Overview of National Sociotechnical Imaginaries

Abstract

In this Chapter, we give an overview of national STI imaginaries by country. We provide information on policy structure and policy culture, and other aspects of national discourses and practices that are relevant to our study.

1 Australia

Characteristic of the Australian STI imaginary is that its science and innovation systems are relatively separate. There is the political ambition to move the innovation system towards a ‘systems of innovation’ model to strengthen the economy, but there is a lack of effective intermediaries, and of incentives for actors in the STI system to collaborate. Particular to this imaginary is attention to the inclusion of marginalised groups to increase their welfare and economic productivity. The STI system seems to be aligned with the ‘science for society’ model and an accompanying ‘deficit model’ of science communication. However, it is pushed in the direction of the ‘systems of innovation’ model by policy-makers intent on increasing public–private collaborations, and in the direction of the ‘RRI model’, because of attention to inclusion of marginalised groups and a realisation of the challenges this offers for non-localised research. These different directions are not necessarily in tension, as inclusion is also considered important in the innovation system.

Another characteristic of the Australian STI imaginary is the reason for public distrust in science. While many nations struggle with this phenomenon, the reason given in various national reports is scientific contributions to controversial technologies, such as nuclear energy or GMOs. The Australia report (Sehic and Ashworth 2018) claims that it is rather because of scientific contributions to an economy based on the resource-intensive sectors of industrial agriculture and mineral extraction, in a country characterised by water scarcity and fragile ecosystems. Here, it is thus not so much the technologies themselves, but the fit of the technologies with the local environment that generates controversy. The history of this imaginary seems to be similar to that of many Western countries: after the Second World War, spurred on by scientists championing scientific autonomy, Australia adopted the ‘linear model.’ However, fundamental science never became as important as in e.g. the US, and Australia’s government was quick to transition to the ‘science for society’ model to address societal and economic challenges. Finally, while the Australia report identifies involvement in resource-intensive sectors of the economy as a reason for current distrust in science, Gascoigne and Metcalfe (2017) suggest that it initially arose because of science moving out of the direct experience of many Australians (i.e. developing agriculture) into areas that were less visible in Australians’ daily lives, such as computing and aeronautics.

Concerning STI policy goals, Australia adopted its overarching National Innovation Science Agenda (NISA) in 2015. It consists of four pillars, Culture and Capital, Collaboration, Talent and Skills and Government as an exemplar, all to drive innovation for jobs and growth (Australia report, p. 21). These priorities reflect current barriers to public–private collaborations, such as the lack of skilled personnel (including but not limited to technical skills). Other barriers are that researchers tend to have little interest in (and typically are not rewarded for) collaborations with industry, and that there is a lack of effective intermediaries. The NISA is thus trying to change the role of universities in society, orienting them more towards societal value. While economic value is a strong component of this, there is an ongoing discussion on the need to better include the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, and to stimulate multidisciplinary research (ibid., pp. 16–17). One source of friction regarding STI policy goals is that because Australia is hot, dry and an island, protection of the environment and natural resources, particularly water, is considered highly important. At the same time, Australia’s economy is built on the resource-intensive STI-dependent sectors of agriculture and extraction of mineral resources. Those sectors compete to some degree, and agricultural intensification has led to loss of rural livelihoods, leading to loss of trust in the STI system that has supported those developments (ibid., pp. 75–76).

Concerning the framing of responsibilities of researchers, with the NISA this has increasingly moved from doing fundamental science to creating value for society, particularly economic value through public–private collaborations. One challenge for this is that researchers are expected to keep to the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, while this code is not well adopted by the private sector with which researchers are supposed to cooperate. The Australia report also mentions that despite the long-term, overarching nature of the NISA, its operationalisation is often piecemeal and based on short-term political goals. One concern that researchers have raised is that long-term fundamental research might in the end lead to innovations with much higher societal value than applied research and innovation with quick impacts. However, a recent investment in fundamental research has included the Responsible Innovation Initiative, to apply RRI principles to this research, which suggests that a focus on RRI does not imply a focus on applied research only (Ashworth et al. 2019, pp. 335–336).

Concerning the administrative style of STI governance, responsibility for the STI system is pluralistic and distributed between various departments and agencies, with research institutions enjoying relative autonomy (Australia report, pp. 19, 22). On a national political level, the Australian Parliament is influenced by that of the UK, and party politics tends to be a competition between two major parties.

Public participation in STI activities has traditionally been about creating awareness and understanding of (the importance of) science to create public support. Another goal of participation has been ‘fostering the public’s ability to critically assess the credibility of scientific information’ (ibid., p. 26). One challenge here is distrust in science, witnessed by falling participation rates in science courses and political polarization of scientific topics, particularly climate change (ibid., pp. 26–27). Then again, societal engagement in research and citizen science initiatives are on the rise due to increasing interactions between universities and external partners, as well as between different scientific disciplines, stimulated amongst others by the NISA. Another cultural factor that stimulates participation is a political focus on inclusion. As the Australia report states, ‘Australia is often classified as an immigrant and multi-cultural nation where diversity and inclusion have provided the backbone for international linkages, both economically and socially, and this has naturally diffused into most aspects of the Australian way of life’ (ibid., p. 34). Inclusion in politics is often conceptualized through the idea of sustainable growth: helping marginalized groups to improve their welfare and their economic productivity at the same time.

In research, participation is typically about getting researchers not only to focus on politicians and decision-makers, but also on culturally, socially and linguistically diverse communities. However, this is not without its challenges. The geographical vastness of Australia and its cultural diversity creates difficulties for centralized policy-making and for non-localized research to have local added value (ibid., pp. 26–28). The ‘gross under-representation of women and Indigenous Australians in science’ also counts as a barrier here (ibid., p. 28).

On the fit of the Australian STI imaginary with the ‘RRI model’, NISA has created an opportunity for Australian research to become more oriented towards societal value, that is kept open amongst others through discussions on the role of the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, and on the importance of multidisciplinarity. However, without clarity on how exactly it will be operationalised, there is the risk of it unreflexively orienting research towards cooperation with the private sector and economic value creation. Another factor that might create an opening for RRI is public unrest regarding the environmental crisis and distrust in STI for its contribution to agricultural intensification and the extractive industries. These offer incentives to politicians and scientists to involve the public more intensively in STI governance. However, one risk is the contentious political culture that could lead to polarization and a focus on winning debates and votes rather than listening and striving for consensus.

Finally, opportunities for RRI lie in the decentralisation of responsibilities and the acknowledged importance of inclusion and diversity in its science and innovation systems.

2 Brazil

Brazil’s national STI imaginary is shaped from five intersecting dynamics. First, there remains the pervasive adoption of the linear model of science policy, adhered to by scientific elites seeking to retain institutional autonomy in the face of political pressures and interference, and by a drive to improve excellence and prestige in science, particularly in international rankings. Second, there remains the strong endorsement of a systems of innovation model, particularly strong in the industrial South-East and in powerful funding bodies like FAPESP, seeking to use science in a strategic manner for economic growth and competitiveness. Third, there is a wider imaginary of national pride and self-sufficiency, including a marked ambivalence and resistance to the imposition of foreign ideas framed as colonial impositions and of taking advantage. Fourth, there is the problem of weak institutions, including government ministries and funding bodies, who prove unable to pursue and carry out long-term strategic investment. In this context, the funder FAPESP is an exception, with relatively constant and long-term funding written into its constitution. Fifth, there is the problem of the many Brazils, with very high indices of racial, social and regional inequality.

Brazil’s national STI imaginary developed its policy goals broadly in three phases. Brazil’s STI system is relatively young compared to industrialized countries, with its first modern university dating from the 1930s, and it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that more relevant investments were made to build scientific capacity and achieve greater technological independence, especially through the national security doctrines of the military dictatorship post–1964. Its first phase can be identified in the period of Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985), where significant investment in science and technology was aimed at producing technological independence, national security and the development of the interior, including the Amazon. This period was characterised by an economic boom: the ‘Brazilian Miracle’.

