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MiFID and MiFID II Conduct of Business Rules and Their Relationship with Private Law: The EU Dimension

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EU Investor Protection Regulation and Liability for Investment Losses

Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 20))

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the tension between the MiFID and MiFID II conduct of business rules and national private law from the perspective of EU law. The chapter describes how this tension has been generated by the fact that MiFID and MiFID II have subjected conduct of business rules, which are similar in substance to the duties of care formulated in national private laws, to a regime of public supervision and administrative enforcement. The fact that the conduct of business rules also affect private law relationships by imposing standards of conduct on firms when they provide investment services to clients demonstrates the relevance of these rules for national private law. However, the fact that the conduct of business rules are cast as financial supervision standards and that MiFID and MiFID II remain silent with regard to judicial enforcement, makes it difficult to determine the effect of these rules in national private law. The potential effect of EU investor protection regulation in national private law is shown to extend to private law concepts which determine whether and, if so, to what extent investment firms can be required to compensate retail investors based on national contract and torts law. The chapter comprehensively explores two competing approaches to the interaction between the MiFID and MiFID II conduct of business and private law concepts governing a firm’s liability to pay—the subordination and the complementarity model—and advances the latter as the preferred approach.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See in general Cherednychenko (2015a), pp. 504 et seq.; Cherednychenko (2014a).

  2. 2.

    For more detailed information about the development of these duties, see Sects. 5.2–5.4 and the case law cited. See also Cherednychenko (2010), p. 418; Mülbert (2009), p. 301. An illustration of this development are the duties formulated by the BGH in the seminal Bond-decision (BGH 6 July 1993, XI ZR 12/93), see Sect. 5.2.3. The BGH formulated a general duty of care that breaks down into two more specific duties, to ensure “anleger- und objektgerechte Beratung”, which show considerable overlap with the suitability rule and information disclosure duty contained in MiFID and MiFID II. Also, in this regard and including further references, see Grundmann (2017), p. 930; Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 80 and 84; Spindler (2016), no. 103. Similarly, in English law, Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1018 provides an example where liability was based on failure by an adviser to cater the recommended investment to the characteristics of the investor, see Sect. 5.4.2.

  3. 3.

    In general, see Cherednychenko (2015a), pp. 504 et seq.; Cherednychenko (2014a).

  4. 4.

    See Möslein (2015), p. 560; Cherednychenko (2014a); Köndgen (2011); Assmann (2011); Ferrarini (2005).

  5. 5.

    In further detail, see Cherednychenko (2014a). See also: Cherednychenko (2015a).

  6. 6.

    Art. 48 MiFID, art. 50 MiFID; art. 67 MiFID II, art. 69 MiFID II.

  7. 7.

    Art. 50 and 51 MiFID; art. 69 and 70 MiFID II.

  8. 8.

    Accordingly, Member States have implemented EU investment services regulation into their national financial supervision framework (see in more detail: Chap. 4).

  9. 9.

    Grundmann (2017), pp. 927 and 928; Möslein (2015), p. 560; Cherednychenko (2014a). Also, more recently, see Della Negra (2019), p. 36.

  10. 10.

    MiFID and MiFID II deploy conduct of business regulation facilitating transactions in investments as a regulatory strategy to give effect to the goal of investor protection. For more general information, see: MacNeil (2012), p. 217.

  11. 11.

    In the same vein: Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 502.

  12. 12.

    Assmann (2011), p. 43.

  13. 13.

    Cherednychenko (2014a).

  14. 14.

    Also in this regard: Cherednychenko (2010), p. 417.

  15. 15.

    Cherednychenko (2015a).

  16. 16.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), pp. 511 et seq.

  17. 17.

    See in more detail Riassetto and Richard (2012), no. 6.62.

  18. 18.

    [2012] CSOH. The decision was handed down by Lord Hudge, now justice in the UK Supreme Court. See in more detail about this decision Sect. 5.4.3.2.

  19. 19.

    In more detail, see Sect. 6.2.2.

  20. 20.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), pp. 516 et seq.

  21. 21.

    For an overview of jurisdictions which have adopted these models and relevant scholarship, see Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 507; Cherednychenko (2014a), p. 62. Also including further references: Wallinga (2014). More recently, see Andenas and Della Negra (2017), p. 502. These schools of thought resemble the opposing points of view in German legal literature regarding the nature of the regulatory rules implemented in the financial supervision framework (see in more detail: Sect. 4.7.2).

  22. 22.

    Proponents of this model include Busch (2012a, 2017, 2018); Herresthal (2012), p. 103; Colaert (2011), pp. 347 and 348; Mülbert (2009); also seemingly in this regard Ferrarini (2005), p. 22.

  23. 23.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 513. Also, more in general, see Wallinga (2014); Cherednychenko (2010), p. 419; Hudson (2013), pp. 233 et seq.

  24. 24.

    For more detailed information about this at the Member State level, see Part III of this research.

  25. 25.

    In some Member States, such as Germany and the Netherlands, a successful claim for damages in tort requires that the standard of care in question aims at protecting not only the general interests, but also the specific interests of the claimant. See in more detail Sects. 6.2.2 and 6.3.1.1.

