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Bloc Aviation Under Late Socialism

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on developments within the Soviet orbit in the late 1970s and 1980s. These were characterised by a lack of aviation fuel supply because of the underdeveloped petrochemical sector and dramatically increased emphasis on the production of military materiel. Such a combination, by the mid-1980s, resulted in a deep crisis as the Soviet aircraft producers were unable to develop and produce airplanes to match their Western rivals in all key technical specifications. The gradual opening of communist regimes after Gorbachev announced the reformist Perestroika and Glasnost policies enabled the bloc aviation companies to re-orient themselves towards Western aircraft producers with the Polish and Hungarian carriers opting for the Boeing aircraft while Czechoslovak Airlines and East German Interflug acquired airplanes from Airbus.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. NSA, KAL 007, Box 1, Embassy Sofia to DoS, 7 September 1983; Embassy Prague to DoS, 17 September 1983 and Embassy Rome to DoS, 1 January 1984.

  2. 2.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/4, folder 53, item 99/1, Zpráva o plnění politicko-hospodářských úkolů v Československých aeroliniích [Report on Fulfilment of Politico-Economic Goals in the CSA], 28 November 1983.

  3. 3.

    Cf. SOA, CSA, Box 353, Společný integrovaný provoz dálkových linek leteckých podniků socialistických zemí do třetích zemí [A Joint Service of Long-Haul Routes by the Airlines of Socialist Nations to the Third Countries], 16 December 1977 and Box 379, Vývoj přepravných výkonů v mezin. let. depravě čl. států RVHP, 1960–78 [Transportation Volumes in the Segment of International Traffic for COMECON Member States, 1960–78], July 1980.

  4. 4.

    Cf. SOA, CSA, Box 353, Společný integrovaný provoz dálkových linek [A Joint Service of Long-Haul Routes] and Box 379, Náměty podniku pro jednání s FMD o sestavbě plánu na 7. pětiletku [CSA’s Suggestions for Federal Ministry of Transportation Regarding the Elaboration of the 7th Five-Year Programme], 28 July 1980.

  5. 5.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 154, item 158/5, Návrh rozvoje československé civiliní letecké dopravy do roku 1980: Příloha 6 [Proposal for the Development of Czechoslovak Civil Air Transport Until 1980: Appendix 6], 24 April 1975 and NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 26, item 31/3, Zpráva o postavení a dalším rozvoji čs. civilní letecké dopravy v období do roku 1985 [Resolution on the Situation and Further Development of the Czechoslovak Civil Aviation Until 1985], 28 January 1982.

  6. 6.

    Cf. SOA, CSA, Box 387, Směrnice o zvláštní obchodní činnosti [Directive on Special Sales Programme], 24 September 1982.

  7. 7.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 26, item 31/3, Zpráva o postavení a dalším rozvoji čs. civilní letecké dopravy v období do roku 1985: Příloha II [Report on the Situation and Further Development of the Czechoslovak Civil Aviation Until 1985: Annex II], 28 January 1982.

  8. 8.

    Reduction of working positions was extremely unusual for lay-offs should only have been inherent to the capitalist system and not to the self-proclaimed advanced socialist economy and society which marched towards communism as per Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 11 July 1960.

  9. 9.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 26, item 31/3, Report on the situation: Annex II and IV, 28 January 1982.

  10. 10.

    Albeit the document did not specify exactly for which purposes the railways used the fuel, as explained below, the kerosene, pure or blended, may have been burned in diesel locomotives. These were mainly used for transport of freight in these years. The paper urged to stop this uneconomic practice and recommended that the railways should only utilise the fuels which did not meet the aviation standards. Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 26, item 31/3, Report on the situation: Annex III, 28 January 1982.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 53, item 99/1, Report on fulfillment: Annex III, 28 November 1983.

  13. 13.

    ‘Soviets Facing Aircraft Fuel Shortage’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 September 1979, 34 and CIA, The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis, March 1977, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000498607.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2020.

  14. 14.

    Cf. NSA, UUCA, Embassy Moscow to DoS, 17 December 1979 and CIA, CIA Comments on DIA Critique of Soviet Oil Prospects, 7 November 1977, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M00165A001900030008-4.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2020.

  15. 15.

    Cf. NSA, UUCA, Embassy Moscow to DoS, 17 December 1979.

  16. 16.