Brazil’s second phase follows democratisation in 1985 and lasts up until the end of Dilma’s PT government in 2016. It is associated first with neoliberal reforms in the economy and, soon after, a focus on innovation for growth, on improving public–private collaborations, and developing the innovation capacity of private companies. These goals were only partially successful at either stimulating growth, or in developing better synergy between the provision of public funding and the market, or in increasing private R&D funding, not least due to macroeconomic instabilities, the political turmoil in Brazil, and excessive bureaucracy associated with policy regulations (Brazil report, Reyes-Galindo and Monteiro 2018, p. 23). Core documents on STI policy are the ‘National Conferences on Science, Technology and Innovation’ ‘books’ carried out after nation-wide stakeholder R&D exercises, leading to comprehensive national policy white-papers produced more or less every presidential cycle’ (Brazil report, p. 14). During this period, STI policy has been aligned with more general political goals of several progressive governments, including the reduction of inequalities and the sustainable use of natural resources.

Brazil’s third phase is from mid–2014 onwards and has been shaped by a rapidly changing external environment characterised by a deep and long-lasting recession, a series of major and systemic political corruption scandals, and a political shift to the right and more conservative political priorities. The recession and the political shift have led to drastic cuts in public STI funding, leading to heated and ongoing debates about the future of science in Brazil (ibid.)

In Brazil’s STI imaginary, in its latest and ongoing iteration, the framing of the responsibilities of scientists occurs against this backdrop of drastic funding cuts and political instability. The Brazilian Academy of Sciences acknowledges ‘quality of life’ as an important concern of science, but configures the priority of societal challenges as secondary to ‘the advance of knowledge’ and ‘economic development.’ Societal challenges are thus rarely viewed as entwined with fundamental science or innovation for growth, but rather as a separate topic to be addressed by the social sciences (Brazil report, p. 24). This separation of issues can also be seen in the framing of responsibilities of the private sector, which has a narrow focus on creating jobs and economic growth (Brazil report authors, personal communication).

For scientists, an important responsibility lies in maintaining their autonomy, a traditional and long-standing frame that has been given topical relevance in the face of recent attempts aimed at political interventions and undemocratic influences. While in some cases this insistence on autonomy can be seen as a lack of responsiveness towards societal concerns, in Brazil rather the reverse is true: scientists and institutions wish to remain autonomous to avoid being captured by undemocratic forces in society. This creates a tension with the RRI ideal of making science more open and responsive to society (Brazil report, p. 4). For example, some institutions have resisted gender and diversity policies on the grounds that adopting criteria other than ‘academic excellence’ is outside their scope (ibid., pp. 74–77). Finally, Brazil’s framing of the responsibility of scientists is shaped by its relation to Europe and North America. Ideologically seen, because of its colonial history, Brazil is reluctant to uncritically adopt European research policy frameworks such as the European Commission’s framing of RRI, not least because it is not perceived as sensitive to Brazilian needs. For example, while the European Commission has designated ‘gender’ as an RRI key, considerations of racial and socio-economic inequality are seen as arguably more important for Brazil, yet have not received any special attention (Brazil report, p. 38).

The administrative style of Brazil’s STI system is bureaucratic and top-down, which has long been recognised as a barrier to technological investment (ibid., p. 23). This has also been a barrier for discussing and implementing RRI: for example, in the RRI-Practice project, approaching relevant parties had to be done either through personal contacts or through the top management, and by the PI of the Brazil team rather than by the junior researcher.

The role of public participation in Brazil’s STI imaginary is limited, in line with its top-down administrative style and an institutional desire for autonomy. Non-scientific stakeholders have traditionally had little involvement with STI policy development, in line with the ‘science for society’ model. Nevertheless, there are exceptions: crises such as the Zika outbreak, for example, have brought scientists and societal stakeholders together (ibid., pp. 27–28). Moreover, in Brazil, there has been a tradition of a contentious style of public participation in STI matters through public protests and activism. Brazil is an ethnically very diverse country, due to its rich history, colonialism and trans-Atlantic slave trade, and a traditional openness to immigration. This diversity is accompanied by severe racial, social and regional inequalities (ibid., p. 13) which, in turn, has fuelled civil rights and gender equality activism that takes inspiration from similar movements in the US. With the recent political shift to the right, the (modest) progress made in the preceding years towards more inclusive and participatory policies is expected to be halted or even reversed. Thus, activism will likely remain the major channel of public participation for now. Paradoxically, in this situation the relative autonomy of universities can act as a driver as well as a barrier for inclusion. One the one hand, it has led to the reluctance of universities to engage with politicized issues such as inequalities. On the other hand, it can make existing affirmative actions within the universities more resilient against shifting political trends (ibid., p. 31).

On the fit of RRI with the Brazilian STI imaginary, Macnaghten et al. (2014) have written that RRI is ‘a Northern political artefact’ (p. 193). This means that it makes assumptions concerning the social and political order that might not fit with Brazilian reality, such as regarding which socio-economic inequalities should be addressed explicitly. It also means that uncritically applying the concept to the Brazilian context could constitute and be represented as an act of intellectual neo-colonisation. This means that for RRI to make a meaningful contribution to the Brazilian STI system, the concept needs to not only be translated to the Brazilian context, but to be enacted (and owned) by actors within that system.

In this context, the strong adherence of Brazilian academia to autonomy offers both opportunities and challenges to RRI. On the one hand, its (partly historically justified) reluctance to let outsiders take part in the research process makes the adaptation of RRI dimensions such as anticipation, inclusion and reflexivity difficult. Co-creating solutions with societal actors has been done during times of crisis, however, and in specific cases such as UNICAMP’s University Hospital (Brazil report, p. 37). On the other hand, academic autonomy can also be beneficial for those aspects of RRI that are strongly related to a progressive political agenda, especially in the current conservative political climate. This particularly holds for inclusion and gender. That insistence on autonomy is a double-edged sword is also argued by Monteiro (2020), who notes that in the current political climate, it may not be sufficient anymore to protect universities from powerful conservative political actors. Monteiro rather contends that in arguing for autonomy, universities need to rethink their responsibilities in how they respond to societal demands.

The top-down, hierarchical administrative style of the Brazilian public sector also influences RRI uptake, posing a significant challenge for dimensions that thrive on deliberation and interaction, such as inclusion and reflexivity. For the RRI keys, if higher management is convinced of their value, they can be relatively quickly implemented in Brazilian institutions by dirigiste injunction. However, without top-down authorisation, the room for experimentation and for alternative practices is limited. Similarly, while national policies can be effective in creating change in the STI system, the lack of a national policy on relevant issues can be a barrier (e.g. ibid., pp. 29–30). Finally, though deliberative and participatory exercises are not widely spread, grassroots movements, civil rights and gender activism all influence institutional policies on RRI-related topics. And though Brazil would be reluctant to adopt EC policy goals, its scientists are both aware of and sensitive to relevant developments in the international scientific community (ibid., pp. 38–39). Thus, this combination of bottom-up pressure and top-down standards of good practice can be an incentive for institutional change.

3 Bulgaria

The Bulgarian STI imaginary is formed by three forces that are all to some degree in tension with each other. The first is the relative autonomy of research institutions and their orientation towards the global research system. The second is the development of Bulgaria’s market economy to be more competitive and innovative following a ‘systems of innovation’ model. In this Bulgaria shows a strong orientation towards Europe, even if its lack of competitiveness on the European market has had negative effects, particularly regarding the migration of young Bulgarians to more competitive economies. The third is a movement towards the ‘RRI model’ to increase public trust in science and thus generate legitimacy. Historically seen, a turning point in Bulgaria’s STI imaginary is the fall of the Communist regime in 1989 (Bulgaria report, Damianova et al. 2018, p. 14). This marked the beginning of a difficult transition to a market economy, with related mass emigrations. For the STI system, this has resulted in chronic underfunding, with a relatively low percentage of Bulgaria’s GDP going to R&D.

Concerning STI policy goals, where Western countries have a strong focus on maintaining or improving economic competitiveness, Bulgarian STI policy is rather concerned with building up competitiveness. One important aspect of this, which of all project reports is most prominent in the Bulgarian one, is avoiding the negative effects of being not as competitive as its Western European counterparts, such as the aforementioned ‘brain drain’ of young Bulgarians. (Bulgaria report, pp. 14–17). Regarding more specific STI policy goals, the National Strategy for Development of Scientific Research in Bulgaria 2017–2030 mentions raising its international authority in science, but also increasing the responsibility of Bulgarian science towards society and vice versa. Furthermore, the Strategy aims to change the reward structure of researchers, moving from impact factors and citations more towards social impact indicators. However, policy-makers lack a uniform vision on how to implement this, so that this is mostly left to the discretion of research organisations and individual researchers. Chronic underfunding of and distrust in the research system remain problematic (ibid., pp. 18–21).