  26. 26.

    In this respect, see Busch (2018), pp. 1017 and 1018; Busch (2017), pp. 86 and 90.

  27. 27.

    Also in this respect, see Grundmann (2018a), pp. 3 and 4; Grundmann (2017), pp. 926 et seq., 932 et seq., 947 and 948.

  28. 28.

    In more detail, see Schütze (2018), pp. 351 et seq.; Arnull (2018); Schütze (2016), pp. 394 et seq.; Nowak et al. (2011); Prechal (2006); Prechal et al. (2005), pp. 8 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Compare art. 4(3) TEU. Also about the role of private law remedies in the light of the effectiveness of EU law, see Sieburgh (2013), p. 1186.

  30. 30.

    Similarly: Sieburgh (2011).

  31. 31.

    It should be noted that in contrast to the situation under MiFID, the Commission has elaborated the MiFID II information disclosure duty and suitability rule central to this research in a MiFID II Delegated Regulation on organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms (No. 2017/565), see in more detail: Sects. 2.4.3 and 2.5. In the light of the hierarchy between the measure in which a delegated rule-making power is laid down, on the one hand, and a delegated act which is adopted under that power, on the other, it is proposed that the fact that the MiFID II conduct of business rules regime is laid down in a Directive should be the guiding principle in establishing the regime’s relationship with private law.

  32. 32.

    See more in general about Directives: Prechal (2005).

  33. 33.

    Art. 4(3) TFEU.

  34. 34.

    CJEU 10 April 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, C-14/83 (Von Colson), para. 26. Also, on this in more detail, see: Schütze (2018), pp. 406 et seq.; Prechal (2006); Prechal (2005), pp. 132 et seq.

  35. 35.

    Prechal (2005), pp. 73 et seq. For exceptions to this general rule in the form of examples where EU law requires the use of (regulatory) private law, see Hellgardt (2016), pp. 189 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Art. 288 TFEU.

  37. 37.

    See about this in further detail: Schütze (2018), p. 570.

  38. 38.

    This issue has generated an interesting scholarly debate. See for example Wallinga and Cherednychenko (2016), p. 191; Cherednychenko (2015a), pp. 504 et seq.; Wallinga (2015); Forschner (2013), pp. 39 et seq. and 61; Cherednychenko (2012), pp. 247 et seq.; Tridimas (2011), p. 794; Tison (2008), pp. 8 et seq.

  39. 39.

    Similarly Zahrte (2019), no. 105 et seq.; Grigoleit (2013), pp. 273 et seq.; Koller (2018), § 63, no. 9 and 10; Ellenberger (2009), p. 537; Assmann (2008), p. 30; Koller (2006), pp. 839 and 840.

  40. 40.

    Busch (2017), pp. 80 et seq.; Kalkman (2016).

  41. 41.

    Recently about the relevance of the distinction between public and private law in the context of EU private law, see Cherednychenko (2019).

  42. 42.

    For instance, see: art. 4(2)(k) TFEU, art. 36 TFEU, art. 45(4) TFEU, art. 54 TFEU, art. 106 TFEU, art. 123(1) TFEU, 179 VWEU and art. 272 VWEU. The most striking examples are art. 54 TFEU and art. 272 TFEU, where public and private law are put on opposite ends.

  43. 43.

    For example, also the Communication by the Commission on European contract law COM(2001) 398, where the Commission refers to “material private law, in particular contract law”. See also on this Semmelman (2012), p. 12. Furthermore, the fact, as will be shown in more detail in Sect. 3.3.2.4, that it is commonly recognised that the EU legislator lacks a general competence to harmonise private law also illustrates that EU law is not, in general, blind to the distinction, see more in general Reich (2013), p. 14; Micklitz (2011), p. 585.

  44. 44.

    Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage [2004] OJ L143/56.

  45. 45.

    COM(2002) 17 (Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, Explanatory Memorandum), 16 and 17.

  46. 46.

    Brans (2013), no. 2.25 et seq.; Bauw (2014), pp. 564 et seq.; Winter et al. (2008), p. 163. See also Cherednychenko (2019), pp. 13 and 14.

  47. 47.

    Art. 48 MiFID, art. 50 MiFID; art. 67 MiFID II, art. 69 MiFID II.

  48. 48.

    Art. 51(1) MiFID; art. 70 MiFID II.

  49. 49.

    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector COM(2010) 716.

  50. 50.

    Art. 52(2) MiFID, art. 53 MiFID II which state that Member States shall “encourage” the setting-up of extra-judicial mechanisms; art. 74(2) MiFID II, art. 75 MiFID II which state that Member States shall “ensure” such setting-up. For more general information about promotion by the EU legislator of the use of out-of-court enforcement mechanisms of EU investor protection regulation as a substitution for enforcement by civil courts, see: Cherednychenko (2015b), p. 638; Micklitz (2014a), p. 508.

  51. 51.

    In the same vein: Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 505.

  52. 52.

