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Introduction and Concept

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China’s Foreign-Invested Limited Partnership Enterprise

Part of the book series: China-EU Law Series ((CELS,volume 7))

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Abstract

The core object of analysis in this book is China’s Foreign-Invested Limited Partnership Enterprise (FILPE) with a foreign corporate general partner. The assumption is that a foreign investor who plans to establish a sino-foreign alliance, will choose the enterprise form offering him the legal framework which will achieve the biggest return on his investment. The investor is looking for the most efficient enterprise form. The analytic framework is based on a comparison of enterprise organisation law between different jurisdictions identifying three key characteristics which define a standard corporate form. An evaluation of efficiency requires benchmarks. The criteria used in this book to analyse the efficiency of the FILPE address whether the FILPE fulfils the three central elements of a standard corporate form: legal personality, limited liability and transferable ownership interest.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Para. 1 Explanatory Notes on the PRC Foreign Investment Law (Draft for Comments) (中华人民共和国外国投资法 (草案征求意见稿)的说明), promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce on 19 January 2015.

  2. 2.

    In this book, ‘Foreign investor’ refers to companies, enterprises and other economic organisations that are incorporated outside the PRC, or individuals who are not PRC nationals.

  3. 3.

    For a definition of FDI, see Chap. 2.

  4. 4.

    For the purpose of this book, China refers to the People’s Republic of China or PRC, excluding the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macau Special Administrative Region and the territory of Taiwan.

  5. 5.

    Jiao and Kasteleijn (2011), p. 50.

  6. 6.

    In this book, ‘Chinese investor’ refers to companies, enterprises and other economic organisations that are incorporated in the PRC, excluding foreign-invested enterprises, or individuals who are PRC nationals.

  7. 7.

    ‘Foreign investment regime’ refers to the legal regime that governs foreign investments in China, consisting of the specific laws and regulations governing foreign investments as well as any other rules and policies issued by the government on national, provincial or local levels.

  8. 8.

    See Sect. 3.2 for other investment vehicles for sino-foreign alliances provided for by Chinese law, which have however been used significantly less in practice; see Sect. 3.1.5 for the impact of the new Foreign Investment Law.

  9. 9.

    Ribstein (1988), p. 840.

  10. 10.

    Bromberg and Ribstein (1994), pp. 11:19–11:23; Holdsworth (1925), pp. 195–199.

  11. 11.

    Haase (2014), pp. 3, 4.

  12. 12.

    Wu and Geu (2007–2008), p. 137.

  13. 13.

    Ibid, p. 137.

  14. 14.

    Schaper (2013), p. 80.

  15. 15.

    Ibid, p. 91; Teichmann (2014), p. 220.

  16. 16.

    Bavarian Higher Regional Court (BayObLG), 16.02.1912, in: Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung vol 18 (1913), pp. 647–648.

  17. 17.

    Schaper (2013), pp. 82, 91.

  18. 18.

    Ibid, pp. 75, 83, 111; Fleischer and Wansleben (2017a), p. 169.

  19. 19.

    Schaper (2013), p. 82.

  20. 20.

    Ibid, pp. 91–92.

  21. 21.

    Ibid, p. 89.

  22. 22.

    Ibid, pp. 83–84.

  23. 23.

    For an introduction to these hybrid forms, see Schaper (2013), pp. 84–87, 90.

  24. 24.

    Schaper (2013), pp. 100–101.

  25. 25.

    Ibid, pp. 101–103.

  26. 26.

    Ibid, p. 101.

  27. 27.

    Regarding the statutory hybrid elements in the Foreign-Invested Specialised General Partnership Enterprise, see Sect. 4.2.3.2.

  28. 28.

    Lu (吕美昂) (2011), pp. 81–82; Yang (杨杰) and Qu (曲天明) (2010), p. 63.

  29. 29.

    Yang (杨杰) and Qu (曲天明) (2010), p. 64; Werthwein (2010), p. 47; Wu and Geu (2007–2008), p. 137.

  30. 30.

