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Managing Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information in Roman Auctions

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Managing Information in the Roman Economy

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Ancient Economies ((PASTAE))

Abstract

Auctions are market structures that allocate rights through a process of price competition in which bidders make offers. The volume of trade and money that auctions generate in modern economies is unparallel in world history. This explains why in recent times they are also relevant in economic theory. Game theory regards auctions as non-cooperational games of incomplete information. Some theoretical studies, informed by fields such as behavioural economics and economic sociology, aim specifically to improve our capacity to predict patterns of behaviour, reduce uncertainty, and, ultimately calculate winning strategies for both bidders and sellers. Despite the unquestionable impact of this research on our better knowledge of the mental and social mechanisms that lead actors’ performances and decision-making in auctions, there is no exact science behind this practice. Incomplete knowledge remains, after all, a distinctive trait of auctions, ancient and modern. In this light, they feature as theatres of uncertainties in which actors engage in multilayered games of asymmetric information. This chapter investigates the impact of dysfunctionalities and asymmetries on Roman auctions. Following a concept coined by Douglass North, the first part of the contribution will discuss the ‘rules of the game’: the enforcement and marketing mechanisms, as well as the social norms that shaped the information systems of Roman auctions. In the second part, the chapter investigates the shadows of this information system. Two specific dysfunctional conspiracies—also typical of modern auctions—will be analysed: the formation of bidding rings or collusions, and shill bidding, a practice that involves the seller and at least one fake-bidder. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that ancient Romans had a profound understanding of the complexities and the risks attached to this versatile market structure, which was shaped by both transparency and opacity, and by games of information that did not always match the restrictions imposed by law and morality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Descending price auctions are conducted in the allocation of certain types of public contracts, such as procurement auctions, or in the sale of perishable products, such as fresh fish, fruits and vegetables, and flowers. Alternatives to these systems are the second-bid and the sealed auctions; see Milgrom (1989); Kemperer (2004: 14–15).

  2. 2.

    However, the auction’s value does not necessarily represent the market value of an item, the dynamics of supply and demand, or the valuation estimated by the actors.

  3. 3.

    See on this point also Revilla’s chapter in this volume.

  4. 4.

    See Hubbard and Paarsch (2015: 34–42). The Nash equilibrium and the prisoner’s dilemma are two well-known theorems developed by game theory that have also been applied to the analysis of auctions.

  5. 5.

    Risk aversion and anchoring are two phenomena studied by behavioural economics that seek to understand the bidder’s mental framework in the process of valuation and decision making.

  6. 6.

    In general, on Roman auctions, see Talamanca (1954); Thielmann (1961); Ankum (1972); Andreau (1974, 1987, 1999a, 2018); García Morcillo (2005).

  7. 7.

    On the informative function of institutions see North (1990: 3, 25); Knight (1997) and Dequech (2004).

  8. 8.

    On the differentiation between both types of uncertainty, see Dosi and Egidi (1991); and Dequech (2006).

  9. 9.

    In his chapter about Roman finances in the present volume, Koen Verboven uses and discusses the term ‘information governance system’ to refer to the set of restrictions and opportunities that determine the perception and use of information and that contribute to reduce transaction costs.

  10. 10.

    Cicero complained, for instance, that territories in Paphlagonia, Pontus and Cappadocia had already seen the hasta praeconis, and thus been apportioned to purchasers, even if Pompey’s army was still active in the region, Leg. Agr. 1.6; 2.53–54.

  11. 11.

    Cic. Leg. agr. 1.7: Censoribus vectigalia locare nisi in conspectus populi Romani non licet; his vendere vel in ultimis terris licebit? (transl. J. H. Freese).

  12. 12.

    Cic. Leg. agr. 1.7: At hoc etiam nequissimi homines cinsumptis patrimoniis faciunt, ut in atriis auctionariis potius quam in triviis aut in compitis auctionentur; hic permittit sua lege decemviris, ut, in quibus commodum sit tenebris, ut, in qua velim solitudine, bona populi Romani possint divendere.

  13. 13.

    Cic. Leg. agr. 2.55–56. The argument is strengthened by evoking the feared Sullan proscriptions and the subsequent sale of confiscated properties. Despite the opposition they generated, these sales were announced and conducted from the Rostra, and were thus in the public eye; see further García Morcillo 2016: 121–125.