    Commission, Public Consultation. Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), Brussels: 8 December 2010, 63.

  53. 53.

    Commission Public Consultation. Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), Brussels: 8 December 2010, 63.

  54. 54.

    In more detail: Moloney (2012), p. 421. See also recently Della Negra (2019), pp. 13 et seq.

  55. 55.

    It should be noted that in the course of drafting MiFID an amendment to the draft of the Directive was proposed by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Report by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 4 September 2003 A5-0287/2003 amendment 23. The proposed amendment that was to bring harmonisation of liability based on private law within the scope of the Directive was ultimately not adopted in MiFID, which could similarly be understood as an indication that private law norms are not subordinated to the EU investor protection regulation. Similarly Rothenhöfer (2008), p. 68. See also in the same vein: BGH 17 September 2013, XI ZR 332/12, no. 27.

  56. 56.

    In more detail about delegated rule-making in the context of MiFID II: Sect. 2.4.2.

  57. 57.

    See in this regard Koller (2018), § 63, no. 10; Assmann (2011), p. 42; Rothenhöfer (2008), p. 68.

  58. 58.

    See in more detail: Schütze (2016), pp. 224 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Art. 5(1) TEU. In more detail and including further references, see Micklitz (2014b), p. 132; Reich (2013), p. 14; Poelzig (2012); Micklitz (2011), p. 585; Weatherill (2010), p. 58; Caruso (1997), p. 10.

  60. 60.

    Art. 114 TFEU.

  61. 61.

    Art. 169(2)(b) TFEU.

  62. 62.

    Art. 67–81 TFEU.

  63. 63.

    See in further detail Kuipers (2014); Forschner (2013), p. 32; Micklitz (2012a), p. 13; Semmelman (2012); Weatherill (2010), pp. 58 and 59.

  64. 64.

    Art. 53 TFEU(1), former art. 47(1) TEC.

  65. 65.

    Similarly Spindler (2016), no. 26a; Grigoleit (2013), pp. 274 and 275, who regards the competence used as an indication of the Directive’s “zivilrechtliche Neutralität”; Assmann (2011), pp. 32, 34 and 43.

  66. 66.

    Art. 5(3) TEU. For more detailed information about the principle of subsidiarity including further references, see Schütze (2016), pp. 252 et seq.; Weatherill (2010), pp. 64 and 65; Tridimas (2006), pp. 183 et seq.

  67. 67.

    For more detailed information about the principle of proportionality, see Schütze (2016), pp. 352 et seq.

  68. 68.

    For the applicable test, see Schütze (2016), pp. 252 et seq.

  69. 69.

    Art. 5 Protocol (No 2) on the application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. For more detailed information about this duty and how it is enforced, see Schütze (2016), pp. 252 et seq.; Weatherill (2010), pp. 179 et seq.

  70. 70.

    Granted, the Commission generally fails to do so. The Commission does seem to have acknowledged that these issues need to be addressed by considering whether the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were satisfied in the course of the recast of MiFID (see MiFID II Proposal, 4 and 5; MiFIR Proposal, 5 and 6, see also MiFID II, rec. 164; MIFIR, rec. 48), however, the Commission failed to go into specifics.

  71. 71.

    CJEU EU 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:344, C-604/11 (Genil v. Bankinter), annotated by, inter alia, Grundmann (2013).

  72. 72.

    These regulatory conduct of business duties were transposed in the Spanish law on the securities market (Ley 24/1988 del Mercado de Valore).

  73. 73.

    Genil v. Bankinter, paras. 16 and 17.

  74. 74.

    Genil v. Bankinter, para. 56. For the remaining prejudicial questions referred to the CJEU, see paras. 22, 35 et seq. and 49 et seq.

  75. 75.

    My italics.

  76. 76.

    Confirmed in CJEU 3 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:794 (Banif Plus Bank v. Lantos), para. 79.

  77. 77.

    Similarly Spindler (2016), no. 28a. See differently Grundmann (2018b), no. 126; Grundmann (2013), 278, who focuses on the wording by the CJEU in para. 58 and suggests that it be interpreted as that Member States are left with only the freedom to choose which contractual consequences they would want to impose. This would imply, according to Grundmann, that Member States do not have the freedom to choose whether a contractual consequence should be applied to breach of MiFID conduct of business rules in the first place.

  78. 78.

    Similarly Möllers and Poppele (2013), pp. 467 and 468; Möllers (2015), p. 165; BGH 17 September 2013, XI ZR 332/12, no. 27 et seq.

  79. 79.

    See in more detail Wallinga (2014), § 4 and § 5.2. Similarly BGH 17 September 2013, XI ZR 332/12, para. 30 and 31. Differently Busch (2017); Busch (2013), pp. 675 and 676, who attaches considerable weight to the reference by the CJEU to the principle of effectiveness and who argues that civil courts are bound to MiFID in accordance with the subordination model.

  80. 80.

    CJEU 19 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:856.

  81. 81.

    Art. 25 Prospectus Directive. In contrast to MiFID, the Prospectus Directive does appear to contain a provision pertaining to private law. Art. 6(2) Prospectus Directive requires Member States to ensure that “their laws, regulation and administrative provisions on civil liability apply to those persons responsible for the information given in a prospectus”.