Concerning the framing of the responsibilities of researchers, there is no unified code of conduct for the Bulgarian research system to explicitly frame them. However, responsibility itself has been mentioned as a concept to legitimize institutional policies, expand professional responsibilities of researchers, and overcome mistrust by engaging society more actively in research (ibid., p. 20). As said, however, operationalising and implementing these responsibilities is left mostly to organisations and individual researchers.

Concerning Bulgaria’s administrative style, responsibility for STI is divided between the Ministry of Education and Science (science) and the Ministry of Economy (innovation). In line with the earlier observation regarding operationalisation and implementation of responsibilities, the report notes that: ‘overall, the structure of the public universities and research institutes is decentralized, thus allowing the organisations to act autonomously’ (ibid., p. 15). Furthermore, one challenge to maintaining and operationalising a stable, long-term STI imaginary is that ministers of Education and Science tend to hold office for only a short time (on average less than two years over the past two decades). Therefore, those ministers tend to look for quick wins and usually do not take a longer-term perspective (ibid., pp. 26–27).

Concerning public participation, the Bulgaria report mentions that public participation is widely regarded as something that should be facilitated and encouraged. Not so much to create ‘better’ research, but to secure public trust in science and to generate legitimacy for STI policy. Participatory exercises are (still) uncommon, and there is scepticism whether ‘the public’ is knowledgeable enough to engage in a meaningful dialogue with scientists or policy-makers. However, the National Strategy for the Development of Scientific Research has set a positive precedent (ibid., pp. 22–23). Similarly, Bulgaria’s innovation strategy, the Innovation Strategy for Smart Specialisation (IS3) has involved consultations with key stakeholders (ibid., pp. 14–17).

Concerning the fit of the Bulgarian STI imaginary with the ‘RRI model’, the national report does identify a number of opportunities for Bulgaria to move into an RRI direction. Concerns about low economic competitiveness and youth migration (including young scientists), and especially about public distrust of the STI system and a perceived lack of legitimacy, all create opportunities for a more collaborative and deliberative reform of the STI system. And indeed, participation and consultation of stakeholders has played a role in recent science and innovation policies, even though they have been developed by different ministries. However, there are challenges in the combination of decentralised governance, quick succession of ministers and the chronic underfunding of the STI system: these factors raise the question whether policy ideals will indeed be translated into more reflexive and inclusive institutional practices, or whether Bulgaria’s research conducting organisations will mostly keep following more stable and established ‘global’ indicators of scientific quality such as impact factors and citations.

4 China

RRI in China has to be contextualized through its interaction with an STI imaginary that emphasizes contributions to economic development and the socialist society as defined by the Chinese Communist Party. The unique characteristics of the Chinese STI imaginary indicate both potential for adoption but also reinterpretation of RRI in the Chinese context. On the one hand, the Chinese STI imaginary converges with RRI in its strong emphasis on the applied and societal orientation of research at the expense of ideals of value-freedom and neutrality of science. On the other hand, the Chinese STI imaginary contrasts with deliberative and participatory traditions of RRI in emphasizing the centralized power of the Chinese Communist Party in defining societal goals and ensuring compliance through tight control of the STI system.

The Chinese STI imaginary has evolved through changing policy goals in three phases. All three phases can be located in a Chinese governance tradition of emphasizing applied science in the service of society while shifting priorities of societal contribution (Guo and Ludwig forthcoming). While the first phase builds on “Dialectics of Nature” (Engels 1883/1925) as an alternative to bourgeois science in the service of communist society, the second phase (“Reform and Opening-Up” policy of Deng Xiaoping (1978–2012)) expands beyond communist science by focusing on the contribution of the Chinese STI system in developing a successful market economy. The ‘New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ under Xi Jinping (2012–) continues to focus on economic development while also increasingly emphasizing the need to control science in ensuring its contribution to socialist society and Chinese values. As the China report (Zhao et al. 2018) notes, current emphasis on both economic growth and societal contribution can create tensions: ‘On the one hand, the pursuit is towards the socialist ideal of national development, common prosperity, social harmony and improved quality of life; on the other, it focuses on the philosophy of the market economy, featuring individual achievements and fair competition. These two aspects stand in conflict yet have common grounds, such as the pursuit of economic development (China report, pp. 11–13).

RRI converges with the policy goals for Chinese science through its emphasis on societal contribution and therefore creates a fruitful ground for exchange between Chinese and Western perspectives on the governance of science. At the same time, RRI creates clear tensions with the administrative style of STI governance in China that is focused on tight control and censorship by the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese STI system is structured by the centralized power of the party and government not only in the control but also in the definition of societal goals and values. As the report puts it: “Core socialist values are the soul of the Chinese nation and serve as the guide for building socialism with Chinese characteristics […] We should promote prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony, uphold freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law and advocate patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship, so as to cultivate and observe core socialist values’ (Hu 2012, p. 13).”

While convergence in societal orientation creates opportunities for dialogue between RRI and the Chinese STI imaginary, divergence in administrative styles indicates friction that makes adoption of frameworks in deliberative and participatory traditions such as AIRR (Stilgoe et al. 2013) unlikely and raises wider questions about responsible governance of science in contexts “where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted” (Wong 2016, p. 154). As mentioned, RRI is part of the 13th Five-Year National Science and Technology Innovation Plan (2016–2020). Chapter 7, article 24 (Creating A Social and Cultural Atmosphere for Encouraging Innovation) mentions: “promoting responsible research and innovation, strengthening research ethics, enhancing research ethics education, raising science and technology personnel’s awareness of scientific research ethics, and guiding enterprises to pay attention to and undertake social responsibility for protecting ecology and ensuring safety in technological innovation activities.” (China report, p. 15). What complicates interpreting these policy priorities is that there are no clear and easy equivalents of Western concepts (and their associated intellectual history) of ‘responsibility’ and ‘ethics’ in Mandarin (ibid., pp. 14–16). For example, in policy documents ethics is more widely used as ‘adherence to moral norms’, but those norms are not explicated in those documents. Also, they seem to refer more to Confucianist norms for the appropriate social and family relations than to Western-style rules for resolving the value conflicts that innovations can give rise to. An exception is norms in the biomedical field, which is quite strongly regulated (ibid., pp. 12; 15–17).

An important recent framing of the role of STI in China is the ‘Chinese Dream.’ Formulated by president Xi Jinping in 2012, it envisions science and technology (as well as institutional reform) to rejuvenate the Chinese nation by increasing productivity, facilitating global cooperation and meeting people’s needs. Concerns regarding societal and ethical aspects of technologies are often framed in terms of risk management, to be addressed by the Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development (CASTED) (ibid., pp. 15, 47–48). This, in addition to the strong emphasis of RRI in China on research integrity, implies that the responsibility of scientists is so far primarily seen as for doing good science.

On the fit of RRI with the Chinese STI imaginary, Gao et al. (2019) argue that there are certainly various entry points for RRI into ‘a quickly developing country in the midst of a complicated transformation’ (abstract). Those include the change of focus from economic to sustainable development, driven by increasing environmental problems and social inequalities; the continued importance of science education/communication and experiments with more interactive models; and criticism of ethical research regulations that are often more quick fixes than clear and structural norms.

However, the adoption of RRI in the Chinese STI governance system is by no means guaranteed. Its explicit incorporation in the 13th Five-Year Plan is a case in point: Gao et al. (2019) point out that it’s currently a slogan without much clarity on its implementation. Worse, Mei et al. (2020) argue that the formulation stresses the responsibility of individual researchers (and enterprises) to behave in an ethically responsible way, where RRI should be about structural transformation of STI systems to make them more open and inclusive. The meaning and institutional function of RRI in China is therefore still in the making. On the one hand, RRI could function as a mediator between Chinese and European STI imaginaries that share an orientation towards societal goals while facilitating conversations about thorny issues such as deliberation and participation in the Chinese context. On the other hand, “RRI with Chinese Characteristics” may take a shape that is very different from dominant European framings in emphasizing compliance with socialist society and Chinese values as defined by the centralized power of party and government.