  14. 14.

    An in-depth analysis of this episode and its legal complications is provided by Hinard (1975); Platschek 2002 and Lintott (2008: 43–59). On the venditio bonorum see Giuffrè (1993: 317–364).

  15. 15.

    In the sale of public land in fourth-century Athens, the prokyrexis or written announcement commenced a period of sixty days, during which inspections and claims could be made. The oral announcement of the keryx, five days before the actual auction, opened the acceptance of bids, which were introduced in written form on the agora, Thphr. Frg. 97 (Stobae. Serm. 42), 1–3. Similar regulations are attested throughout the Greek world, and particularly in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt, see Talamanca (1954); Alessandrì (2005, 2012, 2017); Monson (2012).

  16. 16.

    The jurist Gaius confirms the testimony of Cicero and attests the prevalence of this practice during the Principate, see Gai. 3.79.

  17. 17.

    Cic. Quinct. 27; 73.

  18. 18.

    The expression is well attested in public announcements preserved in epigraphic documents—see for instance the Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre (AE 2008, 651); the Lex Irnitana, (AE 2008, 63). Further examples: AE 1984, 250; 2003, 359; 2008, 417; CIL X, 4643; CIL XII, 4393. See Corbier (2013), 25; Rosillo-López (2003), 63–65. Specific recommendations to increase the visibility and clarity of the announcements posted are mentioned by Ulpian, Dig. 14.3.11.3 (Ulp. 28 ad. ed.).

  19. 19.

    TPSulp. 83–93, cf. Camodeca (1999: 185–204).

  20. 20.

    TPSulp. 83–86; 88; 90–92, cf. Camodeca (1999: 189).

  21. 21.

    TPSulp. 85; 87; 90–92, cf. Camodeca (1999: 185–204). The chalcidicum was a columned porticus.

  22. 22.

    Two tablets indicate that the auction would have taken place on the town’s market day (in nundinas proximas), TPSulp. 87 and 89.

  23. 23.

    Dig. 21.1.31–32 (Ulp. 1 ed. aed. Cur.) See Jakab (1997: 45–49); Lavan in this volume.

  24. 24.

    Cic. Phil. 2.73.

  25. 25.

    D.C. 75.54–55.

  26. 26.

    See the Lex metalli Vipascensis, lin 10–11, and García Morcillo (2005: 145–147).

  27. 27.

    See for instance Mart. 6.66; Apul. Met. 23–25, Cic. Off. 3.55–56 (on this particular case, see Rosillo-López, in this volume), further Hinard, F. (1976); Rauh (1989b); García Morcillo (2005: 137–156); Bond (2016: 21–58).

  28. 28.

    On the handling of security by public contractors, see the Lex pareti faciundo (1.5; 3.54); Lex portorium Asiae (e.g. 43.101–103) and the Lex Flavia Municipalis. See also Dig. 39.4.9 pr.1 (Paul. 5 sent.).

  29. 29.

    On the use of promises of payment or stipulations and the participation of bankers and financial intermediaries in private auctions, see Andreau (1974: 88–103; 1987: 174–176; 658); García Morcillo (2005: 120–128); Petrucci (2016).

  30. 30.

    See Cic. Ver. 3.77; and the Lex Flavia Municipalis.

  31. 31.

    Dig. 27.3.1.3 (Ulp. 36 ad ed.): cum neque inventaria neque auctionalia proferentur; Ambr. Epist. 37.13: tabulae auctionales.

  32. 32.

    See for instance Cic. Cluent. 64.80; Caec. 6.17; Quint. inst. 11.2.24; Sen. contr. 1 pr. 19. The tablets containing the payment receipts from auctions in the archive of the Pompeian banker Iucundus were confirmed by a number of witnesses, Andreau (1974: 86–87).

  33. 33.

    The centesima rerum venalium or centesima auctionis. The deduction of this tax from the tablets of Iucundus is convincingly argued by Andreau (1974: 81–86). The tax is explicitly mentioned in the Lex metalli Vipascensis as centesima argentariae stipulationis; lin. 6–8; Talamanca (1954: 147); Thielmann (1961: 68–69); Andreau (1987: 134–136). Traces of the collection of this tax by private bankers in Roman Egypt are discussed by García Morcillo (2008: 271–274).

  34. 34.

