decision making, the topic also has figured in the discussion of human enhancement (Räikkä and Varelius 2013) and on female oppression (Nussbaum 2001).

  10. 10.

    For a more extensive statement and defense of this way of construing autonomy see: (Beauchamp and Childress 2013).

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Correspondence to Milijana Đerić .

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Đerić, M. (2020). What is Autonomy Anyway?. In: Kühler, M., Mitrović, V.L. (eds) Theories of the Self and Autonomy in Medical Ethics. The International Library of Bioethics, vol 83. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56703-3_2

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