Abstract
The text argues that the classicists were the first institutionalists which revealed the role of formal and informal institutions (market, property, money) for gaining wealth. Only a great crisis forces one to realize how much he has to lose by neglecting them. The architecture of the classical institutional arrangement underlines the role of education, “the sense of duty and the respect of human dignity”. The text argues about the responsibility of the state regarding the “art of government” and the proper functioning of the “economic machine”. If only the classicists would be periodically read, the vaccine against “that great fiction, through which everybody endeavours to live at the expense of everybody else” would be readily available (Bastiat 2007, p. 99). The state is condemned to be a “costly intermediary” and its role as a universal milking cow is incompatible with sustainability.
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Pohoaţă, I., Diaconaşu, D.E., Crupenschi, V.M. (2020). Institutionalism Drawn Upon Founding and Sustainable Roots. In: The Sustainable Development Theory: A Critical Approach, Volume 1. Palgrave Studies in Sustainability, Environment and Macroeconomics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54847-6_3
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