    Ibid. For development of the Soviet energy sector, see, e.g., Jeronim Perović and Dunja Krempin, ‘“The Key Is in Our Hand:” Soviet Energy Strategy During Détente and the Global Oil Crises of the 1970s’, Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 39, no. 4 (2014): 113–44 and Jeronim Perović, ‘The Soviet Union’s Rise as an International Energy Power: A Short History’, in Jeronim Perović (ed.), Cold War Energy: A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1–43.

  17. 17.

    A kerosene or paraffin-based aviation fuel (or jet fuel or aviation turbine fuel [Jet A-1]) must not be confused with aviation gasoline (AvGas) which is used in piston engine planes and was the most common spirit to power the aircraft before the advent of jet engines. Much higher in octane rating than automotive petrol (100/130 vs. 87/97 octane respectively), the main disadvantages of aviation gasoline compared to aviation fuel (app. 15 octane) are its higher cost due to more refined processing (the hydrocarbon chain needs to be shortened by technique known as catalytic reforming) and low flashpoint. This means that the AvGas catches the fire more easily than higher flash aviation fuel giving the latter significant advantage in combat situations or when stored at aircraft carriers. Military fuels such as JP-4/8 for ground-based aircraft or JP-5 used by aircraft carriers are a blend of gasoline and kerosene with flashpoints reflecting their operational requirements.

  18. 18.

    These years also witnessed an increased Soviet activity in North Africa and Middle East which aimed at gaining access and control of the oil flow in these critical regions. Cf. ‘Soviets Focus on Control of Oil Flow from Region’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 December 1981, 48–54.

  19. 19.

    Depending on the quality of source and processing, a barrel of crude oil (159 litres) typically yields 13–15 litres of aviation fuel. In Soviet conditions, however, this ratio was likely (much) lower because of the backward refinery sector and lower quality input: in general, the West Siberian crude oil contains more sulphur and is also more dense (heavy) than Brent Crude or West Texas Intermediate which serve as industry benchmarks. It was for these reasons that the Soviet and then Russian exports of aviation fuel were only negligible, cf. Vitaly Yermakov, James Henderson and Bassam Fattouh, ‘Russia’s Heavy Fuel Oil Exports: Challenges and Changing Rules Abroad and at Home’, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper: WPM 80, April 2019, https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784671358. Accessed 1 April 2020.

  20. 20.

    Cf. ‘Soviet Military Spending Found to Top US’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 29 October 1979, 67; ‘Soviets to Push Qualitative Advances’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 November 1980, 53–4 and ‘CIA, Defense Intelligence Diverge on Soviet Arms Spending Growth’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 March 1985, 101–4.

  21. 21.

    In early 1980s, the Soviet energy sector underwent a major transformation from mazut to abundant natural gas of which transport by pipelines was rising at ‘double-digit rates’ according to Gates. However, the refineries continued to lag behind with the most of the higher-end fuel production going to military and other sensitive industries. This pattern only changed in the 1990s when ‘individual and commercial car and truck ownership grew quickly’ and the ‘demand for high-octane gasoline and low-sulphur diesel’ substantially increased. Cf. ‘CIA, Defense Intelligence’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 March 1985, 103 and Yermakov et al., Russia’s Heavy Fuel Oil Exports, 5.

  22. 22.

    Cf. NSA, The Soviet ‘War Scare’, 15 February 1990, 65, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb533-The-Able-Archer-War-Scare-Declassified-PFIAB-Report-Released/2012-0238-MR.pdf. Accessed 1 February 2020.

  23. 23.

    Cf. ‘NATO Warned of Threat of New Soviet Forays’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 May 1980, 18–9.

  24. 24.