  82. 82.

    CJEU 19 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:856, no. 39 and 40. Similarly: Haentjens (2017), p. 1339.

  83. 83.

    In this regard: Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 505; Grundmann (2013), p. 275.

  84. 84.

    Recommendation by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for First Reading, 5 October 2012 A7-0306/2012 (MiFID II, art. 72(ha)).

  85. 85.

    A7-0306/2012.

  86. 86.

    In the same vein: Della Negra (2016), p. 155.

  87. 87.

    Janssen (2017), pp. 289 et seq.; Busch (2017), pp. 80 and 81. More in general about that MiFID and MiFID II would aim at providing for full harmonisation (also in relation to the conduct of business rules): Grundmann (2018b), no. 12; Verbruggen (2018); Marcacci (2017), p. 311; Hage (2017); Lerch (2015), pp. 409 et seq.; Cherednychenko (2014b), p. 480; Cherednychenko (2014a), p. 43; Forschner (2013), pp. 55 et seq.; Herresthal (2012), p. 102; MacNeil (2012), p. 57; Mak (2011), p. 558; Cherednychenko (2012), p. 243; Buchmann (2008), pp. 100 et seq.; Nikolaus and d’Oleire (2007), p. 2134.

  88. 88.

    COM(1999) 232, 5 and 11. The Commission repeated this desire in its Proposal for MiFID: COM(2002), 5, 8 and 27. In the same vein, the Lamfalussy Committee, which was responsible for the approach to regulation on which MiFID would ultimately be based, proposed to further limit the freedom of Member States: Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, Brussels: 2001, 24.

  89. 89.

    COM(2002) 625, 5, 8 and 27.

  90. 90.

    Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, Brussels: 15 February 2001, 24.

  91. 91.

    The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Brussels: February 2009, 27 et seq.

  92. 92.

    Communication on European financial supervision COM(2009) 252, 4.

  93. 93.

    For more general information about the ESMA and its powers to contribute to regulatory and supervisory convergence, see, inter alia: Moloney (2014), pp. 339 et seq.; Busuioc (2013); Möllers (2010).

  94. 94.

    ESMA has elaborated in particular detail several aspects of MiFID II, see for example: Final Report on Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements ESMA35-43-620; Final Report on Guidelines on complex debt instruments and structured deposits ESMA/2015/1783; Guidelines on the management body of market operators and data reporting services providers ESMA70-154-271; Guidelines for the assessment of knowledge and competence ESMA71-1154262120-153; Final Report on Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines on the assessment of on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU EBA/GL/2017/12/ESMA71-99-598.

  95. 95.

    See in more detail: Frank (2015); Wallinga (2015); Moloney (2014), pp. 339 et seq.; Walla (2012); Möllers (2010). In a similar vein: Tridimas (2011), p. 792; Moloney (2008), p. 36.

  96. 96.

    Wallinga (2015), § 2.1 including further references: Wallinga (2014). In the same vein: Walker and Purves (2014), no. 3.115 et seq.; Forschner (2013), p. 52.

  97. 97.

    See also: Moloney (2014), p. 28; Moloney (2008), p. 35.

  98. 98.

    MiFID, rec. 2 (“(…) [i]t is necessary to provide for the degree of harmonisation needed to offer a high level of protection and to allow investment firms to provide services throughout the Community (…)”) and rec. 5 (“It is necessary to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime (…)”; MiFID Implementing Directive, rec. 7 (“In order to ensure the uniform application of the various provisions of Directive 2004/39/EC [MiFID, MWW], it is necessary to establish a harmonised set of organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms.”); MIFID Implementing Regulation, rec. 2 (“It is appropriate that the provisions of this Regulation take that legislative form in order to ensure a harmonised regime in all Member States (…)”). Furthermore, for instance, MiFID, rec. 60 and MiFID Implementing Regulation, rec. 3 express the desire to realise a high degree of harmonisation of supervisory powers, the transparency requirements, and provisions regulating transaction reporting. MiFID II, rec. 58, for example, states that the European Union is committed to “minimising, where appropriate, the discretion available to Member States” and MiFID II, rec. 42 for instance states that “(…) it is appropriate to require Member States to apply requirements at least analogous to the ones laid down in this Directive to those persons, in particular during the phase of authorisation, in the assessment of their reputation and experience and of the suitability of any shareholders, in the review of the conditions for initial authorisation and on-going supervision as well as on conduct of business obligations”.

  99. 99.

    Additionally, the formulation of MiFID II’s recitals using the formulation of “minimising discretion”, especially when combined with the condition of “where appropriate” and “at least analogous”, lacks clarity, which leaves room for discussion as to its exact meaning.

  100. 100.

    Conclusion Advocate General Kokott, ECLI:EU:2009:534 (Spector v. CBFA), no. 75.

  101. 101.

    Conclusion Advocate General Kokott, ECLI:EU:2009:534 (Spector v. CBFA), no. 76. Also on this Forschner (2013), p. 52; Gerner-Beuerle (2012), pp. 317, 329 and 330.