    Cic. Ver. 1.130–132.

  35. 35.

    Cic. Ver. 1.140–145.

  36. 36.

    Cic. Ver. 141.

  37. 37.

    Cic. Ver. 1.144–5.

  38. 38.

    Cic. Ver. 1.149–150. The security had not been returned because Verres’ departure avoided the probatio of the accomplishment of the works, see Rosillo-López (2003: 61). Ver. 1.149–150.

  39. 39.

    Ver. 3.13–14; 18–27; 36; 42; 51; 150. On the leasing out of the contract of the decuma, see Nicolet (2000: 277–293). Former contractors tried to organise themselves to offer higher bids than Verres’ candidates, Ver. 3.99.

  40. 40.

    Cic. Ver. 3.110; 148.

  41. 41.

    Cic. Ver. 3. 111–113. See also 3.48–49; 70–76; 90–91. On the importance of these documents, see Butler (2002: 35–60); Andreau (2007: 81–92). The suspiciously cheap prices written down in Verres’ private records for three famous artworks supposedly bought at an auction were used by Cicero as evidence of fraud, a simulatio emptionis, Ver. 4.12.

  42. 42.

    App. BC. 4.29; D.C. 47.17. Exceptions were made for those who would buy at high prices and not just speculate on the price, D.C. 47.14.

  43. 43.

    On the devaluation of prices and the unfavourable market for sellers of spoils in certain military campaigns, see Plut. Luc. 14.1.

  44. 44.

    On ring bidding, see McAffee and McMillan (1992).

  45. 45.

    On the success of cartels, see Levenstein and Suslow (2006).

  46. 46.

    Several strategies to detect collusion are discussed by Porter and Zona (1993).

  47. 47.

    Symptomatic cases are detailed in Andocides’ On the Mysteries 133–134. On the tax-farming process in Athens, see Pritchard (2015). Another famous case of a bidding cartel is discussed in Lysias’ speech 22 (Against the corn dealers).

  48. 48.

    P. Eleph. 20; P. Eleph.Gr. 18–21, see Clarysse (2003). The documents attest that the praktor Milon was in charge of the sale, due to financial problems, of the priestly property in the nome of Edfu. As Manning (2003: 83–85; 2010: 118–120) plausibly discusses, the family tried to recover the items through a fake purchaser and the probable bribery or mismanagement of Milon, who soon after the scandal ran away to avoid facing responsibilities.

  49. 49.

    UPZ II 224, Talamanca (1960); Bogaert (1998–9: 53–54).

  50. 50.

    Cic. Att. 1.17.9. On this episode, see Nicolet (2000: 310–12). Further, Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.33; Mur. 62.

  51. 51.

    On the continuity of competitive licitationes for public contracts, see Nicolet (2000: 311–312).

  52. 52.

    Tan (2017: 42–50), following Butcher (1993), convincingly states that Roman tax farmers did have a weak position relative to the state, as they were subjected to restrictive regulations but still had to compete for contracts.

  53. 53.

    Dig. 39. 4.9pr. (Paul. 5 sent.).

  54. 54.

    Suet. Aug. 24: Equitem Romanum, quod duobus filiis adulescentibus causa detrectandi sacramenti pollices amputasset, ipsum bonaque subiecit hastae; quem tamen, quod inminere emptioni publicanos videbat, liberto suo addixit, ut relegatum in agros pro libero esse sineret.

  55. 55.

    This is the case, for instance, with the auctions held by the triumvirs, App. BC. 4.31.

  56. 56.

    Famously, Sextus Pompeius purchased some of the properties that had belonged to his father and then been resold by Antony in this way, Cic. Phil. 13.5.10–12. Similarly, Cassius Dio (47.17) reports that during the Second Triumvirate, victims of proscriptions were permitted to reacquire one-third of their own patrimonies, yet encountered difficulties doing so due to the highly devaluated prices at auctions, which attracted external bidders, and the fact that entire lots were sold at a single auction.

  57. 57.

    Cic. Att. 5.8.2: id ego ita fieri volui de C. Duroni sententia quem et amicissimum Miloni perspexeram et talem virum qualem tu iudicas cognoram. Eius autem consilium meumque hoc fuerat, primum ut in potestate nostra esset res, ne illum malus emptor alienus mancipiis quae permulta secum habet spoliaret, deinde ut Faustae. quoi cautum ille esse voluisset ratum esset. Erat etiam illud ut ipsi nos si quid servari posset quam facillime servaremus.

