Skip to main content

Asymmetric Information, Ager Publicus and the Roman Land Market in the Second Century BC

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Managing Information in the Roman Economy

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Ancient Economies ((PASTAE))

Abstract

This chapter will discuss asymmetric information in the land market of the Roman Republican period, especially the second century BC. It first investigates whether a free land market existed in this period. If this was indeed the case, the paper will discuss whether the free land market was subject to problems of asymmetric information, and if so, to what extent. Problems may have occurred especially with regard to the sale of land, since it was difficult for potential buyers to accurately estimate the value of a plot. They therefore always had to be on their guard against being cheated. There were also problems of asymmetric information in cases where land was worked by caretakers for absentee landowners. In this case, the principal-agent problem raised its head, since the landowner could never be sure that the agent took the best interests of the owner to heart. Finally, the paper will compare the free market for land in general with the market for a specific type of land, namely ager publicus, that is land owned by the Roman state. Lack of information, and specifically uncertainty regarding its legal status, may have impacted willingness to investment in buying or renting state-owned land. Therefore, not all land may have been available on the free market, despite the growing demand for land in Italy in the Republican period.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    Temin (2006: 134–7); Arruñada (2020). Prices, for land especially, could fluctuate wildly. Examples mostly date from the civil wars of the first century, when the ownership of land as a secure possession was coveted more than ever before. See for example Suet. Aug. 41.1–2; Plut. Crass. 2.3–5; Cic. Rosc. Am. passim. See Andreau (1999: 12–16, 108–111); Hollander (2012: 148).

  2. 2.

    See recent works on the Roman economy in the second century BC: Kay (2014); Flohr (2017); Jongman (2017); Tol and De Haas (2017); Roselaar (2019).

  3. 3.

    See Isayev (2007: 73–76); Marzano and Métraux (2018); Roselaar (2019: 85–115).

  4. 4.

    For example Finley (1999); see discussion in Tol and De Haas (2017: 3).

  5. 5.

    Flohr (2017: 80–81).

  6. 6.

    Capogrossi (2010: 536). In general, profits from agriculture seem to have been much larger in the second century than in the fourth and third; see the works cited in note 2.

  7. 7.

    Plut. Cat. Mai. 21.5.

  8. 8.

    See Rosenstein (2008), who argues that investment in urban property and other commercial enterprises made up a much larger part of elite incomes than land ownership.

  9. 9.

    Var. R. 1.2.8. Cic. Att. 9.9.4 similarly describes how Atticus “usually wanted to know how many years’ purchase it was worth, and what was the value of the fixtures” before buying any land. See Hollander (2012: 75–76).

  10. 10.

    For example Cic. Att. 1.14.7, 7.3.6–9, 12.32.2, 14.3, 15.17.1, 15.20.4, 16.1.5; Cael. 17–18; Off. 3.66. See Frier (1978) for urban property management.

  11. 11.

    Cic. Att. 13.46. 3, 14.9.1, 14.10.3. See Frier (1978: 2).

  12. 12.

    Cic. Q.Fr. 3.1 list a number of properties which Cicero owns or is considering buying. See Walcot (1975: 127–8).

  13. 13.

    Cic. Att. 1.13.6.

  14. 14.

    For the renting of agricultural property, see Kehoe (1997); Roselaar (forthcoming).

  15. 15.

    On the speed and costs of travel and communication, see both positive and negative examples in Cato Agr. 22. 3; Plin. HN. 19. 3–4; see Nicholson (1994); Adams (n.d.), with further references.

  16. 16.

    For which see White (1973: 456–457); Terrenato (2012).

  17. 17.

    Cato Agr. 1.1–5: 1 Praedium quom parare cogitabis, sic in animo habeto, uti ne cupide emas neve opera tua parcas visere et ne satis habeas semel circumire. Quotiens ibis, totiens magis placebit quod bonum erit. 2 Vicini quo pacto niteant, id animum advertito: in bona regione bene nitere oportebit. … Uti bonum caelum habeat, ne calamitosum siet, solo bono, sua virtute valeat. 3 Si poteris, sub radice montis siet, in meridiem spectet, loco salubri, operariorum copia siet, bonumque aquarium, oppidum validum prope siet aut mare aut amnis, qua naves ambulant, aut via bona celebrisque. 4 Siet in his agris, qui non saepe dominos mutant: qui in his agris praedia vendiderint, eos pigeat vendidisse.