  102. 102.

    With regard to mutual recognition and home Member States authorisation the Directive prohibits Member States from imposing any additional requirements (art. 31(1), 32(1) MiFID, and 33(2) MiFID; art. 34(1), 35(1), and 41(2) MiFID II). Similarly, MiFID II precludes Member States from imposing stricter requirements with regard to notification to and approval by competent authorities of proposed acquisitions (Art. 12(7) MiFID II).

  103. 103.

    Regulated markets for instance are allowed to impose more stringent standards on the issuers of financial instruments (MiFID II, rec. 122). Member States appear to have the same freedom with regard to regulating tied agents (art. 23(6) MiFID; 29(6) MiFID II) and SME growth markets (art. 33(4) MiFID II). Moreover, Member States are free to provide supervisory authorities with farther-reaching enforcement powers than are contained in the (art. 50(2) MiFID; MiFID II, rec. 137 jo. art. 69(2) MiFID II).

  104. 104.

    Also with regard to MiFID, see Forschner (2013), pp. 54 et seq.; Tison (2010), pp. 2632 and 2633; Tison (2007), p. 445.

  105. 105.

    ESC Minutes, 25 February 2005. See on this Moloney (2008), p. 1063; Moloney (2007), p. 631.

  106. 106.

    Also in this regard, see Armour (2016), p. 233. This seems to be supported by the Commission’s acknowledgement that EU financial services legislation was, in this phase, largely based on minimum harmonisation: Communication on a reformed financial sector for Europe COM(2014) 279, 4.

  107. 107.

    A provision similar to art. 24(12) MiFID II was contained in art. 4 of the MiFID Implementing Directive (2006/73/EC). While art. 24(12) MiFID II explicitly refers to the conduct of business rules contained in that provision, one could argue that it also extends to the suitability rule laid down in art. 25 MiFID II which can be considered to be a specific expression of the principle of loyalty contained in art. 24(1) MiFID II. Nevertheless, considering the importance of the approach to harmonisation, such a legislative omission could be regarded, to say the least, rather remarkable.

  108. 108.

    See art. 24 lid 12, second paragraph, MiFID II.

  109. 109.

    The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Brussels: 25 February 2009, 29.

  110. 110.

    CJEU EU 29 April 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:286 (Nationale Nederlanden v. Van Leeuwen). For further information about the decision, see Wallinga and Cherednychenko (2016).

  111. 111.

    Nationale Nederlanden v. Van Leeuwen, para. 21, confirming: CJEU 5 March 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:136 (Axa Royale).

  112. 112.

    Nationale Nederlanden v. Van Leeuwen, para. 21; Axa Royale, para. 24. This, however, does not mean that there can be no conditions attached to the exercise of the power. The additional information disclosure duties need to be necessary for a proper understanding of the essential elements of the offered product and, Furthermore, insurance companies need to be able to sufficiently clearly and accurately determine what information has to be provided.

  113. 113.

    Also in this regard: FCA, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation – Policy Statement II’, London: July 2017, PS17/14, no. 2.9 et seq.

  114. 114.

    See also Moloney (2014), p. 340.

  115. 115.

    MiFID II, rec. 3, 7 and 37.

  116. 116.

    Art. 16(11) MiFID II.

  117. 117.

    Similarly Möllers (2015), p. 169.

  118. 118.

    MiFID II Proposal, 4 and 5; MiFIR Proposal, 5 and 6. See also MiFID II, rec. 164; MiFIR, rec. 48. The way the Commission discusses these tests still leaves room for improvement. Stating, for example, that the “proposal take (sic) full account of the principle of proportionality” does not make it so.

  119. 119.

    Micklitz (2009), p. 53. More in general about the importance of these principles, see Micklitz (2012a), pp. 19 and 20. Also in this context, see Wallinga (2015), p. 268.

  120. 120.

    For instance, see Cherednychenko (2012).

  121. 121.

    It adopts the system set out in the preamble of the MiFID Implementing Directive, rec. 7–10.

  122. 122.

    It has additionally been submitted that the harmonisation which the ban on goldplating would realise is limited to the provisions specified in the Implementing Directive and does not extend to the general principles contained in art. 19 MiFID, see in more detail Roth (2012); Forschner (2013).

  123. 123.

    Compare, for example, that Member States considered the characterisation of derivatives as non-complex instruments as such an important issue that it should be regulated in a framework measure instead of an implementing measure: ESC Minutes, 26–27 April 2006, 4. See on this: Moloney (2008), 1063. In a similar vein, Tison (2008), pp. 4 and 5.

  124. 124.

    See also Walker and Purves (2014), no. 3.117 where it is considered that a measure at the second Lamfalussy level cannot convert the provisions of a framework Directive enacted at the first Lamfalussy level into maximum harmonisation provisions if the wording of the framework measure does not explicitly provide for that approach to harmonisation; Tison (2010), footnote 48, who argues that even though art. 4 MiFID Implementing Directive restricts Member States from gold plating, this “(…) in itself is not sufficient (…) to hold that the higher level MiFID Directive constitutes maximum harmonization.”

