If we turn our view to the individual contributions, already the first one written by Christian Tomuschat evidences the dimension of this challenge to write about single national contributions to international law. It reveals, however, also that this challenge can be mastered and that highly interesting insights can result from such an endeavour. The author demonstrates that the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) endorses the general rules of international law in a spirit of optimistic world solidarity, which is in strict contrast to an understanding of international law as “external state law”, a concept that German philosophers (Hegel) and legal thinkers (see Jellinek, Zorn) have predominantly contributed to develop. Tomuschat highlights Germany’s trust in international law (in strict contrast to the situation in the period between 1933 and 1945), strongly supported by the German international law academia. He ends his article with a plea for an even more active foreign policy in the service of peace, human rights and the international rule of law.
Heribert Franz Köck gives a broad overview of the “Austrian School of International Law”. He again starts with the consideration that it is difficult to identify a typical national approach to international law, but he also manages to identify some fundamental contributions that Austrian legal doctrine has given to the international law doctrine as a whole. Mostly and pre-eminently, this doctrine is associated with the name of Hans Kelsen and his Vienna School of legal theory, but Professor Köck, himself an eminent representative of the modern natural law school, highlights the contributions by Alfred Verdross and his concept of justice, strongly influenced by natural law ideas, which has given a lasting impact on present-day international law. According to Köck, many basic concepts of international law, in particular as they find expression in UN law, are based on these ideas. He demonstrates that Verdross’ ideas are living on in the “Austrian School of International Law” and far beyond.
The reader of Carlo Focarelli’s contribution will learn a lot of the development of Italy’s international law academia—but at the same time get acquainted with Italian literature, history and philosophy. Focarelli demonstrates how closely national legal traditions are connected with the general culture of the respective country. The lawyer who wants to become really domestic with a specific national legal tradition will have to adopt a very broad perspective and not limit his studies to legal norms and texts.
As to the Italian manuals of the past, which in the meantime, outside Italy, might have become all but forgotten,Footnote 27 it might be revealing for the reader to see how modern many of their insights are, even if they have been formulated in the nineteenth or in the early twentieth century. It suffices here to refer, for example, to Pasquale Fiore’s (1837–1914) studies on what we would call today “erga omnes obligations”. The analysis of Rolando Quadri’s (1907–1976) studies calls into mind the acts of modern superpower politicians when Focarelli cites Quadri’s underlying assumption according to which “the law is a product of the strongest who act uti universi”, but at same time he quotes Quadri as stating that “no state in the world, not even the strongest, is legisbus solutus”.
As to the “literary part” of Focarelli’s contribution, he identifies in the works examined two “key Italian attitudes”: “realism” and “humanism”. Focarelli ably demonstrates that the same aspects can be identified in the attitude of Italian lawyers towards international law.
Andrea Hamann undertakes a broad enquiry into the concept of “traditions in International Law” in general and in France in particular. As an academic of German provenience and full legal education in France, she is best prepared to adopt an “inside” as an “outside” perspective. She analyzes academic trends and attitudes of a country that has given so important contributions to the development of international law on both practical and theoretical levels, whose language has once been the lingua franca of international law but which, in the meantime, has lost much of its clout. On the practical level, this results from a massive shift in the power relations on the political landscape, while on the academic level this problem is also associated with the diminishing relevance of the French language on the international scene. Furthermore, also the structure of the French academia might have influenced this development. Andrea Hamann pinpoints in her contribution some of the most conspicuous traits of the French international law academia that are peculiar to this country—and nonetheless evoke associations with similar situations in other European countries.Footnote 28
It has already been pointed out that the concept of “traditions of International Law” means different things to different people. It might not be surprising that those international lawyers who are particularly wary of preserving the unity of international law have the most problems with speaking about “national traditions”. The British practitioner Sir Michael Wood is one of these lawyers. He opposes any attempt to “compartmentalize” international law study and practice into “national” approaches and to imagine a “divisible college of international lawyers”. These warnings are, of course, justified, and any international lawyer who would seriously try to artificially fragment international law with the intent to advocate a national tradition perhaps retained as superior or more advanced in respect of other national traditions would commit a capital sin: he would saw the branch on which he is sitting. Needless to say, this is usually not the intent of that part of the international law academia that engages in studies on international law traditions.
Wood wants to rule out any doubt in this regard, and for this reason he speaks more modestly of “British contributions” in public international law. At the end, the choice of this wording is fully in line with the overall philosophy that undergirds this research project. In fact, the basic idea is that there are some distinct national contributions to international law, some national attitudes that are distinct in respect of those of other nations, and identifying (but not necessarily emphasizing) them might contribute to a better understanding of the international law order as a whole and to devising lines of development that might identify future advancements in international law.