  18. 18.

    Var. R. 1.5.3: Agri culturae, inquit, quattuor sunt partes summae: e quis prima cognitio fundi, solum partesque eius quales sint.

  19. 19.

    Var. R. 1.6.1: Igitur primum de solo fundi videndum haec quattuor, quae sit forma, quo in genere terrae, quantus, quam per se tutus.

  20. 20.

    Var. R. 1.16.1: Si vicina regio est infesta; si quo neque fructus nostros exportare expediat neque inde quae opus sunt adportare; tertium, si viae aut fluvii, qua portetur, aut non sunt aut idonei non sunt; quartum, siquid ita est in confinibus fundis, ut nostris agris prosit aut noceat.

  21. 21.

    Varro R. 1.6.6: Campester locus is melior, qui totus aequabiliter in unam partem verget, quam is qui est ad libellam aequos, quod is, cum aquae non habet delapsum, fieri solet uliginosus.

  22. 22.

    Cato Agr. 7.1.

  23. 23.

    Martin (1971: 85–7, 92); Dalby (1998: 24).

  24. 24.

    See Culham (1989) on private and public archives.

  25. 25.

    Cato Agr. 1.4.

  26. 26.

    Cic. Caec. 11.

  27. 27.

    Plin. Ep. 3.19.1–5: [1] Praedia agris meis vicina atque etiam inserta venalia sunt. In his me multa sollicitant, aliqua nec minora deterrent. [2] Sollicitat primum ipsa pulchritudo iungendi; deinde, quod non minus utile quam voluptuosum, posse utraque eadem opera eodem viatico invisere, sub eodem procuratore ac paene isdem actoribus habere, unam villam colere et ornare, alteram tantum tueri. [3] Inest huic computationi sumptus supellectilis, sumptus atriensium topiariorum fabrorum atque etiam venatorii instrumenti; quae plurimum refert unum in locum conferas an in diversa dispergas. [4] Contra vereor ne sit incautum, rem tam magnam isdem tempestatibus isdem casibus subdere; tutius videtur incerta fortunae possessionum varietatibus experiri. Habet etiam multum iucunditatis soli caelique mutatio, ipsaque illa peregrinatio inter sua. [5] Iam, quod deliberationis nostrae caput est, agri sunt fertiles pingues aquosi; constant campis vineis silvis, quae materiam et ex ea reditum sicut modicum ita statum praestant.

  28. 28.

    Cic. Phil. 13.6.11; Plut. Pomp. 6.1; Vell. 2.29.1. See below for Cicero’s multiple business properties.

  29. 29.

    See Nappo in this volume. Most of the available evidence comes from the early Imperial period, especially the archives of the Sulpicii and of Caecilius Iucundus. For these, see Verboven (2008); Broekaert (2017).

  30. 30.

    See Verboven in this volume.

  31. 31.

    Broekaert (2017: 388–399, 406–409).

  32. 32.

    Cic. Sest. 18.

  33. 33.

    Plaut. Pseud. 1145; see Pseud. 556, Curc. 683, Epid. 118, Men. pr.48, Truc. 759. On collegia see Verboven (2007).

  34. 34.

    Watson (1961: 5–6); Aubert (1994: 46–64); Broekaert (2017: 390–391).

  35. 35.

    Eisenhardt (1989).

  36. 36.

    Watson (1961: 12–13).

  37. 37.

    Kaser (1996: 408–421).

  38. 38.

    Frier and Kehoe (2007); Roselaar (2019: 125).

  39. 39.

    North (1990).

  40. 40.

    Cic. Off. 3.65: Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud nos est iure civili, ut in iis vendendis vitia dicerentur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam, cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent lingua nuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret, a iuris consultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta; quicquid enim esset in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. See also Dig. 19.1.38.2 (Proculus), Dig. 21.1.19pr (Ulpian. 1 ad Ed. Cur. Aed.), Dig. 18.1.43pr (Florian. 8 Inst.). See Orth (2003); Rosillo-López in this volume. For defects relating to slaves, see Lavan in this volume.

