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The Form of Value: The Scylla of Bailey and the Charybdis of Hegel

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Fetishism and the Theory of Value

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Abstract

In this long chapter, I trace Marx’s route beyond Ricardo, as his criticisms become gradually more apparent. In Theories of Surplus Value, the break is clear; here, Marx criticises Ricardo for failing to analyse the form of value. But what exactly does this mean? To address this question, I examine the first chapter of Capital Volume I in great detail. It is particularly enlightening to analyse the revisions that Marx makes in the Second Edition. Here it is clear that he wishes to distinguish his position from that of an influential contemporary economist, Samuel Bailey who, like other economists, ‘exclusively give their attention to the quantitative aspect of the question’. But in doing so, Marx risks indulging in the sort of speculative philosophy that he had earlier criticised. A close analysis of the first, and revised, texts thus offers a valuable insight into what precisely Marx was seeking to communicate.

The whole mystery of the form of value lies hidden in this elementary form (20 yards of linen = 1 coat). Its analysis, therefore, is our real difficulty.

(Marx 1954: 55)

This is a revised version of a chapter in McNeill, D (1988), Fetishism and the Form of Value. Unpublished thesis, University of London.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I shall not attempt to trace this development in any detail. What follows here is merely an outline, based on other commentators.

  2. 2.

    Rubin makes this point in relation to economists of his era; it could also be applied to many subsequent commentators, and perhaps most especially to Neo-Ricardians.

  3. 3.

    Of course, the difficulties of translation greatly complicate the issue. These are not limited to English. See, for example, Rubin’s discussion of the Russian translation of “darstellen” (Rubin 1982: 111).

  4. 4.

    Samuel Bailey (1791–1870), British economist.

  5. 5.

    The first meaning is “magnitude of value in contradistinction to having value at all. For this reason the latter is not something absolute.”

  6. 6.

    Marx here calls it “a social substance” but retracts even this in his Marginal Notes on Wagner.

  7. 7.

    Although Rubin does credit him with influencing Marx’s reformulation of the opening chapter of Capital (Rubin 1982: 108).

  8. 8.

    In this instance, Marx was unaware that Bailey was the object of his comments, for the Observations on Certain Verbal Disputes in Political Economy, from which this extract is taken, was published anonymously—and only later identified as Bailey’s work.

  9. 9.

    Here Marx is surely inaccurate in accusing Bailey too of absolutism, when he writes:

    Thus he, the wiseacre, transforms value into something absolute, ‘a property of things’, instead of seeing in it only something relative. (Marx 1973: 130)

    Indeed he concedes as much, even when describing Bailey as a fetishist. (See below.)

  10. 10.

    This despite the fact that,

    Like all economists worth naming, … Ricardo emphasises that labour as human activity, even more, as socially determined human activity, is the sole source of value. (Marx 1973: 181)

  11. 11.

    Arthur (1978) notes the similarity between these two texts, but his interpretation of Marx’s position is rather different from my own.

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Correspondence to Desmond McNeill .

Annex: A Comparison Between the First and Second German Editions of Capital

Based on the English translation by A. Dragstedt, 1976. (Referred to in this book as Marx 1976.)

Annex: A Comparison Between the First and Second German Editions of Capital

Marx draws attention to the textual changes he has made in Capital Volume I in his Afterword to the Second German Edition; as follows:

Modification 1

In Chapter 1, Section 1, the derivation of value from an analysis of the equations by which every exchange-value is expressed has been carried out with greater scientific strictness. (Marx 1954: 22)

This refers to the argument concerning the equation of wheat (or corn) and iron. Marx asks what such an equation means, and concludes that the two must have something in common. In the First Edition he makes little attempt at proof, being confident to assert that:

Commodities as objects of use or goods are corporeally different things. Their reality as values forms, on the other hand, their unity. This unity does not arise out of nature but out of society. The common social substance which merely manifests itself differently in different use-values, is labour. (Marx 1954: 9)

In later editions he seeks to justify this assertion more fully:

This common ‘something’ cannot be … any … natural property of commodities. … If then we leave out of consideration the use-values of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labour. (Marx 1954: 45)

Further, this is not concrete labour but,

what is common to them all … human labour in the abstract. … All that these things now tell us is, that human labour-power has been expended in their production, that human labour-power is embodied in them. When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are—Values. (Marx 1954: 46)

This is therefore another example of the sort of argument by residual which is to be found elsewhere in Marx’s writings (e.g. Marx 1954: 164).

Modification 2

Likewise the connexion between the substance of value and the determination of the magnitude of value by socially necessary labour-time, which was only alluded to in the first edition, is now expressly emphasised. (Marx 1954: 22)

In this instance, Marx has added (before the words “But only the socially necessary labour-time” in the First Edition):

The labour, however, that forms the substance of value, is homogeneous human labour, expenditure of one human labour-power. The total labour-power of society, which is embodied in the sum total of all the values of all commodities produced by that society, counts here as one homogeneous mass of human labour-power, composed though it be of innumerable individual units. (Marx 1954: 46)

Modification 3

Chapter 1, Section 3 (the Form of Value), has been completely revised, a task which was made necessary by the double exposition in the first edition, if nothing else. (Marx 1954: 22)

There are a number of changes here which have to be described in detail. These will be dealt with in the order of the final and more familiar version, of the Second German Edition. (Note: In the First Edition, the first chapter was titled “The Commodity”, while the Appendix was titled “The Form of Value”. In the following summary, the abbreviation C will refer to the former, and F to the latter.) In summary, the chapter from the First German Edition titled “The Commodity” (C) lacks “The Money-form” but provides the basis for sections 1, 2 and 4 of the Second Edition (and a little of 3); while the Appendix “The Form of Value” (F) provides the basis for section 3.