5 France

France’s STI imaginary seems to align strongly with the ‘science for society’ model. In public policy, the emphasis is very much on autonomous experts addressing societal needs, and innovation policy for economic goals is relatively detached from science policy. As in other countries studied in the RRI-Practice project, the ‘science for society’ model has so far not been able to decisively address public distrust. Much like in other Western European countries, this distrust arose in the 1970s in response to controversial technological developments, in France’s case, particularly its nuclear energy strategy. What does stand out in the France report (Grinbaum et al. 2018) is that this public distrust has, amongst others, resulted in protest groups disrupting participative exercises, which they perceived as window-dressing.

Prominent STI policy goals in France are excellence and freedom of research, in line with France’s rationalist and humanist tradition. More recent policy documents stress the importance of making science intelligible for citizens to restore trust, as a response to controversies on scientific expertise in realms such as GMOs, nuclear power and nanotechnology (France report, pp. 13–14). The goal of restoring trust, together with a suggestion of an underlying ‘deficit model’, is also present in a 2017 Assemblée Nationale resolution, which states that science is ‘a common good which widens cultural perspectives of all citizens looking for a better understanding of the world’ (ibid., p. 14).

Concerning the framing of the responsibilities of researchers, ‘responsibility’ is often mentioned in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), sustainable development and UN ‘universal’ values. In addition, there have been debates on the societal responsibility of researchers, which have touched upon improving social wellbeing, but also on resistance against those who threaten it, e.g. by advancing independence and general over specific interests. RRI as a concept is being investigated more and more because of the abundant French participation in EC projects. However, there are concerns that this focus on societal responsibility and public engagement might lead to a loss of research autonomy (ibid., pp. 16–18, 34–35).

The administrative style in the STI system is relatively top-down and formal, with policy prescriptions providing not only general goals, but also their operationalisations. The France report authors mentioned about this that for organisations to implement a measure, they would like to see either its added value for the organisation, or the legal document that would oblige them to do so (personal communication). While this provides research institutes with clear and specific instructions, it can come at the cost of flexibility and responsiveness.

This brings us to public participation in France’s STI imaginary. French STI policy documents ‘constantly highlight’ the importance of public engagement and citizen science (ibid., p. 22). However, in line with the ‘science for society model’ and the ‘deficit model’, debates tend to be framed (by both scientists and the public) as between ‘experts’ and ‘lay persons’. In several instances societal groups have even stopped or perturbed societal debates that they perceived as mere window-dressing, so that they could not take place. Various institutions have instigated public engagement missions or pilot projects to circumvent the limitations of a societal debate, La Paillasse having become an international exemplar as a biotechnology lab accessible to the public and open to experimentation and alternative visions of technology (ibid., pp. 22–25). Art & science initiatives and NGO-developed initiatives have also proven to be effective and powerful tools for engagement (ibid., pp. 71–73).

Regarding the fit of France’s STI imaginary with RRI, the French imaginary is mostly aligned with the ‘science for society model’, but also perceives a need to restore trust in science. While activism in response to scientific and technological developments has been signalled in other reports (e.g. Brazil, the US), only the French report signals a structural disruption of participation exercises that are being perceived as window-dressing. Responses can be found in official STI policy, that stresses the importance of making science intelligible, and how science is a common good for all citizens. However, these mostly seem to perpetuate the ‘science for society model’ and the ‘deficit model.’ France’s formal administrative style helps to offer clear prescriptions on how to operationalise these responses, but at the same time, risks precluding responsiveness and creativity. In practice there are also participation experiments more aligned with the ‘RRI model’, such as La Paillasse’s open laboratories, and art & science initiatives.

6 Germany

Typical about the German STI imaginary is a strong focus on sustainability (Nachhaltigkeit). This concept, already used in Germany in the eighteenth century with respect to forest management (Grober 2009), was successfully brought into the political mainstream by social and environmental groups in the 1970s and 1980s. This happened during broader debates about the legitimacy of science, fuelled by concerns about controversial technologies such as nuclear power and later genetic engineering (Germany report, Hahn et al. 2018, p. 20). The sustainability concept covers not only environmental concerns, but also responsibilities of scientists towards society and the future.

The dominant role of sustainability in the German STI imaginary allows for different interpretations. On the one hand, the Germany report suggests that RRI are largely redundant as the RRI dimensions are already covered by the sustainability concept. Moreover, this concept is already well-established, operationalised, and connects to global debates and concerns such as the Sustainable Development Goals (ibid., pp. 18–19). On the other hand, there are also differences in RRI and sustainability discourses that point towards particular characteristics of how responsibility is organised in the German STI imaginary. For example, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) illustrate how sustainability discourses tend to emphasize outputs such as “no poverty” (SDG1), “affordable and clean energy” (SDG7), or “life on land” (SDG15) while RRI tends to be more focused on how such outputs are negotiated through anticipatory, inclusive, reflexive, and responsive processes.

Anticipation is the most clearly articulated RRI dimension in the German STI imaginary. While one dominant framing in science regulation is that of ‘risk assessment’, particularly with regards to health and the environment, anticipation activities are also undertaken by the social sciences and the German Parliament’s Office of Technology Assessment, which has been active for over 25 years (ibid., p. 25). Moreover, while in many of the studied countries national ethics committees mostly focus on new developments in the life sciences, in Germany national ethics committees have been set up to work on new technological developments such as the phase-out of nuclear energy and autonomous driving. Thus, narrow framings of anticipation in terms of risks are complemented by institutionalised mechanisms to consider other social and ethical aspects of innovations.

Another defining characteristic of the German STI imaginary is its focus on democracy and participation. Democratic values are core to the German constitution, drawn up shortly after the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945. Like the sustainability concept, the mainstreaming of participation in STI took off in the 1970s as a result of social and environmental activism. Especially in the 1990s scientists began to open up to the public through technology assessment exercises and citizen science. Participation is also present in current German science policy and in the sense of responsibility of many researchers towards society. This is exemplified by Germany’s 2014 High-Tech-Strategy, ‘the main document to lead public research and innovation’ (ibid., p. 15). Its main aims are maintaining Germany’s global competitiveness, dealing with global challenges and securing future well-being. However, it places clear demands on the processes needed to achieve those aims: they should take into account social as well as technological innovations, achieve social benefit, engage civil society in innovation processes, and be transparent (ibid., p. 16).

The aspects of sustainability and participation in the German STI imaginary work through framings of how scientists perceive their responsibilities. This is in terms of the need to communicate and interact with society, to align scientific and societal aims, besides in terms of responsible conduct of research (ibid., p. 17). However, it is unclear what the actual impact of participation on decision-making or agenda-setting is; and research organisations ‘tend to coordinate their research programmes directly with policy makers as elected representatives, without involving other representatives of civil society’ (ibid., p. 21).

Germany is (together with France) a prominent country in our study on scoring high on economic indicators, but that showing little concerns about science policy being used to disproportionately advance economic rather than societal goals. The authors of their reports have suggested that this is because French and German research institutes and industry operate relatively autonomously (France/Germany report authors, personal communication).

While the concept of RRI thus seems to find little traction in Germany, many of its contents are already advanced by the well-entrenched sustainability concept. The sustainability concept most clearly converges with the dimension of anticipation in RRI through the shared goal of creating responsible futures through risk assessment and wider considerations of social-environmental impact. At the same time, the sustainability focus of the German STI imaginary diverges from RRI in being less concerned with procedural guidance of how to negotiate those futures. While Germany has strong participatory traditions, it also continues to highlight institutional autonomy and freedom of research that tend to give actors such as universities or states considerable procedural independence in how they approach socially negotiated sustainability goals. The sustainability focus of the German STI imaginary does therefore not lead to a full congruence with dominant framings of RRI but also highlights different cultures of organising social responsibility within the European context.

7 India

The Indian STI imaginary aligns with the ‘science for society’ model and has been very stable since India’s independence in 1947. It originates in the vision of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who saw STI as ‘vehicles for national development and social transformation’ that would help in building an independent postcolonial state (India report, Srinivas et al. 2018, p. 9; cf. Chakraborty and Giuffredi 2019). The national development aspect is not only economic, but also social, and generally organised in a centralised, top-down way. Likewise, the social transformation aspect is about inclusion and access. One of the reasons for the stability of the Indian STI imaginary seems to be that, unlike other national reports, the India report does not signal significant public distrust in or contestation of science. While there has been contestation around infrastructural projects, or access and inclusion aspects of new technologies, these tend to be aimed at political choices regarding the implementation of technologies, rather than at the system that has designed and developed those technologies.