  41. 41.

    As Pliny the Younger describes (Ep. 3.19.6–7), the tenants on the estate he was considering buying had been impoverished by the bad management of the previous owner, so that Pliny would have to invest in slaves to work for them, if he were to buy the estate.

  42. 42.

    For the management of farms, see Maróti (1976); Teitler (1993); Carlsen (1995).

  43. 43.

    Varro R. 1.17.4–7: Qui praesint esse oportere, qui litteris atque aliqua sint humanitate imbuti, frugi, aetate maiore quam operarios, quos dixi. Facilius enim iis quam qui minore natu sunt dicto audientes. Praeterea potissimum eos praeesse oportere, qui periti sint rerum rusticarum. Non solum enim debere imperare, sed etiam facere, ut facientem imitetur et ut animadvertat eum cum causa sibi praeesse, quod scientia praestet …. Praefectos alacriores faciendum praemiis dandaque opera ut habeant peculium et coniunctas conservas, e quibus habeant filios. Eo enim fiunt firmiores ac coniunctiores fundo…. Studiosiores ad opus fieri liberalius tractando aut cibariis aut vestitu largiore aut remissione operis concessioneve, ut peculiare aliquid in fundo pascere liceat, huiusce modi rerum aliis, ut quibus quid gravius sit imperatum aut animadversum qui, consolando eorum restituat voluntatem ac benevolentiam in dominum. Similar comments are made by Cato Agr. 5.1–5, but with less explicit care for the vilicus’ wellbeing.

  44. 44.

    Cato Agr. 2.1: Pater familias ubi ad villam venit, ubi larem familiarem salutavit, fundum eodem die, si potest, circumeat; si non eodem die, at postridie. Ubi cognovit, quo modo fundus cultus siet operaque quae facta infectaque sient, postridie eius diei vilicum vocet, roget, quid operis siet factum, quid restet, satisne temperi opera sient confecta, possitne quae reliqua sient conficere, et quid factum vini, frumenti aliarumque rerum omnium. See Marzano and Métraux (2018: 27) for the variety of issues that the owner had to deal with when arriving at his estate.

  45. 45.

    Cato Agr. 2.

  46. 46.

    Cato Agr. 5.4: Nequid emisse velit insciente domino, neu quid dominum celavisse velit.

  47. 47.

    Cato Agr. 4.

  48. 48.

    Martin (1971, 90–1); Marzano and Métraux (2018: 18).

  49. 49.

    Cic. Att. 12.32.2, 14.10.3, 15.17.1, 16.1.5; Dig. 19.2.30 pr. (Alf. 3 Dig. a Paulo Epit.); Dig. 19.2.60.pr (Labeo). See Frier (1978: 3–4).

  50. 50.

    App. BC. 1.7: ῾Ρωμαῖοι τὴν ᾿Ιταλίαν πολέμῳ κατὰ μέρη χειρούμενοι γῆς μέρος ἐλάμβανον καὶ πόλεις ἐνῴκιζον … καὶ τάδε μὲν ἀντὶ φρουρίων ἐπενόουν, τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς δορικτήτου σφίσιν ἑκάστοτε γιγνομένης τὴν μὲν ἐξειγρασμένην αὐτίκα τοῖς οἰκιζομένοις ἐπιδιῄρουν ἢ ἐπίπρασκον ἢ ἐξεμίσθουν, τὴν δ᾿ ἀργὸν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου τότε οὖσαν, ἢ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐπλήθυεν, οὐκ ἄγοντές πω σχολὴν διαλαχεῖν ἐπεκήρυττον ἐν τοσῷδε τοῖς ἐθέλουσιν ἐκπονεῖν ἐπὶ τέλει τῶν ἐτησίων καρπῶν, δεκάτῃ μὲν τῶν σπειρομένων, πέμπτῃ δὲ τῶν φυτευομένων. ὥριστο δὲ καὶ τοῖς προβατεύουσι τέλη μειζόνων τε καὶ ἐλαττόνων ζῴων.

