Abstract
This Chapter addresses the shift generated in criminal investigations by the digital turn. In Western legal culture, home and correspondence have traditionally been considered the beacons of privacy, against intrusion by public authorities. For this reason, interference into an individual’s privacy for investigative purposes has been considered legitimate only under specific and strict conditions, often regulated by international bills of rights and domestic constitutions. With the digital turn, the core of an individual’s private life is not necessarily confined to home and correspondence, any longer: personal, sensitive information is now almost always stored on digital devices, that may prove easily vulnerable to external intrusions. In this context, Law Enforcement Agencies are taking advantage of an unprecedented ‘regulation gap’, allowing for an easy and effective interference in people’s lives. Fundamental rights seem to be the basis for filling that gap, developing from an evolutive interpretation of traditional concepts, like home and correspondence.
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Notes
- 1.
E.g. police in England and Wales leads the investigation until the final moment of prosecution, while in a certain number of continental legal order, the prosecutor is the master of the criminal investigation and the police almost responds to her guidelines (e.g. Italy, France, Germany, Spain): see Perrodet (2002), p. 434 f.
- 2.
Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 49.
- 3.
Bowling et al. (2019), p. 150.
- 4.
The distinction between prevention and repression of crime spread in continental Europe in the second half of nineteenth century. But it was the eighteenth century when Blackstone set the spotlight on ‘preventive justice’ in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (although he recognised preventive value to punishment in itself): “this preventive justice consists in obliging those persons whom there is a probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour to stipulate with and to give full assurance to the public that such as is apprehended shall not happen” Blackstone (1765), p. 251. About Blackstone’s position see extensively Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 29 f.
- 5.
See Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 30. In particular, the Italian legal order provides for a specific system of preventive measures, which is quite unique in Europe (see, more extensively, Chap. 6). Measures (freezing assets or limiting personal liberty of movement and liberty itself), are aimed to prevent the perpetration of crimes, depriving the potential perpetrator of her assets or liberty. As the European Court of Human Rights assessed in the case of De Tommaso v. Italy, a vast majority of the European legal orders do not provide for similar measure. Only Austria, Switzerland, France, Russia, UK provide for similar tools (ECtHR, 23.2.2017, De Tommaso v. Italy, §§ 69, 70).
- 6.
As we shall see, this implies a relevant distinction between intelligence gathering and obtaining evidence to be used in trial: Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 51.
- 7.
At least in its basic standard of a prior, democratic mandate to the legislative authority, to pass, for the future, laws that are not overly vague, allowing for a discretional, arbitrary and inconsistent application: Ashworth and Zedner (2014), cit., 265.
- 8.
“Smart, effective, and proactive policing is clearly preferable to simply reacting to criminal acts”: Perry et al. (2003). In 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, held the first predictive policing symposium, gathering researchers and practitioners in the field of policing, to discuss achievements and expectations in the field of the application of predictive algorithm to crime prevention.
- 9.
- 10.
Bowling and Iyer (2019), p. 142 define ‘automated policing’ as “policework that has been converted so as to operate automatically”.
- 11.
- 12.
Pease and Andromachi (2014), passim.
- 13.
With regard to the police body-worn video transmission systems, see Bowling and Iyer (2019), p. 140 ff.
- 14.
Wilson (2019), p. 69 ff.
- 15.
Caplan et al. (2017), p. 133 f.;
- 16.
Basile (2019), p. 12.
- 17.
Kaufmann et al. (2019), pp. 674–692, 679.
- 18.
Basile (2019), p. 12.
- 19.
Schweer (2018), p. 4. See also the presentation at https://land-der-ideen.de/en/project/precobs-software-for-predicting-crimes-355.
- 20.
Oswald et al. (2018), p. 223 ff.
- 21.
Parodi and Sellaroli (2019), p. 56.
- 22.
Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 47.
- 23.
Kaufmann et al. (2019), p. 689.
- 24.
Ibidem.
- 25.
For an updated overview see Guide on Art. 2—Right to life, edited by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018, p. 28 ff., at https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_2_ENG.pdf.
- 26.
Vervaele (2014), p. 116.
- 27.
Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 65.
- 28.
Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 51.
- 29.
For a definition see Flor and Oh Jang (2012), p. 13 ff.
- 30.
Cadoppi et al. (2019), passim.
- 31.
Bachmaier Winter (2012), passim.
- 32.
See the Council of Europe Budapest Convention, 23.11.2001, at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185/signatures.