Concerning STI policy goals, the currently most important policy document is the 2013 S&T and Innovation Policy that aims for sustainable and inclusive growth and public engagement through science and technology. However, critics have argued that this policy is too technocratic and relying on experts. Moreover, ‘the Policy has not been followed up with any strategy. Hence it is difficult to assess as to whether the objectives have been met and if so to what extent’ (ibid., p. 12). This lack of overall strategy has created a void filled by lower-lev el policies: sectoral visions; science academies’ visions; State Councils on S&T; and increasingly ambitions of private sector actors (ibid., pp. 12–13). While RRI does not explicitly appear in Indian science policy, in 2017 Prime Minister Modi issued a call for Scientific Social Responsibility in Indian science institutions, in line with the existing concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, to connect all stakeholders and share ideas and resources (ibid., p. 21). However, while this concept could signal a move towards the ‘RRI model’, it is not clear (yet) how it would be operationalised.

Concerning the framing of the responsibilities of researchers, contributing to socio-economic development has traditionally been more important than science for the sake of science (ibid., p. 21). However, scientists are presumed to be able to autonomously identify and address the needs of society in line with the ‘science for society’ model. The public is seen as lacking the capacity to engage with scientists and policy-makers, and in need of scientific education, in line with the ‘deficit model’ of science communication (ibid., pp. 26–28). The combination of socio-economic policy goals, deference to scientific experts and a relatively top-down governance style has led to ‘STI’, much like the notion of ‘development’, being regarded as so undeniably good that critical voices have been muted.

Concerning the administrative style of India’s STI governance, India’s central government has law-making and regulatory powers over STI and a top-down governance style. Its vision on science governance is technocratic, expert-driven and very stable over time (ibid., pp. 12–13). As the report notes, ‘in all the science departments [of the federal government], the Secretaries are technocrats or scientists and it has been the practice since the 1950s’ (ibid., p. 14). Because of the abovementioned factors, ‘Public engagement in theory and practice is yet to be considered important in research and innovation’ (ibid., p. 19) and there is a subsequent lack of procedures or guidelines for public engagement. While in several other countries public controversies have led to more engagement with the public in STI development and governance, this is less evident in the India report. For example, it claims that most political parties share the same STI imaginary. Nuclear energy has by and large not spurred controversies. And GM controversies are more about seed pricing and environmental effects than about the technology itself. Thus, STI projects are generally not scrutinised in the same way as the infrastructural and industrial projects sometimes have (ibid., p. 19).

Concerning the fit of the Indian context with the ‘RRI model’, the Indian STI imaginary shares RRI’s orientation at meeting societal needs, and the idea that researchers have responsibilities towards society, not just for doing good science. However, when it comes to the means, both are very different. Where the ‘RRI model’ emphasises inclusion and public engagement, the Indian STI imaginary, in line with the ‘science for society model’, lets scientists discharge their responsibility through top-down, technocratic research and policy-making, sometimes demanding sacrifices from citizens in the name of the public good. While there have been policy initiatives to promote public engagement, these are often not operationalised or translated into specific strategies. In this context, the India report authors have indicated that RRI has been valuable to them particularly by opening up a space for reflexive discussions between stakeholders that would not normally engage in conversation on the topic of STI governance (personal communication).

8 Italy

Typical of Italy’s STI imaginary is that there are few connections between its science and innovation systems. Its innovation system is partly decentralised, making room for diversification and experimentation, occasionally moving from a ‘systems of innovation’ model into an ‘RRI model’. Centralised governance of the S&T system tends to follow the ‘science for society’ model, with an emphasis on economic goals and supporting Italy’s manufacturing and export-oriented industries, but also with a clear role for researchers as experts who work for and inform the public. Historically seen, from the Second World War onwards the Italy STI imaginary followed a similar pattern to other Western European countries, starting with reconstruction and modernisation of the STI system, transitioning in the 1960s and 1970s into a ‘science for society’ model for the STI system and a ‘systems of innovation’ model for the innovation system. This transition was heavily contested in the STI system by researchers fearing for the autonomy and integrity of science, according to Pancaldi (1980).

In the past decades, Italian STI policy has taken steps towards decentralization: it used to be the responsibility of the national government, but in 2001, it was shared between national and regional governments. However, in recent years, regulation and control of higher education has been centralised again. This centralisation is particularly visible in the set-up of the independent public body ANVUR, which is responsible for evaluations of and setting up parameters for the distribution of public funds among higher education institutions, amongst others (Italy report, Neresini and Arnaldi 2018, p. 10). While Italy has universities and research centres comparable to most other nations, particular to Italy are the foundations, institutions ‘to coalesce local public and private partners around research and technology transfer ventures’ (ibid., p. 11). These can be funded by the (regional) government, but also by savings banks. The latter are required by law to invest their profits in projects and investments to benefit local and regional communities.

For Italy’s innovation system, decentralisation has led to diversification and some regional governments adopting RRI or similar frameworks for their innovation policy, affecting both public and private sector innovation. The clearest example is Lombardy, which explicitly promotes RRI in the form of open science, social innovations that meet social needs, and an advisory board to the regional government of experts in STI-society relations (ibid., p. 18). The latter is considered especially important by Arnaldi and Neresini (2019): they argue that much private-sector innovation in Italy takes place in SMEs that often struggle to survive in a competitive market environment. These SMEs don’t have the resources to do RRI themselves and need intermediaries to support them to incorporate RRI into their operations.

Among Italy’s STI policy goals, economic growth is prominent. At the same time, there are political concerns about potential negative consequences of innovation, particularly regarding automation. According to 2014 Eurobarometer research, job creation and health are also considered priorities for STI by the Italian public (Italy report, p. 12).

Concerning the framing of responsibilities of researchers, ANVUR is a powerful actor as it determines the criteria by which higher education institutions are evaluated. These include what it calls the ‘Third Mission’, which involves creating value from research (valorizzazione) and producing public goods. In this framing, creating value is thus a task separate from research and teaching activities, and also subservient to them. Moreover, the choice of indicators (such as patents obtained and spin-offs generated) reflects a focus on commercialisation more than on the creation of public goods. Finally, unlike research and teaching, the Third Mission is framed as a responsibility of research organisations rather than individual researchers, and thus also evaluated on an organisational rather than an individual level. (ibid., pp. 21–22).

Concerning Italy’s administrative style of STI governance, as written before, the decentralisation of STI policy has created spaces for RRI initiative such as Lombardy’s RRI-oriented innovation policy. At the same time, the evaluation of higher education institutions has been centralised in ANVUR. While this centralisation could in theory facilitate the Third Mission across Italy, the abovementioned factors show that the Third Mission does not (yet) share RRI’s more transformative aims. Moreover, ‘the risk of bureaucratization is high’ (ibid., p. 23).

Concerning public participation in STI, the Third Mission does promote this under the heading of ‘creating public goods.’ The emphasis of the Third Mission is on commercialisation of knowledge and the continuation of existing practices that would more appropriately be labelled ‘science communication’ according to the ‘deficit model.’ This fits the general trend in the imaginary of scientists being cast as experts, according to the ‘science for society’ model. Nevertheless, it could provide an opportunity for research institutions to reflect on what ‘public goods’ they create for society, and how (ibid., pp. 22–23). In addition, public participation manifests itself in the expression of public concerns, such as regarding the disruptive effects of digitisation and automation (ibid., p. 77). Or in full-blown public controversies that challenge the ‘science for society’ model, of which the most recent one was on a 2017 law mandating infant vaccination. This debate proceeded in an adversarial, contentious way, displaying a widespread distrust in experts, industry and regulators who were in favour of the law, and little inclusive interaction or consensus-seeking (ibid., 12–14).

Concerning the prospects of RRI in Italy, while the Third Mission does have potential to further RRI at research institutes, the way it has been designed now promotes commercialisation and knowledge transfer over more inclusive and reflexive research. Moreover, it focuses on the institutional level, leaving the practices of individual researchers largely untouched. Thus, so far, the ‘science for society’ model and the ‘deficit model’ of science communication seem dominant in institutional organisations and researcher practices. Nevertheless, the vaccination debate has exposed a distrust in experts and government, that in theory could provide a motivation for experimenting with more responsive public engagement activities. One unique feature of the Italy report is its identification of the industry sector as promoting some of the most promising initiatives in RRI in the country. Where reports of countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and the US expose concerns of over-reliance on private sector STI activities to achieve public goals, the Italy report notes that some of the most promising RRI activities are taking place in the private sector. Examples are the work of the foundations that bring public and private partners together and Lombardy’s regional innovation policy that promotes open science, social innovations and societal engagement.