  51. 51.

    Roselaar (2010: 83–84, 113–118).

  52. 52.

    Liv. 42.1.6.

  53. 53.

    Liv. 42.19.1–2.

  54. 54.

    Gran. Lic. 9–10. See Cic. Leg. Ag. 2.82. On this episode, see Pina Polo (2011: 170), who states that Cicero specifies that the land was private. However, Cicero says privatos agros qui in publicum Campanum incurrebant, which suggests that private individuals encroached on public land, like Granius does.

  55. 55.

    Liv. 31.13.6–9.

  56. 56.

    Lex agraria ll. 31–2.

  57. 57.

    Roselaar (2010: 127–128).

  58. 58.

    Cic. Att. 13.33a.

  59. 59.

    Cato Agr. 10–13.

  60. 60.

    Marzano and Métraux (2018).

  61. 61.

    Liv. 39.44.4. The Latin in fact says loca publica, which is not the same as ager publicus, but could refer to public places such as roads or fora.

  62. 62.

    Cic. Phil. 6.5.14; apparently, they lacked confidence in the security of their holdings. See App. BC. 4.31. Uncertainty about property would cause problems when trying to sell land. For example in 45 Caesar tried to have sales made in Sulla’s time ratified, so that he would have more authority over those lands that he had bought himself and was now selling. If his title as owner would remain uncertain, then “what possible right of property can his sales carry?” As long as Caesar’s title to the land remained uncertain, he could not transfer its ownership by sale, Cic. Fam. 13.8.2.

  63. 63.

    Plin. Ep. 3.19, 9.37. See Kehoe (1997: 15).

  64. 64.

    Liv. 28.46.5. The state often depended on private informers for gathering intelligence on ager publicus: App. BC. 1.18; Lex agraria ll. 90–1.

  65. 65.

    App. BC. 1.10.

  66. 66.

    Roselaar (2010: 230–279).

  67. 67.

    See Roselaar (2010: 278–287).

  68. 68.

    For example the passage of Appian cited above; for modern interpretations, see Toynbee (1965: 1); Hopkins (1978).

Bibliography

  • Adams, C. (n.d.). Transport in the Roman Empire. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/10259552/Transport_in_the_Roman_Empire

  • Andreau, J. 1999. Banking and Business in the Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arruñada, B. 2020. The Institutions of Roman Markets. In Roman Law and Economics, ed. G. Dari-Mattiacci and D. Kehoe, vol. II, 247–299. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Aubert, J.-J. 1994. Business managers in Ancient Rome: a social and economic study of institores, 200 B.C.–A.D. 250. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Broekaert, W. 2017. Conflicts, Contract Enforcement, and Business Communities in the Archive of the Sulpicii. In The Economy of Pompeii, ed. M. Flohr and A. Wilson, 387–414. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caprogrossi Colognesi, L. 2010. Appunti per una storia dell’economia agraria romana. Studia et documenta historiae et iuris 76: 523–542.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlsen, J. 1995. Vilici and Roman Estate Managers. Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider.

