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Socrates and Emerson on Areté

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Abstract

Socrates’ early dialogues end in aporia. Interlocutors walk away perplexed or ashamed of what the dialogue has brought to daylight, that is, their ignorance about their basic beliefs. But Socrates was after something far more fundamental. He saw aporia as a prelude to a search for areté, commonly translated as “virtue” or “excellence.” There are at least two narratives on the impacts of the Socratic method on his interlocutors. The first group argues that aporia is a precondition for realizing the urgency of the care for the self by searching for true knowledge. Advocates of the second narrative are concerned that embracing philosophia requires more than just an acknowledgment of aporia. For even if the interlocutor admits that she is unable to defend her position or sees that her account is untenable, the move toward philosophia is not guaranteed. Embracing philosophical life or desire for wisdom requires something else besides or beyond the acknowledgment of inconsistency in one’s argument or aporia. If the arguments of the second group withstand scrutiny, then I suggest that the Socratic project can be supplemented with what I call the Emersonian method of enquiry, one that aims at a fundamental areté, which is as important a precondition as Socratic aporia for the life of philosophy.

“And how am I to persuade you, if you aren’t persuaded by what I said just now? What more can I do? Am I to take the argumentand pour it into your soul?”

The Republic, 345b

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this chapter, I’ll be referring to the word “soul” a few times, by which I am simply referring to the Greek psuchē, or psyche. The term does not imply any particular metaphysical dualism between the soul and the body. In D. S. Hutchinson’s translation, psuchē refers to “that which moves itself” or “the cause of vital processes in living creatures” (Cooper and Hutchinson 1997: 1678); cf. Nussbaum 1994: 13.

  2. 2.

    Karl Joël, Geschichte der antiken Philosophie (1921); quoted from Guthrie (1971: III: 138).

  3. 3.

    Neque enim qua ero intelligere ut credam; sed credo ut intelligam.” St. Anselm, Proslogion [1078] § 1.34, in Logan 2009: 32.

  4. 4.

    Italics in the original. See also Kosman 2007: 120.

  5. 5.

    As John Cooper puts it, this kind of knowledge is “a conception of the soul which cannot be dislodged by reasoning.” Cooper 1997: 1683.

  6. 6.

    It is also important to note that in his middle dialogues, especially in Gorgias and Meno , Socrates moves towards a more positive argument about knowledge. For example, in Meno Socrates introduces the idea of “recollection” as the source of knowledge. Cf. Meno 81b–86d.

  7. 7.

    If curious, it’s from Nature (EL, 19).

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Hosseini, R. (2021). Socrates and Emerson on Areté. In: Emerson's Literary Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54979-4_2

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