9 The Netherlands

The Netherlands’ STI system imaginary is an unusual combination between the ‘systems of innovation’ and ‘RRI models’. While science and innovation policies are strongly linked in order to achieve economic goals (and have been criticised for that), participation and consensus are important parts of Dutch culture, opening up space for the discussion of societal concerns in policy-making. Historically, Dutch science policy after the Second World War was in line with the ‘linear model’, with the addition that it was intended to train skilled personnel for industry as much as to do fundamental research. Rising costs and involvement in OECD science policy, which emphasised the societal importance of science, led to an (explicit) shift in policy in 1974 from ‘science for truth’ to ‘science in the service of humanity’, or from the ‘linear model’ to the ‘science for society model’. For some time, Dutch innovation policy was separate from science policy, but these were increasingly merged around the turn of the millennium, with a focus on economic goals. This merger was accompanied by an increasing transition in innovation policy from the ‘linear model’ to a ‘systems of innovation’ model. In 2015 science policy turned back towards societal goals with the National Science Agenda (Harkema 2017).

Concerning STI policy goals, the Netherlands’ STI system imaginary has a strong international and economic orientation. The 2025 Vision for Science from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science aims to ‘further strengthen the “worldwide significance” of Dutch science in terms of its quality and productivity’ (MECS 2014, 11; from Netherlands report, van der Molen et al. 2018, p. 20). Innovation policy has aimed to realise this by the creation of the Top Sector approach, that promotes public–private R&D collaborations in sectors of the economy that the Netherlands has traditionally been good at, such as Agri&Food and Chemistry. The Netherlands is one of the few countries were RRI has explicitly been incorporated in the STI system: the Dutch research funder NWO has had an RRI programme (called maatschappelijk verantwoord innoveren, or MVI) since 2008. This programme builds on earlier programmes that stimulated reflection on societal and ethical aspects of research and innovation. However, since 2016 it has been fully linked to the Top Sector programme and requires co-funding by private partners (Netherlands report, pp. 81–82). Thus, the RRI funding programme is considered partly the (financial) responsibility of the private sector, and it is also used as a way to boost innovation for economic purposes.

Concerning the Netherlands’ framing of the responsibilities of scientists, this focus on productivity and economic value is also visible there, though after the responsibility to do good science. A key term used in Dutch science policy is valorization, which means utilising knowledge for solving societal problems and creating economic value (Netherlands report, p. 20). With regards to societal goals, solving societal challenges such as the Sustainable Development Goals is one envisioned role of science. With regards to economic goals, both national welfare and international competitiveness are stressed. This strong economic orientation has been criticised by several actors in the Dutch academic system, such as the Science in Transition network (van der Molen et al. 2019). Their counter-imaginary envisions more attention to social rather than economic value creation, and a university based on democratic governance, trust and more versatile assessment criteria of research, rather than one that is bureaucratic, hierarchical and obsessed with producing publications (ibid., p. 19). Thus, this critical response does not focus on returning to the autonomy of science in line with the ‘linear model’ (Bush 1945), but on trust, democracy and societal goals. This is not to say that these are totally lacking in the Dutch context: trust and collaboration have been named as factors that have enabled the Dutch STI system to be relatively efficient and effective. Moreover, there is evidence that the Dutch STI system is moving in the direction of the ‘RRI model’, for example through the consideration of broader research assessment criteria (Netherlands report, pp. 20–21).

Concerning the Netherlands’ administrative style, a major part of the Netherlands STI imaginary is its focus on participation and consensus in decision-making, known as the Dutch ‘Polder model’. The story is that the model originated in the Middle Ages, when management of Dutch waterways—much of the Netherlands is below sea level—required the participation of all. Though this story may be more myth than actual history, the Polder model itself can be seen in Dutch politics, as well as throughout the Dutch STI system. Concerning Dutch politics, the system of proportional representation in the Dutch government enables many parties to enter parliament. Because of this, the government can only effectively be formed by coalitions of different parties. However, government prefers its policies to have broad public support (draagvlak). Hence it often engages in consensus-oriented deliberative exercises with experts and societal actors to feed into policy (Netherlands report, p. 18).

Concerning public participation in the STI system, public engagement is a ‘key objective in Dutch science and innovation policies’ (ibid., p. 23). One example of this is the National Research Agenda, an agenda for research endorsed by a broad coalition of organisations and drawn up by public consultation. Together, the Top Sectors and the National Research Agenda are currently the most important frameworks for prioritising research funding (ibid., pp. 20–21). A number of factors have been mentioned to facilitate the Polder model of participation in research, such as the Dutch’ tendency to freely speak their minds, and the Dutch having high trust in each other (ibid., pp. 18–21; OECD 2016). Moreover, while the RRI funding programme has been used as a way to boost innovation for economic goals, RRI is by no means only instrumentalised: more and more interactive and participatory notions of research are rising to prominence, e.g. through living labs and citizen science (Netherlands report, pp. 23–24). These two parts of the Netherlands STI imaginary, the economic orientation and the importance of participation, seem to be tied together by the assumption that participation and consensus will best serve productivity and competitiveness, which in turn will help to solve societal problems.

Concerning the fit of the Netherlands STI imaginary with the ‘RRI model’, the imaginary is still linked strongly to the ‘systems of innovation’ model, due to the interlinkages between science and innovation policy, and the orientation towards economic goals of the latter. Yet the National Research agenda suggests a shift towards the ‘RRI model’, one that is facilitated by a number of factors, such as the Netherlands’ administrative style of participation and consensus, the importance of public engagement in science and innovation policies, and RRI-compatible counter-imaginaries by actors within the Dutch academic system. The tension between both models remains, however, and this is likely to affect the form and degree of uptake of further RRI ideas.

10 Norway

Norway’s STI system imaginary has in recent years moved from a ‘science for society’ to an ‘RRI’ model, which fits well with its small, networked, collaboration-based economy. However, this move has exposed two tensions. The first is with Norway’s ideal of excellent science and corresponding institutional evaluation systems, that compete for time and effort with RRI activities. The second is with Norway’s separation of science and innovation systems, which has led to the criticism that societal and especially business actors are not sufficiently involved in innovation, even as initiatives are undertaken to involve them more in science. After the Second World War, inspired by Bush (1945) and a desire to modernise industry and defence capabilities, Norway adopted the ‘linear model’. From the 1950s and onwards a comparatively large institute sector of independent research institutes was developed to work (but also compete) with universities and industry. However, where the motivation in other countries was to stimulate the economy, in Norway this was less of a priority, as Norway’s economy has traditionally run on resource (petroleum) extraction. Here, rather, the motivation was to better meet societal needs. Because of this focus on societal needs, the ‘systems of innovation’ model in Norway seems to have been largely overlapping with the ‘science for society’ model (Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2009). Changes in more recent years are described in the ‘framing’ section.

Concerning STI policy goals, the main objectives of current Norwegian research policy are: ‘To strengthen competitiveness and innovation capacity; to solve major challenges to society; and to develop high-quality research groups’ (Norway report, Egeland et al. 2018, p. 12). Research policy in Norway is historically fragmented due to the sector principle. This principle was developed due to Norway having a relatively small STI system, which means that it has traditionally focused its research on a few sectors relevant to its society and economy, rather than doing research ‘across the board.’ The sector principle means that ‘each ministry has the responsibility for policy development and long-term knowledge development in their respective areas’ (ibid., p. 11). One consequence of this is that research policy has been developed much further than, and apart from, innovation policy. There is thus no integrated STI imaginary, and sectors such as healthcare have complained that Norwegian research policy is not aligned sufficiently with the needs of Norwegian businesses, even though some sectors might have more cooperation than others (Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2009; Norway report, pp. 12–13). One specific policy challenge for Norway is that traditionally, much of Norway’s wealth has come from exploiting its oil reserves. Consequently, much of its research has been focused on supporting the petroleum sector. This makes it particularly challenging for Norway to map a new direction for its research and innovation system for after the oil age (ibid.).