    Google Scholar 

  • Culham, P. 1989. Archives and Alternatives in Republican Rome. Classical Philology 84: 100–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dalby, A. 1998. Cato: On Farming. Totnes: Prospect Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review 14 (1): 57–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finley, M.I. 1999. The Ancient Economy, Cambridge 1st ed. 1973. University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flohr, M. 2017. Quantifying Pompeii: Population, Inequality, and the Urban Economy. In The Economy of Pompeii, ed. M. Flohr and A. Wilson, 53–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frier, B. 1978. Cicero’s Management of His Urban Properties. The Classical Journal 74: 1–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frier, B., and D. Kehoe. 2007. Law and Economic Institution. In The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller, 113–143. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Garicano, L., and S.N. Kaplan. 2001. The Effects of Business-to-business E-commerce on Transaction Costs. Journal of Industrial Economics 49 (4): 463–485.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geraghty, R.M. 2007. The Impact of Globalization in the Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 100. Journal of Economic History 67 (4): 1036–1061.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hollander, D. 2012. Money in the Late Roman Republic. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopkins, K. 1978. Conquerors and Slaves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isayev, E. 2007. Inside Ancient Lucania: Dialogues in History and Archaeology. London: University of London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jongman, W. 2017. The benefits of market integration. In The Economic Integration of Roman Italy. Rural Communities in a Globalizing World, ed. G. Tol and T. de Haas, 15–27. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaser, M. (ed. R. Hackl), 1996. Das römische Zivilprozessrecht. Munich: C. H. Beck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kay, P. 2014. Rome’s Economic Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kehoe, D. 1997. Investment, Profit and Tenancy. The Jurists and the Roman Agrarian Economy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Maróti, E. 1976. The Vilicus and the Villa System in Ancient Italy. Oikumene 1: 109–124.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, R. 1971. Recherches sur les agronomes latins et leurs conceptions économiques et sociales. Paris: Belles Lettres.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marzano, A., and G.P.R. Métraux. 2018. The Roman Villa: An Overview. In The Roman Villa in the Mediterranean Basin. Late Republic to Late Antiquity, ed. A. Marzano and G.P.R. Métraux, 1–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Nicholson, J. 1994. The Delivery and Confidentiality of Cicero’s Letters. The Classical Journal 90: 33–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Orth, J.V. 2003. Sale of Defective Houses. Cicero and the Moral Choice. University of North Carolina School of Law. Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications/375/

  • Pina Polo, F. 2011. The Consul at Rome. The Civil Functions of the Consuls in the Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Roselaar, S.T. 2010. Public Land in the Roman Republic: A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396–89 BC. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2019. Italy’s Economic Revolution. Integration and Economy in Republican Italy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • ———. forthcoming. Status hierarchies and Economic Differentiation in Rome and Italy (IIIrd to Ist cent. BC). In Statuts personels et main d’oeuvre en Méditerranée hellénistique, ed. S. Maillot and J. Zurbach. Clermont-Ferrand.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenstein, N. 2008. Aristocrats and agriculture in the Middle and Late Republic. Journal of Roman Studies 98: 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teitler, H.C. 1993. Free-born Estate Managers in the Graeco-Roman World. In De Agricultura: In Memoriam P. W. de Neeve, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg et al., 206–213. Amsterdam: Gieben.

    Google Scholar 

  • Temin, P. 2006. The Economy of the Early Roman Empire. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 133–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Terrenato, N. 2012. The Enigma of ‘Catonian’ Villas: The De Agri Cultura in the Context of Second-Century BC Italian Architecture. In Roman Republican Villas. Architecture, Context, and Ideology, ed. J.A. Becker and N. Terrenato, 69–93. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tol, G., and T. de Haas. 2017. Introduction. In The Economic Integration of Roman Italy. Rural Communities in a Globalizing World, ed. G. Tol and T. de Haas, 1–12. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toynbee, A.J. 1965. Hannibal’s Legacy: The Hannibalic War’s Effects on Roman Life. London: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verboven, K. 2007. The Associative Order. Status and Ethos Among Roman Businessmen in Late Republic and Early Empire. Athenaeum 95: 861–893.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. Faeneratores, Negotiatores and Financial Intermediation in the Roman World (Late Republic and Early Empire). In Pistoi dia tèn technèn. Bankers, loans and archives in the ancient world. Studies in honour of Raymond Bogaert, ed. K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe, and V. Chankowski, 211–229. Leuven: Peeters.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walcot, P. 1975. Cicero on Private Property: Theory and Practice. Greece & Rome 22: 120–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watson, A. 1961. Contract of Mandate in Roman Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, K.D. 1973. Roman Agricultural Writers I: Varro and His Predecessors. Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt I. 4: 439–497.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Roselaar, S.T. (2021). Asymmetric Information, Ager Publicus and the Roman Land Market in the Second Century BC. In: Rosillo-López, C., García Morcillo, M. (eds) Managing Information in the Roman Economy. Palgrave Studies in Ancient Economies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54100-2_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54100-2_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-54099-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-54100-2

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics