Abstract
This chapter argues that any attempt to derive a “moral Ought” from an “Is” with a justificatory goal, if successful in its “derivation” part, would face a trilemma in its “justification” part: it would (1) have us consider each human action as morally obligatory or prohibited; or (2) presuppose a moral norm that cannot be derived from facts; or (3) fail to explain why the linguistically based distinction between factual statements from which moral norms can be derived and those from which they cannot should count as morally relevant. One way of avoiding this trilemma (which can be ascribed to Searle) is to interpret the possible derivation of “Ought” from “Is” as related not to ethical justification, but to the problems of social ontology.
This chapter is a modified and extended version of the paper published in Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2019, 63–74.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958a. “On Brute Facts.” Analysis 18 (3): 69–72.
———. 1958b. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33 (124): 1–19.
Kołakowski, L. 1987. Jeśli Boga nie…O Bogu, Diable, Grzechu i innych zmartwieniach tak zwanej filozofii religii. London: Aneks.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Prichard, H. A. 1912. “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 21 (81): 21–37.
Searle, J. R. 1964. “How to Derive “Ought” from “Is”.” The Philosophical Review 73: 43–58.
von Wright, G. H. 1985. “Is and Ought.” In Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life, edited by E. Bulygin, J. L. Gardies, and I. Niiniluoto, 263−81. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Załuski, W. (2021). Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”. In: Di Lucia, P., Fittipaldi, E. (eds) Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is". Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-54115-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-54116-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)