  58. 58.

    Cic. Att. 5.8.2: tu si modo es Romae (vix enim puto), sin es, hoc vehementer animadvertas velim. Roma acceperam litteras Milonem meum queri per litteras iniuriam meam quod Philotimus socius esset in bonis suis.

  59. 59.

    Ascon. tog. Cand. in Mil. 54, 20–21: Milo in exilium Massiliam intra paucissimos dies profectus est. Bona eius propter aeris alieni magnitudinem semuncia venierunt. As has been noted by Shackleton Bailey, Atticus III (1966: 202).

  60. 60.

    Dig. 4.4.49 (Ulp. 35 edict.).

  61. 61.

    Dig. 49.14.1 pr. (Callist. 1 De iure fisci): vel magni pretii rem minoris ex fisco comparasse.

  62. 62.

    Cod. Iust. 10.3.2. Similarly, Cod. Iust. 10.1.3.

  63. 63.

    Cod. Theod. 10.17.3 (AD 392) = Cod. Iust. 44.16.

  64. 64.

    Etenim periniquum est, ut, alienis bonis sub gratiosa auctione distractis, parum accedat publico nomini, quum totum pereat debitori. The expression is translated as a ‘rigged auction’ in the edition of the Codex Iustinianus by Frier et al. (2016). A passage of Ulpian in the Digest (26.7.7.2 (Ulp. Ed. 35)) refers to the purchase of praedia by a tutor per sordes aut gratiam, to describe irregular favours that benefited the emptor.

  65. 65.

    Cod. Iust. 2.37.3 (AD 294).

  66. 66.

    Among others, large auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s frequently resort to these strategies.

  67. 67.

    Attempts to regulate such ambiguous practices in modern auctions are attested from at least since the eighteenth century, see Meisel (1996: 400–403).

  68. 68.

    See Steiglitz (2007).

  69. 69.

    Marshall and Marx (2014: 202–203).

  70. 70.

    For example Cic. Att. 1.14.7; 7.1.9; Fam. 14.5.2–3; Att. 11.15.3–4; 13.12.4; 13.13–14.4; 13.37.a; 13.45.3; 13.46; 14.9.1; 14.10.3; 14.11.2.

  71. 71.

    Cic. Fam. 7.2.1: Mandatum tuum curabo diligenter. Sed homo acutus ei mandasti potissimum cui expediret illud venire quam plurimo. Sed eo vidisti multum quod praefinisti quo ne pluris emerem. Quod si mihi permisisses, qui meus amor in te est, confecissem cum coheredibus. Nunc, quoniam tuum pretium novi, illicitatorem potius ponam quam illud minoris veneat. Sed de ioco satis est. Tuum negotium agam, sicuti debeo, diligenter.

  72. 72.

    Cic. Off. 3.61. Festus links licitatio with those who compete in the market of fighting: licitati in mercando sive pugnando contendentes, Fest p. 83. On licitatio as auction as well as bidding, see Andreau (1999b: 179–180).

  73. 73.

    W. Miller (LCL 1913) translates both sentences less literally: “the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all what he will give or take.” In my view, Cicero’s text does not refer to a discussion on the price between the parties, but rather to negotiations that denaturalise, and thus potentially manipulate the auction.

  74. 74.

    Fest. p. 80.25: Inlicitator: emptor. On il−/inlicitator as mock- or sham-bidders, see also The Oxford Latin Dictionary (ed. P.G. Glare 1973), IV, 828; and further editions of the De Officiis: M. Testard (CUF) (1970, 101–2): ‘enchérisseur’; M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (CUP) (1991, 123): ‘artificial bidder’; R. Nickel (Tusculum) (2008, 255): ‘Scheinkäufer’.

  75. 75.

    Cic. Att. 12.37.2. For the whole episode, see Shackleton Bailey (1966: 404–413).

  76. 76.

    An in-depth analysis is provided by García Morcillo (2020).

  77. 77.

    Rosillo-López discusses in this volume how a crucial confidential information finally ended Cicero’s participation in the auction.

  78. 78.

    Cic. Att. 12.38a.2.

  79. 79.