- 33.
Floridi (2017), p. 12.
- 34.
Ashworth and Zedner (2014), p. 51.
- 35.
About “sanctity” of the home, see De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 67.
- 36.
E.g. conditions limiting room-bugging and phone-tapping to some listed crimes, or restricting it to specific situations (e.g., a person who is reasonably suspected of committing a crime is present in the house).
- 37.
Many jurisdictions provide for a double guarantee: each interference into private life must be provided by law and authorised by a judicial authority. The judicial intervention is seen as an opacity tool: De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 69.
- 38.
ECtHR, Kroon and others v. the Netherland, § 31. Nevertheless, the States’ duty to protect individuals’ right to private and family life does not merely compel the State to refrain from unlawful intrusion but may imply also positive obligations. Although a long list of positive obligation has been drawn with regard to family life, also the guarantee of private life may urge the States to positively act in order to regulate, e.g., interactions between individuals (ECtHR, Evans v. the UK, § 75).
- 39.
- 40.
Art. 8: (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
- 41.
It is common opinion that, at the time of drafting the ECHR, the blueprint of privacy was a negative concept, that only in the following decades evolved into a positive theorisation: see Pollicino and Bassini (2017), p. 135.
- 42.
ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany (n. 2), §95.
- 43.
ECtHR, 16.12.1992, Niemietz v. Germany, § 29.
- 44.
Although the French version of the Convention refers to ‘domicile’, which has a broader sense: ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, cit., § 30.
- 45.
Arendt (2017), p. 87.
- 46.
Privacy is not an absolute but relational value...: De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 74.
- 47.
ECtHR, 13.6.1969, Marckx v. Belgium, § 31.
- 48.
For a reconstruction of privacy as a fundamental right, at least in the western society, see De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 63 f.
- 49.
Or, actually, “weakened”, see Claes et al. (2006), p. 1.
- 50.
ECtHR, Siliadin v. France, 26.7.2005; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 4.12.2003, X and Y v. The Nederland, 26.3.1985.
- 51.
Verbruggen (2006), p. 125: as for these exceptions there are no universal accepted standards, the Court’s task to assess what is “necessary in a democratic society” is not easy.
- 52.
De Beer et al. (2010), p. 75 ff.
- 53.
In critical terms, De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 89.
- 54.
De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 90.
- 55.
It has been noted that the State is the first source of threat to privacy: see Claes et al. (2006), p. 2.
- 56.
De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 91: “the transformation of Art. 8 into a source of procedural Rights and procedural conditions takes it away from the job it was designed for... to prohibit unreasonable exercises of power and to create zones of opacity”.
- 57.
For a critical approach to the theory of ECHR ‘autonomous concepts’, see Letsas (2004), p. 279 ff.
- 58.
ECtHR, MC Cann v.UK, Buckley v. UK, Winterstein and others v. France.
- 59.
ECtHR, 24.11.1986, Gillow v. the UK.
- 60.
Nevertheless, the Court always excluded that Art. 8 encompasses the right of each family to have a home for their own alone (ECtHR, 21.11.1995, Velosa Barreto v. Portugal), or the right to keep up a specific walk of life (ECtHR, 25.9.1996, Buckley v. UK), or to affirm one own’s roots in a specific area (ECtHR, 18.12.1996, Loizidou v. Turkey).
- 61.
ECtHR, (National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France.
- 62.
Buck v. Germany, § 3.1; Niemietz v. Germany, §§ 29-31; Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, § 37, Popovi v. Bulgaria, §103, (Steeg v. Germany (dec.); Société Colas Est and Others v. France, § 41; Kent Pharmaceuticals Limited and Others v. the United Kingdom.
- 63.
Niemietz v. Germany, cit., § 30.
- 64.
- 65.
Durante (2019), pp. 151 ff.; 282.
- 66.
As to the many different concepts of privacy, Pagallo (2014), p. 225 ss.
- 67.
Leenes and De Conca (2018), p. 282. The concept of ‘informational privacy’ owes to the famous decision of 1983 by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision no., 15 December 1983), ruling that, in a democratic society, citizens must enjoy the right to be aware of who knows what about their personal life.
- 68.
Barfield and Pagallo (forthcoming), Chapter V, Issues of Data Protection.
- 69.
See both General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 4 (1); Modernised Convention 108, Art. 2 (a).
- 70.
Sicurella and Scalia (2013), p. 437.