    The author himself, while working in the corporate law department of an international law firm in Shanghai, has been involved in FDI projects where foreign investors were considering to use a FILPE as investment vehicle.

  31. 31.

    Haase (2014), pp. 3, 4.

  32. 32.

    Throughout this book, all gender-specific terms are to be considered to refer to both the feminine and the masculine form.

  33. 33.

    Mahony (2015), pp. 173–174.

  34. 34.

    Wu and Geu (2007–2008), p. 135.

  35. 35.

    Chen (2014), p. 68.

  36. 36.

    Schaper (2013), pp. 90–91.

  37. 37.

    Ibid, pp. 112.

  38. 38.

    Fleischer and Wansleben (2017a), pp. 177–178.

  39. 39.

    Ibid, pp. 177–178.

  40. 40.

    Exemplary, see Lu (吕美昂) (2011), pp. 81–82; Zhu (朱慈蕴) (2008), pp. 77–85; Du (杜瑞孔) (2006), pp. 69–70.

  41. 41.

    For examples, see Shaddox (2013), pp. 469–490; Yu et al. (2012), pp. 10–13; Wu and Geu (2007–2008), pp. 133–178.

  42. 42.

    Howson (2010), pp. 304–316.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, pp. 304–316.

  44. 44.

    Howson (2015), p. 410.

  45. 45.

    Armour et al. (2017c), pp. 4, 22.

  46. 46.

    Windbichler (2014), pp. 112–113.

  47. 47.

    Schaper (2013), p. 80.

  48. 48.

    Kraakman et al. (2017).

  49. 49.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 4.

  50. 50.

    Ibid, p. 1.

  51. 51.

    Ibid, p. 2.

  52. 52.

    An ‘agency problem’ [or ‘principal-agent problem’]—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the welfare of one party, termed the ‘principal’, depends upon actions taken by another party, termed the ‘agent’. The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interest rather than simply in the agent’s own interest. Viewed in these broad terms, agency problems arise in a broad range of contexts that go well beyond those that would formally be classified as agency relationships by lawyers. In particular, almost any contractual relationship, in which one party (the ‘agent’) promises performance to another (the ‘principal’), is potentially subject to an agency problem. (Armour et al. 2017b, p. 29).

  53. 53.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 2.

  54. 54.

    Ibid, pp. 1–2.

  55. 55.

    Ibid, p. 1.

  56. 56.

    For more detail, see Sect. 1.3.1.3.2.

  57. 57.

    Regarding the applicability of The Anatomy of Corporate Law to limited partnership enterprises, see Sect. 1.3.1.3.2.

  58. 58.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 1.

  59. 59.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1527; Enriques (2004), pp. 1012–1013.

  60. 60.

    For more detail, see Sect. 7.1.

  61. 61.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 9.

  62. 62.

    For more detail, see Chap. 8.

  63. 63.

    For more detail, see Chap. 9.

  64. 64.

    The attribute of delegated management with a board structure has two key elements. Externally, it requires the existence of rules that specify to third parties the individuals who have the authority to enter into contracts that bind the firm and its assets (Armour et al. 2017c, p. 7). Internally, a corporation is defined by a governance structure in which all but the most fundamental decisions are generally delegated to a board of directors (Armour et al. 2017c, p. 12). This underscores the significance of the board of directors as an intermediary between the owners and managers. The owners ordinarily have the right to elect directors, but the directors choose and oversee the day-to-day managers (Skeel 2003–2004, p. 1525). This marks a deviation from general partnership forms that usually grant power to a majority of partners to directly manage the partnership in the ordinary course of business (Armour et al. 2017c, p. 11).

  65. 65.

    See Sect. 7.2.

  66. 66.

    See Sect. 8.3.2.1.

  67. 67.

    Investor ownership highlights the fact that the owners (as opposed to employees, financial creditors, suppliers, and customers) have ultimate control over the firm, i.e. the right to choose its directors and the right to receive the firm’s net earnings (Enriques 2004, p. 1017). This sets the corporation apart from enterprise types such as cooperatives, non-profit firms, and public benefit or community interest corporations (Armour et al. 2017c, pp. 13–14).