    This was partially solved by an inspection of the property by his agents, Cic. Att. 13.1.3; 13.29.1–2; 13.33.2.

  80. 80.

    On the financial strategies of this affair, see especially Benöhr (1986); Rauh (1989a: 60–69); Rollinger (2009: 154–60).

  81. 81.

    Cic. Att. 12.5a; 13.31; 13.5.1; 13.7.1.

  82. 82.

    Plin. Ep. 7.11. The text specifies that Hermes removed his five-twelfth of the property after announcing at the auction: Miraris, quod Hermes libertus meus, hereditarios agros, quos ego iusseram proscribe, non expectata auctione pro meo quincunce ex septingentis milibus Corelliae addixerit. On this episode, see Sherwin-White (1966: 415–418); García Morcillo (2005: 245–246).

  83. 83.

    Plin. Ep. 7.11. Pliny admitted that he may have obtained nine hundred thousand sesterces instead of the seven hundred Corellia paid for it. Pliny apologised to Fabatus and the coheirs for having decided to help his friend as a moral obligation.

  84. 84.

    In a later letter, Ep. 7.14, we learn that Corellia insisted to pay nine and not seven hundred thousand sesterces for the purchase of the property. Sherwin-White (1966: 417–418), has noticed that the difference between both is 5%, which coincides with the rate of the inheritance tax, the vicesima hereditatium, which Pliny had to pay for the acceptance of his inheritance.

  85. 85.

    See Dig. 10.2.6 (Ulp. 19 Edict.): Nam ad licitationem rem deducere, ut qui licitatione vicit hic habeat instrumenta hereditaria, non placet neque mihi neque Pomponio.

  86. 86.

    Dig. 10.2.5 (Gai. 7 Prov. ed.).

  87. 87.

    Dig. 10.2.29 (Paul. 23 ed.).

  88. 88.

    Dig. 4.7.12 (Marc. 14 inst.): verbi gratia ut potentior emptor per licitationem vilius eam accipiat et per hoc iterum ipse recipiat (transl. by A. Watson).

  89. 89.

    Dig. 41.4.2.8 (Paul. 54 ad. ed.): si propius habeat emptorem, et, si minoris emerit, tutelae iudicio tenebitur ac si alii minoris addixisset. The iudicium tutelae meant that the tutor could be condemned in the case of irresponsible management that would cause damage or provoke loss of the pupil’s property.

  90. 90.

    A definition of the in diem addictio is provided by Paul, Dig. 18.2.1 (Paul. 5 ad Sab.).

  91. 91.

    Dig. 18.2.5 (Pomp. 9 ad Sab.): Quidquid enim ad utilitatem venditoris pertinet, pro meliore condicione haberi debet.

  92. 92.

    Dig. 18.2.4.6 (Ulp. 28 ad Sab.).

  93. 93.

    See Talamanca (1954: 106–107). The author suggests that sellers may have opted for these alternatives to traditional auctiones to avoid the expenses associated with these processes. In sales of unoccupied or abandoned land in Ptolemaic Egypt, the possibility to outbid the highest price after the adjudication (kuroris) was generally open until the payment of the final sum and the transfer of the goods (paradeixis).

  94. 94.

    Dig. 18.2.7 (Paul. 5 ad Sab.); 18.2.8 (Paul. 33 ad ed.).

  95. 95.

    Dig. 18.2.6.1 (Ulp. 28 ad Sab.). Paul compares the in diem addictio with the situation of tenants and landowners, and defends the idea that whoever cultivates the land should benefit from its fruits, Dig. 49.14.50 (Paul. 3 decr.).

  96. 96.

    Dig. 18.2.6 pr. (Ulp. 28 ad Sab.) (transl. by A. Watson).

  97. 97.

    Ulpian proposes to investigate the intentions of the vendor to state if he is acting in good faith, Dig. 18.26pr. (Ulp. 28 ad Sab.). Along with stricter legislation, intensified self-regulation and professional codes or practices are today still suggested as the most effective mechanisms to attenuate this problem, Meisel (1996: 413).

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  1. University of Roehampton, London, UK

    Marta García Morcillo

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García Morcillo, M. (2021). Managing Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information in Roman Auctions. In: Rosillo-López, C., García Morcillo, M. (eds) Managing Information in the Roman Economy. Palgrave Studies in Ancient Economies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54100-2_4

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