  125. 125.

    See also: Walker and Purves (2014), no. 3.117 where it is considered that a measure at the second Lamfalussy level cannot convert the provisions of a framework Directive enacted at the first Lamfalussy level into maximum harmonisation provisions if the wording of the framework measure does not explicitly provide for that approach to harmonisation; Tison (2010), footnote 48, who argues that even though art. 4 MiFID Implementing Directive restricts Member States from gold plating, this “(…) in itself is not sufficient (…) to hold that the higher level MiFID Directive constitutes maximum harmonization.”

  126. 126.

    See also: Wallinga and Pijls (2018), § 2.

  127. 127.

    MiFID II Delegated Regulation EU 2017/565. See also: MiFID II, rec. 155.

  128. 128.

    For more detailed information including further references, see: Micklitz and Rott (2017), no. 42; Walla (2017), no. 35.

  129. 129.

    This is not to say that the adoption of delegated acts is incapable of contributing to (a significant degree of) convergence of EU investor protection regulation through covering an extensive area of regulation, as well as dealing with the aspects in question in often great detail. See in general: Tridimas (2011), p. 792; Cherednychenko (2012), pp. 250 and 251; Tison (2007), pp. 445 and 446.

  130. 130.

    In further detail and including references: Schütze (2018), pp. 99 et seq.; Craig (2009).

  131. 131.

    CJEU 26 February 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:84, C-152/84 (Marshall I), para. 48, confirmed in: CJEU 14 July 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:292, C-91/92 (Faccini Dori), para. 22; CJEU 7 January 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:12, C-201/02 (Wells), para. 56. In further detail Timmermans (2016), p. 681; Prechal (2005), p. 255.

  132. 132.

    In considerably more detail and with further references Schütze (2018), pp. 98 et seq.; Timmermans (2016), p. 676; Möslein (2015), p. 551; Weatherill (2013), p. 16; Leczykiewicz (2013), pp. 209 and 210; Reich (2010a), pp. 67 et seq.; Craig (2009); Prechal (2005), pp. 55 et seq. and 255.

  133. 133.

    Established in CJEU 19 November 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 (Francovich). See in more detail: Schütze (2016), pp. 414 et seq.

  134. 134.

    CJEU 26 September 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:496, C-443/98 (Unilever Italia), para. 50 et seq.; CJEU 30 April 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:172, C-194/94 (CIA Security), para. 48 and 55. See also: CJEU 7 January 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:12, C-201/01 (Wells), para. 57 et seq.

  135. 135.

    CJEU 10 April 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, C-14/83 (Von Colson), para. 26; confirmed in a relationship between private parties in CJEU 13 November 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:395, C-106/89 (Marleasing). For detailed information about the duty of consistent interpretation in the context of private law, see Wissink (2001).

  136. 136.

    The classic example of this indirect effect is CJEU 22 November 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, C-144/04 (Mangold). In more detail about this device, see Schütze (2018), pp. 106 et seq.

  137. 137.

    See in general Schütze (2018), pp. 01 et seq.; Möslein (2015), p. 551; Weatherill (2013), p. 16; Prechal (2005), p. 261. See also about the terminology used to describe these effects including further references Timmermans (2016), pp. 675 et seq., who illustrates the (often confusing) difference in terminology used in EU legal doctrine (horizontal direct and indirect effect) and private law doctrine (direct and indirect horizontal effect).

  138. 138.

    Arnull (2018); Poelzig (2012), pp. 258 and 259; Prechal (2006), pp. 429 and 430; Prechal (2005), pp. 134 and 135.

  139. 139.

    For further information and including references to criticism on the notion, see Schütze (2018), pp. 405, 406, 411 and 412; Arnull (2018), pp. 1012 et seq.; Hellgardt (2016), pp. 187 et seq.; Rott (2013), pp. 181 et seq.; Reich (2013), pp. 92 and 93; Prechal (2005), p. 134; Van Gerven (2000); Prechal (1998); Kakouris (1997).

  140. 140.

    Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017); Rott (2013), pp. 182 et seq.; Leczykiewicz (2013), p. 211; Poelzig (2012), pp. 259 et seq. and 270 et seq.; Micklitz (2009), p. 54; Prechal (2006), p. 430.

  141. 141.

    CJEU 16 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, C-33/76 (Rewe-Zentralfinanz), para. 5; CJEU 16 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:191, C-45/76 (Comet), para. 16; CJEU 9 November 1983, ECLI:EU:C:1983:317, C-199/82 (San Giorgio), para. 14, which added the “excessively difficult” part.

  142. 142.

    In more detail Rott (2013), pp. 182 and 183.

  143. 143.

    For more information about the (development of the) principle of effectiveness and its different functions, see Schütze (2018), pp. 411 et seq.; Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017), p. 581; Rott (2013): Reich (2013), pp. 89 et seq.; Tridimas (2006), pp. 418 et seq.

  144. 144.