Concerning the framing of the responsibilities of scientists, the Norway report distinguishes three major relevant policy developments from 2000 onwards. Throughout all of these, excellent science remains an important constant. Policy from 2000–2008 was primarily aimed at ‘competence and knowledge building, emphasizing new and emerging technologies as a tool for value growth and establishing new areas of scientific excellence’ (ibid., p. 15). The ‘deficit model’ was implicit in this policy, which emphasised responsibility for good research practices, and involvement of the public being limited to ‘dissemination’ and ‘informing.’ In 2008–2012, global societal challenges came to the fore and remained there, alongside the continued excellence agenda. The period 2012–2015 saw an increased focus on values important for RRI such as transparency, interdisciplinarity and, in some S&T areas, deliberative practices. The Research Council of Norway (RCN) seeks to put these policy trends to practice through certain funding schemes (ibid., pp. 15–16). RCN explicitly endorses Responsible Research and Innovation, though Åm (2019) has cautioned that without corresponding institutional opportunities and incentives, appeals to individual researchers to do RRI will lead to accommodation rather than proper enactment.

Typical for Norway’s administrative style is that it has a ‘small, networked, collaboration-based economy’ (Norway report, p. 13). As many actors in the research system know and trust each other, coordination within the system tends to happen through informal, dialogical communication (ibid., p. 14), just as much as through formal governance and steering. Like the Netherlands, the collaborative and networked nature of the economy has been suggested to be responsible for the relative efficiency of Norway’s STI system, though the report acknowledges other possible explanations (ibid., p. 13).

Concerning public participation, Norway has since 1999 had a Parliamentary Technology Assessment Board that extensively use public participation models. However, public participation is seldom well-operationalized or rewarded within research conducting organisations. More recently there has been increased interest for citizen sciences approaches, triggered by Norwegian and European funding mechanisms.

On the fit of Norway’s STI imaginary with RRI, an area of overlap is the administrative style, which generally involves collaboration and dialogue, and might also be responsible for its relatively efficient innovation system. The strength of the Norwegian social science and humanities community is also a factor that could help to further RRI aspects, such as anticipation and reflexivity. Policy framings of responsibilities of scientists are also quite in line with RRI suggestions, though these aren’t necessarily translated (yet) into institutional incentives or opportunities, due to policy and institutional priorities given to excellent science and its accompanying metrics. Finally, the transition towards the post-oil age and an increased focus on sustainability requires a rethinking of the focus of Norwegian STI and this is increasingly reframing the responsibilities of scientists. However, it remains to be seen whether this will create opportunities to rethink the role of public participation. There is also a risk in this transition: science and innovation could historically work towards societal goals as the economy was fuelled by resource extraction. If Norway’s economy is becoming less oil fuelled, this could well give rise to tensions between economic and societal goals, as can e.g. be seen in the Netherlands and UK reports.

11 The United Kingdom

The UK’s STI imaginary has been built out of the following intersecting elements: a proud tradition of excellence and autonomy in basic science and discovery, a set of world-leading elite universities configured around the London–Cambridge–Oxford golden triangle, a long-standing culture of deference towards science and expertise, the rise of a pro-market STI policy regime aimed at stimulating economic growth through strategic investment, a growing emphasis on a ‘triple helix’ of government–industry–university relations and on the entrepreneurial university, and a residual tension between a ‘systems of innovation’ model aimed at improving productivity and growth and a ‘science for society’ model aimed purposely at societal challenges.

One salient aspect about the UK’s STI imaginary is that the goal of STI policy has been strongly focused on the economy and market governance. This imaginary developed through four intersecting phases. First, following the Second World War, STI policy followed very much the linear model that privileged discovery and the pursuit of pure knowledge with the assumption that these would lead to application and societal benefit. Following the end of the war, science was held in high regard, having played a formative role in the war effort. This status was reinforced by the belief that science was objective and impartial, upheld by adherence to the Mertonian norms, and reflective broadly of the principles of modern liberal democracy (UK report, Pansera and Owen 2018, p. 19). Up until the 1970s, STI policy was informed by Keynesian ideas on an interventionist economy, aimed at producing and supporting ‘national champions’ with control over strategic industries to advance the interests of the nation. This frame portrayed innovation policy as providing incentives to tackle market failures through government funding of basic research, subsidising R&D and strengthening Intellectual Property Regimes (IPR).

From the 1960s, the ‘national champions’ framing started to fade, and two policy frames began to run in parallel. The first derived from the Thatcher-era of neoliberalisation and market governance of government research funding, with has been retained up until the current period. Second, ‘this was accompanied by more pluralistic views giving greater emphasis to learning processes, collaboration and cooperation that eventually crystallised in the notion of Innovation Systems at the end of the 1990s’ (ibid, p. 15). This latter move shifted the focus from technology to innovation, and then to systems of innovation, with the aim of encouraging linkages between universities and business, and aimed at driving the public sector into a major driver of innovation, productivity and economic growth. This model remains a strong driver of STI policy goals, with the UK report reporting that ‘the current dominant political narrative is one where research and innovation are aimed at national competitiveness, economic growth and increasing national productivity through a technological innovation systems paradigm’ (UK report, p. 5). This is witnessed by the titles of STI policy reports. such as the 2014 Our plan for growth: science and innovation, or the new Industrial Strategy that envisions a strong interaction between science, industry and society for a more productive economy that ‘works for everyone’ (ibid., pp. 17–18). This preoccupation with the economy is spurred by factors such as a stagnating economy, an ageing population (ibid., p. 12), a flat productivity and economic uncertainties due to the Brexit (ibid., p. 79).

These final frames have been challenged, mostly by academics, and from the 1980s onwards, who have developed counter-imaginaries arguing that innovation should be much more oriented at societal rather than economic challenges; and that its governing framework should move from collaborative innovation systems through one focused on transformative change (Schot and Steinmueller 2018). The crucial difference is that the hegemonic imaginary focuses on increasing the rate of innovation, while the counter-imaginary focuses on which direction innovation should take. This counter-imaginary overlaps with the RRI imaginary and fits the RRI AIRR dimensions, even if RRI focuses more on the process (and the dimensions of inclusion and responsiveness), and transformative change focuses more on its goals (and the dimensions of anticipation and reflexivity). However, so far these counter-imaginaries have not structurally changed the UK’s STI imaginary (ibid., pp. 15–18).

This focus on productivity and growth is also visible in framings of the responsibilities of scientists in the UK, that follow those of the OECD. Closely linked to the phasing of the policy goals set out above, the dominant imaginary of responsibility in science has shifted from internalist considerations of research integrity and the endorsement of Mertonian norms, to considerations of the risk and safety implications of research and innovation, to responsibilities to disseminate and aid in the public understanding of science, to more dialogic and two-way forms of communication that involve both listening and including citizens in the research and innovation process.

The role of public participation in the UK’s STI imaginary is similarly shaped by the demands of its economic goals and market governance. After the Second World War, researchers were more or less autonomous and largely unaccountable to the public. The state was responsible for science education. After the 1960s, however, neoliberalisation and societal controversies such as the BSE crisis led to calls for accountability and a focus on societal goals (the ‘science for society’ model). The result was that scientists were encouraged to address societal goals, to demonstrate impact and to engage in science communication and education of the unknowing public (the ‘deficit model’ of science communication). Scientists remained largely autonomously responsible for the research process.

Further work by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) challenged the deficit model, suggesting that trust and a meaningful dialogue with scientists were more relevant to positively influence the public attitude to science. A 2000 House of Lords report titled Science and Society endorsed this and stimulated more upstream engagement and participatory activities to that end. Several public engagement initiatives were started, such as the National Coordinating Centre for Public Engagement. Moreover, ‘more direct and deliberative forms of democracy and public participation’ have been foregrounded by modern information technology (UK report, p. 23). Responses among the scientific community were mixed: some see this as an additional burden and responsibility, but recognise the social ‘license to operate’ that these developments provide. The Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) is a driver for RRI in this context: it has explicitly institutionalised the concept and its dimensions (as the AREA framework) in its funding calls and Centres for Doctoral Training (ibid., p. 11).

Nevertheless, despite the existence of transdisciplinary and public engagement initiatives in the spirit of RRI, the dominant model of public participation in the UK’s STI imaginary is the triple helix model of university–industry–government relations. While this model urges scientists to engage with a limited set of stakeholders (namely public servants and private parties, on who they are increasingly reliant for funding), it is rooted in the ‘systems of innovation’ model and its rationale of growth and increased productivity, rather than in the ‘science for society’ model and its rationale of addressing societal goals, as it ‘privileges certain stakeholders, interests and ways of producing knowledge’ (ibid., p. 23).

