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Congress and Congressional Power

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Constitutional Landmarks

Abstract

The relationship between American law and politics is perhaps nowhere more apparent than on Capitol Hill. Given this context, here we first explore Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Next, we turn to Supreme Court decisions on three constitutional issues: (1) congressional membership, (2) privileges and immunities, and (3) the conduct of investigations. We then analyze cases pertaining to Congress’s delegation of power to the president and the executive branch, followed by an examination of the Court’s interpretation of Congress’s taxing and spending power. Finally, we look at the extent to which the Court has overruled congressional legislation over time.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Congress is given additional enforcement powers in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, each of which reads “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

  2. 2.

    Unlike other chapters, no ideology scatterplots appear in this chapter because no database is currently available on congressional power decisions by the Supreme Court over time.

  3. 3.

    The Supreme Court has reversed itself in a fairly large number of cases, most of which involve civil rights, civil liberties, and criminal procedure, but some of which are explored in this book. See, for example, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), United States v. Darby (1941), Baker v. Carr (1962), National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), Puerto Rico v. Bransted (1987), and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996).

  4. 4.

    Although a Supreme Court decision hardly ever leads to an amendment to the Constitution, Pollock was nullified by the Sixteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to lay and collect income taxes.

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Correspondence to Charles M. Lamb .

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Lamb, C.M., Neiheisel, J.R. (2021). Congress and Congressional Power. In: Constitutional Landmarks. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55575-7_3

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