    The CJEU first formulated the principle in CJEU 15 May 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, C-222/84 (Johnston). See also: CJEU 10 April 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, C-14/83 (Von Colson), para. 23. For more information about the principle of effective judicial protection, see Arnull (2018), pp. 1019 et seq.; Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017), p. 581; Krommendijk (2016); Safjan and Düsterhaus (2014); Mak (2014); Rott (2013), pp. 182 and 183; Leczykiewicz (2013), pp. 213 and 214; Reich (2013), pp. 97 et seq.; Tridimas (2006), p. 422; Van Gerven (2000).

  145. 145.

    See, e.g., CJEU 20 September 2001, C-453/99 (Courage v. Crehan), para. 26; CJEU 17 September 2002, C-253/00 (Muñoz), para. 30; CJEU 13 July 2006, C-295/04-C-298/04 (Manfredi and others), para. 60.

  146. 146.

    See in this regard: Krommendijk (2016), p. 1404.

  147. 147.

    Specifically about the relationship between the principle of effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial protection: Arnull (2018), pp. 1019 et seq., 1025 and 1026; Krommendijk (2016), pp. 1404 et seq.; Prechal (2015), pp. 61 et seq.; Prechal and Widdershoven (2011), pp. 44 et seq.

  148. 148.

    For more general information about (the significance of) rights in this regard, see Reich (2007), p. 718; Eilmansberger (2004), p. 1199; Van Gerven (2000), p. 502; Van Gerven (1995), p. 691.

  149. 149.

    For more detailed information and including further references, see Prechal (2005), p. 97; Van Gerven (2000), p. 502. See also Hellgardt (2016), pp. 193 et seq.

  150. 150.

    Tison (2010). See also Grundmann (2013), who argues that it is not clear from Genil v Bankinter how the CJEU would answer that question.

  151. 151.

    See in the context of MiFID (II): Hacker (2017), pp. 854 et seq; Poelzig (2015), pp. 807 et seq.; Tison (2010), p. 2624; Veil (2007), p. 1825. See also Reich (2010b), pp. 151 and 155, however, more reserved in the wake of the decision by the CJEU in Genil v Bankinter is Reich (2013), pp. 202 and 203.

  152. 152.

    This line of reasoning was developed primarily in the field of competition law, see, e.g., CJEU 20 September 2001, C-453/99 (Courage v. Crehan), para. 26; CJEU 17 September 2002, C-253/00 (Muñoz), para. 30; CJEU 13 July 2006, C-295/04-C-298/04 (Manfredi and others); CJEU 5 June 2014, C-557/12 (Kone), para. 21, but has also been applied outside this field in CJEU 17 September 2002, C-253/00 (Muñoz), para. 30.

  153. 153.

    In general about the potential role of the fundamental right to an effective remedy in developing rights and remedies, see Micklitz (2012b), who argues for the adoption of a more activist approach by courts making use of art. 47 Charter; Mak (2014); Collins (2018); Aronstein (2019). It remains to be seen what the added practical benefit is of relying on the principle of effective judicial protection, see Della Negra (2019), pp. 196 et seq.; Arnull (2018), pp. 1025 and 1026; Krommendijk (2016), p. 1408; Reich (2013), p. 121.

  154. 154.

    Similarly: Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 504; Vandendriessche (2015), 103; Tridimas (2011), 794 and 795; Cherednychenko (2012), p. 247. See also the decision rendered by Lord Hodge, now justice in the UK Supreme Court, in the Scottish case of Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland [2012] CSOH, at [48], where he held that MiFID does not require Member States to provide protection to customers by means of a direct right of action for damages against an authorised person.

  155. 155.

    Art. 48 MiFID, art. 50 MiFID; art. 67 MiFID II, art. 69 MiFID II.

  156. 156.

    With regard to out-of-court enforcement: art. 53 MiFID (“shall encourage”); art. 75 MiFID II (“shall ensure”). For more general information about this development of an overall trend of moving enforcement away from (civil) courts, see Cherednychenko (2015b), p. 638; Micklitz (2014a), p. 508.

  157. 157.

    See, e.g., CJEU 12 October 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:606, C-222/02 (Peter Paul), para. 40; CJEU 16 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:128, C-219/15 (Schmitt v TÜV), para. 55.

  158. 158.

    The imposition of an obligation on Member States to give effect to the conduct of business rules through holding firms liable on the basis of a more activist, rights-based approach also seems to sit uneasily with the rejection of a principle of civil liability which would have clearly brought this manner of private enforcement within the ambit of MiFID II (see in more detail: Sect. 3.3.2.3).

  159. 159.

    In general about the “adequate protection” test, see Cafaggi and Iamiceli (2017), p. 581; Reich (2013), pp. 92 and 97; Leczykiewicz (2013), p. 213; Prechal and Widdershoven (2011), p. 40; Van Gerven (2000), pp. 503 and 529.

  160. 160.

    In more detail, see Sieburgh (2014).

  161. 161.

    In this regard: Grigoleit (2013), pp. 275 et seq. This could be supported by the fact that MiFID and MiFID II seem to regard administrative sanctions as effective, proportionate and dissuasive (art. 51 MiFID; art. 70 MiFID II).