Introduction

As F, with two additional paragraphs, of which the central points are:

If, however, we bear in mind that the value of commodities has a purely social reality, and that they acquire this reality only in so far as they are expressions or embodiments of one identical social substance, viz., human labour, it follows as a matter of course, that value can only manifest itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity. (Marx 1954: 54)

the task of tracing the genesis of this money-form, of developing the expression of value implied in the value-relation of commodities, from its simplest almost imperceptible outline to the dazzling money-form. (Marx 1954: 54)

A. Elementary or Accidental form of value.

20 yards linen = 1 coat

(In C this is titled “First or Simple Form”; in F, “Simple Value Form”).

  1. 1.

    The two poles of the expression of value. Relative form and Equivalent form.

    As F, somewhat reduced; nothing substantial lost.

  2. 2.

    The Relative form of value.

    1. (a)

      The nature and import of this form

      Much modified mixture of F and C.

    2. (b)

      Quantitative determination of Relative value

      As C, with minor additions.

  3. 3.

    The Equivalent form of value.

    Largely as F, but much modified and with additions.

  4. 4.

    The Elementary form of value considered as a whole

    Very much modified—but based mainly on F.

B. Total or Expanded Form of Value

20 yards linen = 1 coat or = 10 lbs. tea

(In C titled “Second or developed form of relative value”; in F, “Total or expanded value-form”).

Almost identical to F, with a few excerpts from C. For example “It becomes plain that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the magnitude of their value; but, on the contrary”.

C. The General Form of Value

1 coat, 10 lbs. tea, … = 20 yards of linen”

(In C titled “Third, reversed or reciprocal second form of relative value”; in F “Universal value-form”).

Modified version of F, with additions.

The first form … occurs practically only in the first beginning. … The second form … comes into actual existence for the first time so soon as a particular product of labour, such as cattle, is no longer exceptionally, but habitually, exchanged for various commodities. (Marx 1954: 71)

D. The Money-Form

20 yards of linen, 1 coat, 10 lbs. of tea, … = 2 ounces of gold.

(In C there is no “Money Form”. There is a Form IV—untitled—but this is different, that is 20 yards of linen = one coat or = u coffee or = v tea ….; In F there is “Money-form”).

As F.

In addition to the foregoing, the following may be noted (whether classified by Marx as part of this “complete revision” or as “partial textual changes, which were often purely stylistic”).

  • changes in, or additions to, the analogies used (especially regarding the Elementary Form of Value), for example

to borrow an illustration from chemistry. (Marx 1954: 56)

A, for instance, cannot be ‘your majesty’ to B, unless at the same time majesty in B’s eyes assumes the bodily form of A. (Marx 1954: 58)

The fact that it is value, is made manifest by its equality with the coat, just as the sheep’s nature of a Christian is shown in his resemblance to the Lamb of God. (Marx 1954: 58)

the linen itself, so soon as it comes into communication with another commodity, the coat. Only it betrays its thoughts in that language with which alone it is familiar, the language of commodities. (Marx 1954: 58)

In a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities. … Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo. (Marx 1954: 59 footnote)

  • Omissions of analogies used in the first version (although this earlier version had fewer analogies); notably two, both discussed in this chapter:

“it is as if alongside … animals ….” (C) (Marx 1976: 27)

“If I say: Roman Law and German Law ….” (F) (Marx 1976: 57)

  • addition of footnotes; frequently referring to Bailey (in addition to one reference in the main text):

The few economists, amongst whom is S. Bailey, who have occupied themselves with the analysis of the form of value, have been unable to arrive at any result. (Marx 1954: 56)

A superficial observation of this fact, namely, that in the equation of value, the equivalent figures exclusively as a simple quantity of some article, of some use-value, has misled Bailey, … into seeing, in the expression of value, merely a quantitative relation. (Marx 1954: 62)

S. Bailey … fancied that … he had proved the impossibility of any determination of the concept of value. However narrow his own views … he laid his finger on some serious defects in the Ricardian theory. (Marx 1954: 68)

The insufficiency of Ricardo’s analysis of the magnitude of value, and his analysis is by far the best. (Marx 1954: 84)

It is one of the chief failings of classical political economy that it has never succeeded … in discovering that form under which value becomes exchange-value. (Marx 1954: 85)

S. Bailey accuse(s) Ricardo of converting exchange-value from something relative into something absolute. (Marx 1954: 87)

Modification 5

The last section of the first chapter, ‘The Fetishism of Commodities, etc.’, has largely been altered. (Marx 1954: 22)

Section 4. The fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof.

Generally as C, but:

  • The order is somewhat changed.

  • Some from F is incorporated.

  • There are some additions, notably that in discussing systems other than capitalism, paragraphs on the European Middle Ages and the peasantry are added to those on Robinson Crusoe and communal production.

Note: Marx also points out that:

Chapter III, Section 1 (The Measure of Value), has been carefully revised. (Marx 1954: 22)

This, however, is of less significance for the purposes of this book.

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McNeill, D. (2021). The Form of Value: The Scylla of Bailey and the Charybdis of Hegel. In: Fetishism and the Theory of Value. Palgrave Studies in the History of Economic Thought. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56123-9_6

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