Abstract
This paper aims to discuss ridicule (to geloion) in Plato. Often neglected in modern accounts of emotions, ridicule is in fact considered a pathos (affect) by Plato and extensively deployed in his dialogues. I will analyse ridicule from a descriptive, a normative, and a “practical” perspective, paying attention to how Plato understands its basic functioning, how he thinks that it should be regulated, and how he uses it in his dialogues. More generally, this paper will be an opportunity to explore some issues related to the “pathe of the dialogue”, by which I mean both the emotions that are staged through the characters of Platonic fiction and the emotions which Plato aimed to elicit in his audience.
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Notes
- 1.
Relying on thymos’s concept, Renaut suggests an account of emotions as mediators. Thymos, a word hard to translate, is considered by Renaut the seat of moral emotions such as anger.
- 2.
As Konstan (2006) has underlined, the term pathos still has in Plato a wide range of meanings and may refer to a more extended notion than our concept of emotion. In particular, it can encompass pain, pleasure and appetites. See Konstan (2006, 144–145) for the different meanings of the word in Plato’s dialogues.
- 3.
I will discuss later on the issues that the translations of this word raise.
- 4.
In this homeric passage the term for anger is cholos, which refers to the physical symptoms of this pathos. In the Philebus Socrates speaks of thymos and orge.
- 5.
According to Renaut (2014), this discussion on emotions is fundamental not only in order to refine Plato’s treatment of tragedy, but also because these lines state the central role of thymos (the emotional element) in interpersonal relationships.
- 6.
As Ben-Ze’ev (2014) has clearly outlined, the emotional events are determined by different kinds of comparison. For instance, we can compare our current situation to a previous as well as an ideal one, but we can also compare our condition to that of others.
- 7.
Van de Ven (2014) has proved through empirical research that malicious envy should be considered an antecedent for Schadenfreude. In his opinion, Schadenfreude has a positive function since it may be interpreted as a signal for stopping envy, a very costly emotion in terms of cognitive and physical resources.
- 8.
- 9.
Ben-Ze’ev (2014) considers that the passivity of who is pleased at other’s misfortunes is the main difference between Schadenfreude and sadistic behaviour, which on the contrary demands an active role of the person experiencing the pleasure.
- 10.
Also Fussi 2017, but she has in mind and recalls the Philebus.
- 11.
According to Fussi (2016, 16–17), there are some cases in which we express hyperbolically our envy. She gives the example of someone who expresses envy towards a colleague announcing a forthcoming trip to Egypt. The “envious” person will verbally express her envy, but Fussi states that this cannot be considered a case of true envy. However, this example easily matches with Thomason’s account of envy. What is here expressed by the “envious” person is the value she places on holiday and the fact that she considers it worthwhile.
- 12.
I follow here Kidd (2019, 85–86), who clearly states that Socrates draws a distinction between the actual envy and the sort of envy which arises when watching a comedy.
- 13.
Following Saetta Cottone (2005), I have modified Lamb’s translation, who translates geloios as absurd and katagelastos as ridiculous.
- 14.
For a review of these studies see Di Stefano (2017).
- 15.
- 16.
One may consider the emotional dimension of aporia, which gets both the interlocutor and the reader dazed.
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Di Stefano, M. (2021). The pathos of Ridicule (to geloion) in Plato’s Dialogues. In: Giacomoni, P., Valentini, N., Dellantonio, S. (eds) The Dark Side: Philosophical Reflections on the “Negative Emotions”. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55123-0_4
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