  68. 68.

    See Sects. 3.2.1 and 4.1.9.3.

  69. 69.

    See Sect. 8.3.2.1.

  70. 70.

    The attribute of delegated management with a board structure is a default provision itself. In practice, the governance structure of corporations is often altered so that, de facto, the corporation will be managed directly by the owners (Enriques 2004, p. 1017). Furthermore, The Anatomy of Corporate Law recognises that many jurisdictions provide corporate forms that depart from delegated management by permitting the replacement of the board with direct management by the owners (Armour et al. 2017c, p. 15). This also applies to the EJV in China, the governance structure of which stipulates that shareholders have direct control over the management (Sect. 3.2.1). Therefore, the dogmatic function of delegated management with a board structure is restricted in the context of sino-foreign alliances. Regarding investor ownership, The Anatomy of Corporate Law recognises that, with sufficient special contracting, it is also possible to grant ownership of shares in a business corporation to contributors of labour or other factors of production, or in proportion to consumption of the firm’s services. Such arrangements are especially common between entrepreneurs and investors in high-tech start-up firms (Armour et al. 2017c, p. 14).

  71. 71.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 3.

  72. 72.

    Kraakman et al. (2017).

  73. 73.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 1.

  74. 74.

    The theoretical cornerstone of the present book, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, is described by its authors as a functional analysis, and explicitly attributed to the economic analysis of law (Armour et al. 2017c, pp. 3–4).

  75. 75.

    Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. XXXIII.

  76. 76.

    Ibid, p. XXXIII.

  77. 77.

    Towfigh (2017), p. 39.

  78. 78.

    Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. XXXIII.

  79. 79.

    Posner (2014), p. 31.

  80. 80.

    For an example on the discussion in Germany, see the overview in Kirstein (2000), p. 161; and also Posner (2014), p. 34.

  81. 81.

    Conversely, Pareto efficiency occurs when one party benefits from a decision, but no one is made worse off. Kaldor Hicks states that a decision can be more efficient as long as—in theory—everyone can be compensated to offset any potential costs. A situation is regarded to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient if no potential Kaldor–Hicks improvement from that situation exists; Posner (2014), p. 34; Cooter and Ulen (2012), p. 42; Schäfer and Ott (2012), pp. 19–25.

  82. 82.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 23.

  83. 83.

    Ibid, p. 23.

  84. 84.

    Ibid, p. 23.

  85. 85.

    Ibid, p. 23.

  86. 86.

    Schäfer and Ott (2012), pp. 12–13.

  87. 87.

    For an example, see the overview in Ulen (2000), pp. 800–816; Schäfer and Ott (2012), pp. 103–110; Posner (2014), pp. 4–5, 17–18; Cooter and Ulen (2012), pp. 50–51.

  88. 88.

    Posner (2014), pp. 4.

  89. 89.

    Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. 116.

  90. 90.

    For a detailed account of the history of the economic analysis of law, see Mackaay (2000), pp. 65–94.

  91. 91.

    Eger et al. (2007a), p. xiii.

  92. 92.

    Ibid, p. xiv.

  93. 93.

    Ibid, p. xiv. For an introduction to the concept of Guanxi, see Yang (2002), pp. 459–476; Spence (1990), pp. 638, 694, 737.

  94. 94.

    For a general overview, see Chen (2016), pp. 172–228.

  95. 95.

    Eger et al. (2007a), p. xiv.

  96. 96.

    Recent examples are Jiang (蒋兆康) (2012); Shi (史晋川) and Dong (董雪兵) (2012).

  97. 97.

    Zhang (张乃根) (1995); Zhou (周林彬) (1998).

  98. 98.

    Eger et al. (2007b), p. 308.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, p. 308.

  100. 100.

    Armour et al. (2017a), pp. 267–268.

  101. 101.

    Kraakman et al. (2017).

  102. 102.

    Enriques (2004), p. 1011 (Luca Enriques has not yet been an author of The Anatomy of Corporate Law when he published this book review).

  103. 103.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1577.

  104. 104.

    Ibid, p. 1539.