- 71.
Having been drafted in more recent years, the Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU expressly provides for protection of personal data, in art. 8.
- 72.
Sicurella and Scalia (2013), p. 442.
- 73.
In Kokkinakis V. Greece (25.5.1993) the Court criticized, under this viewpoint, the wording of a national law.
- 74.
Foreseeability played an important role in pushing the due process requirements of art. 6, and the effective remedy of art. 13 ECHR, to merge into the framework of art. 8: De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 85.
- 75.
See the case of Kruslin V. France (24.4.1990), in which even an unwritten rule of criminal procedure was deemed to satisfy art. 8 ECHR.
- 76.
For a critical opinion, see De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 87.
- 77.
ECtHR Klass v. GFR, 6.9.1978.
- 78.
De Schutter (2001), p. 142.
- 79.
“Transparency seems to have replaced legitimacy as the core value of data protection”: De Hert and Gutwirth (2006), p. 80.
- 80.
Sicurella and Scalia (2013), p. 443.
- 81.
ECtHR, 4.12.2008, S. and Marper v. the U.K., § 112.
- 82.
In the case of S. and Marper v. the UK, the Court relied on the fact that many Member States had already settled precise time-limits for retention of biometrics data belonging to suspects who were never convicted of an offence: this made the UK lack of specific terms unjustified.
- 83.
S. and Marper v. the U.K., cit., § 112.
- 84.
The Court applied a similar approach in ECtHR, 13.11.2012, M.M. v. UK, establishing a violation of art. 8 ECHR with regard to the length of retention of criminal records data.
- 85.
Pollicino and Bassini (2017), p. 139.
- 86.
ECtHR, 5.5.2011, Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, § 63.
- 87.
See, e.g., ECtHR, 3.4.2007, Copland v. UK, a case of an employer monitoring an employee’s communications and internet access, without using for disciplinary or labour purposes.
- 88.
Art. 7 “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”
- 89.
And to art. 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and art. 17 ICCPR.
- 90.
Some other important pieces of legislation would be adopted later: Directive 2006/24, on 15.3.2006, and Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, on 8.11.2008. More on this in the text and in the next paragraph.
- 91.
Martinico (2017), p. 117.
- 92.
Pollicino and Bassini (2017), p. 143.
- 93.
See e.g. CJEU, 21.9.1989, Hoechst v. Commission, joint C-46/87 and 227/88.
- 94.
See CJEU, 22.1.2002, Roquette Frères, C-94/00, expressly referring to Hoechst.
- 95.
Tribunal EU 14.11.2012, Nexans v. France and Nexans v. Commission, T-135/09.
- 96.
CJEU, 9.11.201, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, joint C-92/09 and 93/09.
- 97.
CJEU, 24.11.2011, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Credito and Federación de Comercio Electronico y Marketing Directo c. Administracion del Estado, joint C-468/10 and 469/10.
- 98.
CJEU, 8.4.2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., joint C-293/12 and 594/12, § 69.
- 99.
Pollicino and Bassini (2017), p. 153.
- 100.
Pollicino and Bassini (2017), p. 135.
- 101.
Kranenborg (2014), p. 229.
- 102.
CJEU, 6.11.2003, Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01.
- 103.
CJEU, 8.5.2008, Tietosuojavaltuutettu c. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, C-73/07.
- 104.
- 105.
- 106.
Another very important decision was delivered by the CJEU in the case of Maximilian Schrems (Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commission, C-362/14, joined party: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.), with regard, however, to personal data processing for national security reasons, rather than for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes. In that decision, the Court out-ruled the Data Protection Commission decision 2000/520, based on art. 25 dir. 95/46. In decision 520, the Commission had adjudicated that personal data collected in the EU could be transferred, stored and used in the US, on the basis of the alleged adequacy of personal data protection offered by the American ‘safe harbour’ principle. The CJEU, based on art. 7, 8, 48 ChFREU declared the Data Protection Commission decision invalid. The same position has been recently confirmed by the CJEU, in the so-called Schrems II decision, 16.7.2020, followed by strong criticism: Pollicino (2020); Bignami (2020).
- 107.
The Framework decision was adopted under the third pillar, before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. FD were based on unanimity and were binding for MS only in their aims. Under the peculiar third pillar regulation, the CJEU had limited jurisdiction and the rates of implementation by MS were almost very low. In particular, the FD 2008/977/JHA applied only to the exchange of data among LEAs or judicial authorities: it did not apply to personal data collected and processed inside one national legal order.