  162. 162.

    See also Vandendriessche (2015), p. 105.

  163. 163.

    CJEU 16 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, C-33/76 (Rewe-Zentralfinanz), para. 5; CJEU 16 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:191, C-45/76 (Comet), para. 16; CJEU 9 November 1983, ECLI:EU:C:1983:317, C-199/82 (San Giorgio), para. 14. See also: CJEU 19 July 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:478, C-591/10, para. 28; CJEU 20 September 2001, ECLI:EU:2001:465, C-453/99, para. 29.

  164. 164.

    More in general about the less demanding Rewe line and the room this offers Member States in shaping national law: Prechal (2015), pp. 58 et seq; Prechal and Widdershoven (2011), p. 39.

  165. 165.

    Krommendijk (2016), p. 1406.

  166. 166.

    See in particular detail about the applicable standard: Schütze (2018), pp. 411 et seq.; Reich (2013), pp. 90 and 91.

  167. 167.

    CJEU 14 December 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1994:437, C-312/93 (Peterbroeck); CJEU 14 December 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1994:441, joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 (Van Schijndel).

  168. 168.

    In this regard and including further references: Schütze (2018), pp. 416 and 417; Prechal (2005), pp. 174 and 175. See also about the applicable test: Tridimas (2006), p. 424.

  169. 169.

    Peterbroeck, para. 14; Van Schijndel, para. 19.

  170. 170.

    Ibidem.

  171. 171.

    See also Wallinga and Pijls (2018); Haentjens (2017), no. 61 et seq.; opinion of Advocate General Timmerman for HR 30 September 2016, ECLI:NL:PHR:163 (FortisEffect e.a. v. Staat der Nederlanden), no. 3.30; Wallinga (2014). Differently: Busch (2017), pp. 86 and 90, who argues that private law rules governing liability, such as the standard of care in private law, the relativity requirement and the burden to prove the existence of a causal link, cannot stand in the way of a successful claim for compensation of losses suffered as a result of the regulatory conduct of business rules.

  172. 172.

    In this regard: Busch (2012b, 2013).

  173. 173.

    For more general information, see MacNeil (2015), p. 416; Cherednychenko (2014a), p. 53; Cherednychenko (2012), p. 228.

  174. 174.

    Kamerstukken II, 33 632, no. 3, 26 and 28.

  175. 175.

    This is also underlined by the CJEU’s flexible approach to the principle of legal certainty in Nationale Nederlanden v. Van Leeuwen, para. 22, where the Court requires a “sufficient level of legal certainty” (see in more detail about the decision: Sect. 3.3.3.2).

  176. 176.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 516.

  177. 177.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 510; Wallinga (2014), § 5.4; Cherednychenko (2014b), pp. 490 and 491; Cherednychenko (2012), pp. 233 and 234.

  178. 178.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), pp. 510 and 511; Cherednychenko (2014b), p. 490.

  179. 179.

    See in more detail: HR 24 December 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BO1799 (Fortis v. Bourgonje), para. 3.4; HR 3 February 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU4914 (Rabobank Vaart en Vecht v. X), para. 3.6.2.

  180. 180.

    Compare Busch (2013).

  181. 181.

    The Dutch legislator and the regulatory authority, the AFM, identified these risks as the main justification for the introduction of the general duty of care (art. 4:24a Wft), see Kamerstukken II, 31 980, no. 55, addendum 135000, 3 (Wetgevingsbrief AFM); Kamerstukken II, 33 632, no. 3, 26.

  182. 182.

    Similarly Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 511; Forschner (2013), p. 139.

  183. 183.

    Art. 19(1) MiFID and art. 24(1) MiFID II. See also: Janssen (2017), pp. 307 et seq.; Busch (2017), pp. 81 et seq.; Broekhuizen (2016), § 4.66; Busch (2015), pp. 217 et seq.

  184. 184.

    Wallinga and Pijls (2018). Similarly Janssen (2017), p. 305; Busch (2017), pp. 81 and 82.

  185. 185.

    In general about this and including further references: Kerber (2008), pp. 78 et seq. and 89 et seq.; Collins (2008), p. 275; Kerber and Grundmann (2006), p. 222; Van den Bergh (2002), p. 254; Van den Bergh (2000).

  186. 186.

    Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 510.

  187. 187.

    It should also be borne in mind that these norms fulfil the essential (and difficult) task in national private law of striking a balance between the interests of claimant in being compensated and that of the defendant in (not) having to pay damages. The subordination model deprives national private law of its traditional mechanisms to balance these conflicting interests.

  188. 188.

    More in general Kerber (2008), p. 79; Collins (2008), p. 275.

  189. 189.

    See also Cherednychenko (2015a), p. 515.

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    Marnix Wallinga

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Wallinga, M. (2020). MiFID and MiFID II Conduct of Business Rules and Their Relationship with Private Law: The EU Dimension. In: EU Investor Protection Regulation and Liability for Investment Losses. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54001-2_3

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