  105. 105.

    Lin (林建中) (2009).

  106. 106.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 3.

  107. 107.

    Enriques (2004), p. 1014; Armour et al. (2017c), p. 5.

  108. 108.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1521.

  109. 109.

    Enriques (2004), p. 1019ff. For similar criticism, see Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1543.

  110. 110.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1571.

  111. 111.

    Ibid, p. 1570.

  112. 112.

    Ibid, pp. 1572–1573.

  113. 113.

    Ibid, pp. 1572–1573.

  114. 114.

    Kraakman (2009), p. vii.

  115. 115.

    Kraakman (2017), p. vii.

  116. 116.

    Armour et al. (2017a), pp. 268–269.

  117. 117.

    Kraakman (2017), p. vii.

  118. 118.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1574.

  119. 119.

    See Sect. 4.1.1.2.

  120. 120.

    Armour et al. (2017c), pp. 5–15.

  121. 121.

    Ibid, pp. 3–4.

  122. 122.

    For an example, see Eisenberg (2000), p. 100; Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1525.

  123. 123.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1525; Enriques (2004), pp. 1012–1013.

  124. 124.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1525.

  125. 125.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 5, with further references in footnote 11; Enriques (2004), p. 1014.

  126. 126.

    Schaper (2013), p. 80.

  127. 127.

    Enriques (2004), p. 1014.

  128. 128.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 15.

  129. 129.

    Ibid, p. 15.

  130. 130.

    Ibid, p. 15.

  131. 131.

    Regarding possible deviations from the feature ‘delegated management under a board structure’, see Armour et al. (2017c), p. 15.

  132. 132.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 15.

  133. 133.

    Ibid, p. 15.

  134. 134.

    See Sect. 1.1.

  135. 135.

    Ribstein (2004), pp. 153 ff; McCahery and Vermeulen (2004), pp. 191–195.

  136. 136.

    Armour et al. (2017a), p. 269.

  137. 137.

    Ibid, p. 269.

  138. 138.

    Ibid, p. 17.

  139. 139.

    Ibid, p. 17. See Sect. 4.1.9.

  140. 140.

    Ibid, p. 17.

  141. 141.

    Ibid, p. 17.

  142. 142.

    Ibid, p. 17.

  143. 143.

    Ibid, p. 17.

  144. 144.

    Ribstein (1988), p. 895.

  145. 145.

    Armour et al. (2017c), pp. 17–18; Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. 728.

  146. 146.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 18.

  147. 147.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  148. 148.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  149. 149.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 18; Posner (2014), p. 543. Transaction costs: the costs involved in organising economic activity through voluntary exchange (Posner 2014, p. 533).

  150. 150.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 18.

  151. 151.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  152. 152.

    Armour et al. (2009), p. 20.

  153. 153.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  154. 154.

    Ibid, pp. 20–21.

  155. 155.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 18.

  156. 156.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  157. 157.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  158. 158.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  159. 159.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  160. 160.

    Ibid, p. 18.

  161. 161.

    Ibid, p. 19.

  162. 162.

    Ibid, p. 19.

  163. 163.

    Regarding the discriminatory investment restrictions that affect a FILPE in China, see Sect. 4.1.7.

  164. 164.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 19.

  165. 165.

    Ibid, p. 19.

  166. 166.

    Ibid, p. 19.

  167. 167.

    Ibid, p. 19.

  168. 168.

    Regarding the strictly regulated foreign investment regime in China, see Sect. 3.1.2.

  169. 169.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 19.

  170. 170.

    See Sect. 8.2.2.2.

  171. 171.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 19.

  172. 172.

    Ibid, p. 19.

  173. 173.

    Ibid, pp. 19–20.

  174. 174.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  175. 175.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  176. 176.

    Ibid, p. 20 fn. 76.

  177. 177.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  178. 178.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  179. 179.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  180. 180.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  181. 181.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  182. 182.

    Ibid, p. 20.

  183. 183.

    Zweigert and Kötz (1996), p. 3.

  184. 184.

    Ibid, p. 14.

  185. 185.