- 108.
It should be considered whether such situation falls out of the scope of dir. 2016/680 and under the GDPR: in this case, the data subject would have no remedy, but this should be in the possibility of the third person suffering for the negative legal consequence of the fully automated decision.
- 109.
Signorato (2018), p. 97.
- 110.
Klitou (2014), passim.
- 111.
In fact, it will be up to the MS to strike a proper and effective balance between the two concurrent interests: De Hert and Papakstantinou (2016), p. 12.
- 112.
Floridi (2017), p. 9.
- 113.
Floridi (2017), p. 10.
- 114.
Even though ‘hyperhistory’ is a new era in human evolution, it does not transcend completely the spatio-temporal constraints in which the modern society evolved: thus, it is a matter of reframing the concepts of time and space: Floridi (2017), p. 24.
- 115.
Signorato (2018), p. 43.
- 116.
The term is used by Floridi (2017), p. 24.
- 117.
E.g. toilets of public premises: in many jurisdictions, privacy in secluded areas of public place is protected from arbitrary intrusion and the use of intercepted conversions, pictures, videos are prohibited by an exclusionary rule (for an example see Italy, Triggiani 2019, p. 153).
- 118.
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision no. 370, 27.2.2008.
- 119.
Flor (2009), p. 697 ss.
- 120.
Picotti (2004), p. 80.
- 121.
Signorato (2018), p. 80.
- 122.
The phenomenon falls under the phenomenon of extimacy (English translation for the French extimité, first used by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, in late Fifties), a concept having been theorised in opposition to intimacy. For a general overview, see Pavón (2014), p. 661: “extimacy indicates the nondistinction and essential identity between the dual terms of the outside and the deepest inside, the exterior and the most interior of the psyche”.
- 123.
Libe Report, 21.
- 124.
Libe Report, 23.
- 125.
Libe Report, 9.
- 126.
- 127.
Bellovin et al. (2014), espec. p. 22 ff.
- 128.
Hildebrandt (2008), p. 28.
- 129.
Costanzi (2019), 1 ff.
- 130.
Gulotta (2017), p. 118.
- 131.
See Oravec (2010), p. 155.
- 132.
Cfr. https://www.biometricupdate.com/201907/banco-bolivariano-selects-facephi-biometric-digital-onboarding-technology; “The widespread use of CCTV cameras for surveillance and security applications have stirred extensive research interests in video-based face recognition. (…) Automatic face recognition technology is becoming an indispensable tool for modern forensic investigations”;Wei and Li (2017), p. 190.
- 133.
The most important points are: the nasion (root of the nose); glabella (point located above the root of the nose, where the skin is generally free of hair); pronasal (protruding point of the tip of nose); spinal nose (point corresponding to the nasal subset); wingspan (most protruding point of the nose wing); prosthion (upper point of the labial-nose furrow); gonion (lower margin of the jaw branch); gnathion (lower protrusion of the chin); trichion (hairline); vertex (highest point of the head); zygion (most protruding point of the cheekbone). For a general and in-depth analysis see Balossino and Siracusa (2004), passim.
- 134.
See Ministero dell’Interno – Dipartimento di pubblica sicurezza, Capitolato tecnico, Procedura volta alla fornitura della soluzione integrata per il sistema automatico di riconoscimento immagini s.a.r.i. lotto n° 1, available at https://www.poliziadistato.it/statics/06/20160627-ct-sari%2D%2D4-.pdf (20.12.2019).
- 135.
- 136.
Still not in use by the Italian State Police.
- 137.
More specifically, the research can follow three ways: (1) on the basis of the facial image (face-based research) (2) on the basis of anagraphic or descriptive information associated with the images in the recorded people database (anagraphic/descriptive search); (3) on the combined basis of methods 1 and 2 (combined search).
- 138.
For example, see “Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women”, Reuters, October 2018.
- 139.
For a general overview, related to LEAs hacking, see Signorato (2018), p. 263 ff.
- 140.
House of Lords, 23.5.2001, HM the Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept.; UK Supreme Court, 19.6.2013, Bank Mellat v. HM’s Treasury.
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Quattrocolo, S. (2020). Hacking by Law-Enforcement: Investigating with the Help of Computational Models and AI Methods. In: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Modelling and Criminal Proceedings. Legal Studies in International, European and Comparative Criminal Law, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52470-8_3
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