Anybody somewhat familiar with international law as a science might have no difficulties in underwriting the empirical perception by the author that the United Kingdom has a long tradition of being the source of specifically fine and important contributions to international law studies, may they originate from native people or from academics coming to the UK for whatever reason. Wood attempts to explore what might have been the cause for such a leading role the UK is exercising in this field. He sees several reasons for British lawyers being able to contribute so strongly to this discipline, and he refers in this context, for example, to the common law training of its lawyers as this might have given way to a “strong predilection for the development of the law through decided cases and specific instances” (Robert Jennings). One further fact he refers to lies in the circumstance that many leading British academics have also been practitioners before English and international courts. Consequently, international law is taken very seriously in the UK, and thereby a notable influence is exercised on the development of international law on a global scale. By strengthening international law as such, the UK contributes to more respect for this order also by other nations.
Jan Wouters and Nina Pineau have provided an overview of the Belgian and Dutch traditions in international law. And there was much to tell, already in view of the fact that the “father of International Law”, Hugo Grotius, comes from this region. The authors analyze further in their text the contributions by Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Emile de Laveleye, Edouard Descamps, Charles de Visscher, Cornelis van Bijnkershoek, Tobias Michael Carel Asser, Bert Röling, Henry Schermers, Pieter Kooijmans as well as many other also contemporary authors. How was it possible that authors of two rather small countries could exert such an important influence on the development of international law literature? Wouters and Pineau provide an interesting explanation for this: both countries have been neutral for a long period of time, and this created an atmosphere that allowed academics and practitioners to develop a humanist, pacifist and Universalist perspective on international law.
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen and Jakob v.H. Holtermann take a square look at the “Scandinavian Perspective”. They refer to the difficulties in identifying a “Nordic approach” that should apply both to practice and to theory. At the same time, however, they evidence that talking about a “Nordic approach” has a strong aspirational value where this “mythic north” stays for a strong commitment to democracy, rule of law and the protection of human rights. In this sense, the identification of a national (or regional) legal tradition can be important not only for what it actually is but also for what it stands for in theory and imagination.
The following contribution by Lauri Mälksoo on the “Russian Concept of International Law as Imperial Legacy” might meet with particular attention by this book’s readers as it concerns the approach to international law by a powerful state at the geographical margins of Europe which has stood for a long time in conflict with the Western bloc of European states and which again continues to challenge traditional Western values, for example with regard to the annexation of CrimeaFootnote 29 or in relation to human rights before the European Court of Human Rights. For Lauri Mälksoo, this particular attitude towards international law can be explained by Russia’s past as an empire and the deep-rooted fears by the Russian political elite that abandoning the Empire would mean abandoning Russia herself. This attitude is reflected directly by Russian academic writing as internationalists in Russia often see their main role in supporting the government in its foreign policy with legal arguments.Footnote 30
The following two contributions by Stefanie Bock and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann again turn to Germany, but they are focused, differently than the contribution by Christian Tomuschat, on a specific material subject.
Stefanie Bock writes on the German contribution to the creation of international criminal justice. She shows that the highly developed German criminal justice doctrine could in fact give an outstanding contribution to the development of this field, and up to this day, important initiatives to further develop international criminal justice are coming from Germany. It can therefore be said that at least in this field a specific national legal tradition had finally exercised determinant influence on the international level.
The final contribution by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann examines what the influence was of German-speaking countries on the development of international economic law. Undoubtedly, this influence was remarkable (even though it might not have been so far-reaching as that of German criminal law doctrine on international criminal law). And there are many levels on which this influence was exercised: inside the European Union (Austria and Germany), in the European Economic Area (Liechtenstein) and in the European Free Trade Area (Switzerland).
Due to their constitutional “common market” and monetary and fundamental rights protection, these countries share common traditions of supplementing (1) private and (2) public law regulations of the economy by (3) economics-driven, multilevel economic regulation (e.g. of transnational common markets, international trade and investment law); (4) multilevel administrative law (e.g. on transparency and legal accountability of international economic organizations); and (5) multilevel constitutional protection of transnational rule of law and fundamental rights of citizens (e.g. by European courts protecting common market rights and fundamental rights). The article describes regulatory challenges of Europe’s microeconomic “common market constitutions”, macroeconomic “monetary constitution” and “social market economies”, which differ from the hegemonic, interest-group-driven US neoliberalism, the mercantilist “economic security order” advocated by US President Trump in response to the geopolitical rivalry from China and the totalitarian state capitalism promoted inside China.
Of course, one might find some elements of ordo-liberalism also in GATT law and in WTO law, but here the picture becomes more diffuse. What recently has been stated about the universality of international economic law proves again to be right: there are some universal elements in international economic law, but for the rest, “states want to retain control”.Footnote 31 As far as Petersmann writes about a constitution of international economic law, he writes also about his own lifelong academic project. While also many others have participated in this endeavour, Professor Petersmann’s contribution in this field was surely of paramount importance.Footnote 32