Abstract
The purpose of this work is to bring into more explicit contact the theory of commons as developed by Elinor Ostrom and collaborators with the theory of order as developed by Friedrich A. von Hayek. We do so by shifting emphasis from analyzing different types of goods in terms of their intrinsic properties, to goods being analyzed in terms of how the intrinsic properties lead to extrinsic consequences in terms of different governance solutions. Our preliminary considerations suggest that Ostrom and Hayek are complementary when it comes to considering governance solutions. Ostrom’s rules for the management of the commons complement Hayek’s distinction between orders with abstract and specific rules. Governance is about differences in kinds of rules as much as it is about degrees of rules.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baggio, J. A., Barnett, A. J., Perez-Ibarra, I., Brady, U., Ratajczyk, E., Rollins, N. D., Rubiños, C., et al. (2016). Explaining Success and failure in the commons: The configural nature of Ostrom’s Institutional Design Principles. International Journal of the Commons, 10(2), 417–439.
Bryman A., & Bell, E. (2015). Business research methods (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1–14.
Buchanan, J. M. (1982). Order defined in the process of its emergence. Available at: https://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/LtrLbrty/bryRF.html?chapter_num=1#book-reader. Last access on May 10, 2020.
Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Villamayor-Tomas, S. (2010). A review of design principles for community-based natural resource management. Ecology and Society, 15(4), Article 38.
Fischel, W. A. (2001). Municipal corporations, homeowners and the benefit view of the property tax. In W. E. Oates (ed.), Property taxation and local government finance: Essays in honor of C. Lowell Harriss (pp. 33–77). Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Frischmann, B. M. (2013). Two enduring lessons from Elinor Ostrom. Journal of Institutional Economics, 9(4), 387–406.
Frischmann, B. M., Marciano, A., & Ramello, G. B. (2019). Retrospectives. Tragedy of the commons after 50 years. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4), 211–228.
Garzarelli, G. (2004). Old and new theories of fiscal federalism, organizational design problems, and Tiebout. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 22(1–2), 91–104.
Garzarelli, G. (2006). Cognition, incentives and public governance: Laboratory federalism from the organizational viewpoint. Public Finance Review, 34(3), 235–257.
Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk Savvy: How to make good decisions. New York: Viking.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1994). Neither market nor state: Governance of common-pool resources in the twenty-first century. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1–22.
Radford, R. A. (1945). The economic organization of a P.O.W. Camp. Economica, 12(48), 189–201.
Schlager, E. (2016). Introducing the importance of context, scale, and interdependencies in understanding and applying Ostrom’s design principles for successful governance of the commons. International Journal of the Commons, 10(2), 405–416.
Smith, V. (2003). Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. American Economic Review, 93(3), 465–508.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 36(4), 387–389.
Skarbeck, D. (2014). The social order of the underworld. How prison gangs govern the American Penal System. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416–424.
Villamayor-Tomas, S., Thiel, A., Amblard, L., Zikos, D., & Blanco, E. (2019). Diagnosing the role of the state for local collective action: Types of action situations and policy instruments. Environmental Science & Policy, 97, 44–57.
Hayek, F. A. von (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530.
Hayek, F. A. von (2013). Law, legislation and liberty. A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. London: Routledge (First published in three books in 1973, 1976, 1979).
Whitman, D. G. (2009). The rules of abstraction. Review of Austrian Economics, 22(1), 21–41.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Galli, E., Garzarelli, G. (2020). From Goods to Orders and Rules of Governance: A Preliminary Exploration. In: Macrì, E., Morea, V., Trimarchi, M. (eds) Cultural Commons and Urban Dynamics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54418-8_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54418-8_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-54417-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-54418-8
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)