Finally, the administrative style of the UK’s STI imaginary is not explicitly mentioned in the report, but Jasanoff (2005) identifies it as an informal involvement of experts who are consulted by policy-makers if the need arises. This fits with the dominant role of policy-makers in goal-setting for the STI system that is apparent from the report, as well as with the expert-driven governance that was historically dominant in the system, and still is in the triple helix model. Moreover, STI governance is relatively decentralised: autonomy is considered an important value for research institutions, particularly universities, which explains the resistance to calls for public engagement. (Calls for industry engagement do not provoke so much resistance, as ‘industry represents an important, and growing source of income for research in an era, particularly since 2008, where public research funding in the UK has flatlined, and declined in real terms.’ (UK report, p. 23).)

To conclude, despite RRI having a firm foothold in the EPSRC, and public engagement activities and calls for accountability being a recurring policy theme, the UK’s STI imaginary is currently not particularly conducive to RRI. Its strong focus on economic growth and productivity, coupled with uncertainties about Brexit and conservative political priorities, tends to eclipse more societal goals. Moreover, the triple helix model seems to function as a ‘lightning rod’ for calls for public engagement: it enables policy-makers to claim that societal goals are being addressed and that societal stakeholders are being included in research, but in a way that is aligned with and subservient to the goals and framings of the dominant STI imaginary rather than to those of RRI.

12 The United States of America (US)

The US has been the subject of a number of studies on sociotechnical imaginaries, such as biotechnology (Jasanoff 2005) and nuclear energy (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). In that sense, this section can serve not only as a documentation of a national STI imaginary, but also as (part of) a replication study. The US STI imaginary is characterised by three strong and interlocking components. The first is a focus on excellent research institutions, a heritage of the ‘linear model’, which has informed US science policy-making for decades. No other country in the world spends as much on R&D in absolute terms as the US, and it is home to many prestigious universities and generates a significant amount of often-cited publications (US report, Doezema and Guston 2018, p. 8). The second component, also a heritage of the ‘linear model’, is a reliance on market governance of STI, with a minimal guiding role of the government as risk assessor. The third component is a contentious civic epistemology, where epistemic or value conflicts are ‘won’ or ‘lost’ in either a court of law or by political majority.

While these components have been relatively stable, historically seen, two developments are relevant to note here. The first is an increasing push for researchers to be more attentive to societal and especially market demands. A crucial enabler here has been the 1980 Bayh Dole Act, which incentivises commercialisation of publicly funded research (US report, pp. 13–14). Rather than moving towards a ‘systems of innovation’ model, which would involve government interventions to make research institutions collaborate with industry, in line with the ‘linear model’ the emphasis is on strengthening the connection between the lab and the market and to remove ‘regulatory barriers’ (ibid.). The second and more recent development, that is in tension with the first, is an increasing politicisation of the STI system; for example, the Obama administration supported public engagement to make government, including public research, more transparent, participatory and collaborative (ibid., pp. 19–20), and the Trump administration’s perceived rejection of policy-relevant expertise, leading to a sense of crisis among scientists (ibid., p. 41).

Concerning policy goals, US policy is grounded in Enlightenment values, particularly those of justice and liberty. As written, US STI policy emphasises market governance as the best way to ensure that STI activities translate into societal benefits. This is also visible in more recent policy documents, such as the 2012 Bioeconomy Blueprint, that envisions markets and technological innovation to help achieve societal goals (ibid., pp. 13–14). This is not to say that the government does not imagine any role for itself in STI governance, but its technology regulation system focuses heavily on risk. Moreover, the government regards scientists as ‘the best knowers of what should be debated, and how issues should be framed in advance of any public deliberation’ (ibid., p. 23). This sentiment is particularly visible in public engagement initiatives in technology regulation, where agencies such as the EPA and FDA ‘frequently solicit public comments on regulatory decisions, but then reject as irrelevant the vast majority of the comments that the public makes, because they are insufficiently responsive to the narrow concerns of the parameters of environmental assessments and risk-based decision-making’ (ibid., p. 43).

This system of market governance and risk-based regulation does not fit well with the RRI model. While market governance is responsive to some (consumer) concerns, it is not necessarily inclusive or reflexive: because not all societal concerns are market or risk concerns, and because of relatively high and growing levels of financial and social inequalities along class, gender and race lines that affect market access (ibid., p. 8). Market governance also offers limited anticipation, because future concerns can only indirectly affect today’s markets. What further erodes the ability of market governance to create societal benefits is the fact that major economic actors have incentives to, and indeed successfully do, use their economic power as a political tool to put their own interests ahead of societal concerns (ibid., p. 44). An example is the Trump administration’s market interventions to support coal-based energy rather than address the wider societal issue of climate change (US report, p. 13).

The framing of the responsibility of scientists in US national science policy ‘is primarily understood in terms of responsible conduct of research’ (ibid., p. 14). Thus, responsibility of scientists is focused inwardly on research integrity, rather than outwardly, on societal effects, as these are supposed to be governed by the market. This framing, however, has been challenged from several directions. From the 70s onwards, integrity scandals have been a serious concern. Institutional pressures have been blamed for this, such as researcher evaluations based on impact factors and the volume of publications, stimulating researchers to cut corners and prioritise quantity over quality. More recently, discussions have arisen with regards to the responsibility of researchers for societal engagement. This is partly because of the Obama administration’s agenda to make government and public research more open and participatory; partly because of a perceived anti-science sentiment evidenced and fuelled by the Trump administration, which researchers hope to address by more science communication and education (ibid., pp. 19–20; 41). This phrasing from the report tentatively suggests a ‘deficit model’ than an ‘RRI model’ in the making, but how this will further develop, remains to be seen.

Concerning administrative style, the US has a formal, contentious civic epistemology (Jasanoff 2005). What this means is that conflicting truth claims are characteristically settled in a court of law, whose ruling is consequently codified (US report, p. 13), rather than through reasoned deliberation (ibid., p. 43). Jasanoff (2005) has shown how this meant that deciding on the role of biotechnology in society has essentially been treated as settling a number of legal questions rather than societal ones. In that way, the US’s contentious civic epistemology does not fit well with the RRI model either, as RRI advocates a broader role for society in science governance. This legalistic process of settling truth claims is in principle inclusive, as everyone can participate in the process. However, in practice there are various barriers to participation, and the contentious nature of legal conflicts does not encourage reflection on the merits of other viewpoints. Furthermore, though legal measures can advance substantive topics such as gender and ethics, the legalistic culture also incentivises organisations to take measures to avoid liability rather than to tackle the issue at hand (ibid., pp. 27–30).

Concerning public participation, as we noted, contestation is (increasingly) the way to settle not only epistemological, but also political issues, rather than RRI’s focus on consensus-building. This has led to a strong politicisation of societal issues, and an inclination of both parties in the US’s de facto two-party republic to go against or discontinue policies of the other. For example, participation in science and public affairs, driven by activist movements from the 1980s onwards, was encouraged by the Obama administration to make government more open, transparent, participatory and collaborative. A wide variety of engagement activities has resulted from this. However, indifference of the Trump administration has slowed this development (ibid., pp. 19–23). Gender is the most political of the RRI keys, and in the US particularly it has deep roots in struggles for the rights of women and marginalised groups. However, as these struggles are aligned with a progressive political agenda, the Trump administration has undone several equality-promoting measures of the Obama administration. Nevertheless, the national report notes that sexism and racism in the STI system are increasingly being acknowledged and addressed (ibid., pp. 24–30).

In summary, the RRI model does not fit well with the US’s sociotechnical imaginary of the STI system. At the heart of this seem to be very different views about the role of society in STI. While RRI imagines engaged citizens at the heart of science governance, the US’s imaginary focuses on science governance by the market (and thus consumers) and the legal system. Moreover, contestation and politicisation lead to citizens increasingly identifying themselves (or being identified) as affiliated with a certain party, and thus, as being in a contest with the other party. Nevertheless, the US has a long history of counter-imaginaries being put forward, notably by the civil and women’s rights movements. And while groups fighting for gender and racial (particularly black) equality have occasionally betrayed each other, both are broadly aligned and have achieved a number of changes compatible with the RRI model in the STI system. That, and the lack of interest of the Trump administration in STI in general (ibid, p. 18), currently seem to offer the best opportunities for RRI to develop in the US.