    Chen (2009), p. 101ff.

  186. 186.

    Mi (2009), pp. 803–804; Huang (黄毅诚) (1997), p. 13.

  187. 187.

    Senger (2006) p. 56.

  188. 188.

    Mi (2009), p. 806. For the importance and development of the field of comparative law in China during the past decades, see Pan (潘汉典) (1992); or the Journal of Comparative Law (比较法研究) that is published by the Institute of Comparative Law of the Chinese University of Political Science and Law (中国政法大学比较法学研究院) in Beijing since 1987.

  189. 189.

    Ibid, p. 807.

  190. 190.

    Zhu (朱少平) and Gebhardt (葛毅) (2004), p.

  191. 191.

    Julius (2008), p. 68.

  192. 192.

    Zinser (2012), p. 75.

  193. 193.

    Zweigert and Kötz (1996), p. 4.

  194. 194.

    Ibid, pp. 4–5.

  195. 195.

    Ibid, p. 5.

  196. 196.

    Wu and Geu (2007–2008), p. 135.

  197. 197.

    Kraakman (2017), p. vii.

  198. 198.

    Ibid, p. vii.

  199. 199.

    Armour et al. (2017c), p. 3.

  200. 200.

    Davies et al. (2009), p. 305.

  201. 201.

    Skeel (2003–2004), p. 1521.

  202. 202.

    Fleischer and Wansleben (2017b), p. 634.

  203. 203.

    Ibid, p. 639.

  204. 204.

    Ibid, p. 639.

  205. 205.

    1644–1912.

  206. 206.

    Mi (2009), p. 791.

  207. 207.

    Mi (2007), p. 132.

  208. 208.

    Mi (2009), pp. 787–788, 791.

  209. 209.

    Ibid, p. 791; Yu (1997), p. 61 fn. 151.

  210. 210.

    Mi (2009), pp. 794–795.

  211. 211.

    German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch), adopted by the German Reichstag on 10 May 1897; last amended by the German Bundestag on 12 December 2019.

  212. 212.

    Du (杜景林) and Lu (卢谌) (1999); Yang (杨继) (2006).

  213. 213.

    Mi (2009), p. 787.

  214. 214.

    Wu and Geu (2007–2008), p. 136.

  215. 215.

    Ibid, p. 136.

  216. 216.

    For example, see Yuantao et al. (1989), p. 60.

  217. 217.

    For a detailed introduction to functionalism, see Zweigert and Kötz (1996), p. 33ff.

  218. 218.

    Michaels (2012), pp. 297–298.

  219. 219.

    Ibid, pp. 297–298.

  220. 220.

    Mi (2009), pp. 803–804.

  221. 221.

    Senger (2006), pp. 52–59.

  222. 222.

    Michaels (2012), pp. 297–298.

  223. 223.

    Pan (潘汉典) (1990), pp. 10–11.

  224. 224.

    Ibid, p. 11.

  225. 225.

    Ibid, p. 11.

  226. 226.

    For a similar discussion with regard to the application of the economic analysis of law to developing countries, see Sect. 1.3.1.2.

  227. 227.

    Kraakman (2017), pp. viii–ix.

  228. 228.

    Ibid, pp. vii, viii–ix.

  229. 229.

    Fleischer and Wansleben (2017b), p. 641.

  230. 230.

    See Sect. 1.1.

  231. 231.

    Kroymann (2009), p. 385. For more details, see Sect. 3.2.1.

  232. 232.

    See Sect. 3.1.5.3.

  233. 233.

    Art. 42 Para. 1 Foreign Investment Law.

  234. 234.

    See Sect. 3.1.5.

  235. 235.

    McGinty et al. (2020), p. 10; Zhang and Tsoi (2019); Clifford Chance LLP (2019).

  236. 236.

    See Sect. 3.1.3.

  237. 237.

    McGinty et al. (2020), p. 10; McGinty et al. (2019).

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Kuntner, S. (2021). Introduction and Concept. In: China’s Foreign-Invested Limited Partnership Enterprise. China-EU Law Series, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54181-1_1

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