    The paranoia on the part of Andropov, Ustinov and Ogarkov as well as other Soviet leaders about a surprise US nuclear attack was, in part, intensified by negative forecasts of the RYAN (acronym for Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie [nuclear missile attack]) computer model. Put online in 1979 and updated regularly on the basis of classified intelligence, military and economic data, the model ‘assigned a fixed value of 100 to the combined economic-military-political power of the United States.’ It was believed that the USSR ‘would be safe against a US first strike’ at 60–70 per cent of overall US power. However, in 1984, the programme estimated that the Soviet power sank to 45 per cent of that of the USA whereas the 40 per cent was seen as a critical threshold when the USSR would become ‘dangerously inferior’ to its rival. Yet, the impact of the operation RYAN on the Soviet military spending remains unclear. While the quote above from the 1990 post-mortem paper suggests positive causation, the CIA estimated at the time that the military expenditures remained relatively constant over time: some 13–14 per cent of GDP per year since the mid-1960s according to the Agency estimates. This implies that there was most likely no, or only limited, correlation between RYAN and a heightened military built up. Also, as Chapter 6 showed, the Soviet fears of US-USSR relations entering a new period of confrontation began to rise already by mid-1974, i.e. five years before the RYAN programme was launched. Even more important, however, neither these incredibly high figures seemed to correspond with reality since, according to Mikhail Gorbachev, military expenditures comprised some 40 per cent of annual state budgets. Cf. ‘CIA, Defense Intelligence’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 March 1985, 103 and NSA, The Soviet ‘War Scare’, 37–94 and 43–6 in particular. Gorbachev as quoted in Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 59–60.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Gordon and Rigmant, OKB Tupolev, 267–76 and Gordon et al., OKB Ilyushin, 337–42.

  26. 26.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 148, item 139/3, Sjednání mnohostranné mezinárodní dohody o základních směrech spolupráce v rozvoji civilné letecké techniky [Conclusion of a Multilateral Agreement on Basic Directions in Development of the Civilian Air Transports], 28 November 1983.

  27. 27.

    Cf. NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 111, item 111/11, Sjednání Rámcove dohody o vytvoření propojeného komplexu automatizovaných sysémů rezervace míst a prodeje letenek: Příloha III [Conclusion of a Framework Agreement on Creation and Implementation of Unified Automated System of Seat Reservation and Ticket Selling: Annex III], 19 June 1979.

  28. 28.

    An overview of all agreements can be found in NACR, KSC-UV-02/1, folder 26, item 31/3, Report on the situation: Annex III, 28 January 1982.

  29. 29.

    As a part of the agreement, Pan Am also received the Soviet and Afghan overflight rights on its services from points in Europe to India and Pakistan. Because of the more direct routing, the company expected to save $2000–4000 per flight or about one million annually. Cf. ‘US, Soviets Reach Airline Service Accord’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 December 1985, 33; ‘US, Soviets Resume Commercial Air Service’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 5 May 1986, 32 and ‘Airline Observer: Pan American World Airways’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 May 1986, 35.

  30. 30.

    Cf. SOA, CSA, Box 405, Informace o záměrech leteckých společností socialistických států při obnově a doplňovaní letadlového parku dopravních letadel [Information on Intentions of Airlines of the Socialist Countries as Regards the Revitalisation and Re-equipment of Their Aircraft Fleets], undated (but likely created in early 1989) and ‘Washington Roundup: Space Summit’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 December 1987, 17.

  31. 31.

    Cf. ‘Soviets Grant British Carries Right to Overfly Siberia’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 April 1987 and ‘Transsiberian Flights Conducted Routinely’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 8 June 1987, 32.

  32. 32.

    SOA, CSA, Box 408, Protokol 20-go soveshchaniya generlnykh direktorov aviatransportnykh predpriyatiy – uchastnikov Berlinskogo soglasheniya [Protocol of the 20th Meeting of General Directors of the Air Transport Enterprises of the Berlin Agreement] and Protokol 20-go soveshchaniya tekhnicheskikh direktorov aviatransportnykh predpriyatiy – uchastnikov Berlinskogo soglasheniya [Protocol of the 20th Meeting of Technical Directors of Air Transport Enterprises of the Berlin Agreement], April 1985.

  33. 33.

    ‘183 Killed in LOT Crash’, Flight International, 16 May 1987, 3 as well as ‘Poland Probes Cause of LOT Il-62M Crash’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 May 1987, 29 and ‘Investigators Cite Engine Failure in Polish Ilyushin Il-62 M Crash’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 August 1987, 57.

  34. 34.

    SOA, CSA, Box 405, Informace o záměrech leteckých společností socialistických států při obnově a doplňovaní letadlového parku dopravních letadel [Information on Intentions of Airlines of the Socialist Countries as Regards the Revitalisation and Re-equipment of Their Aircraft Fleets], undated (but likely created in early 1989) as well as ‘LOT Grounds Ilyushin Il-62Ms’, Flight International, 22 August 1987, 6 and ‘News Scan: Arrow Air’, Flight International, 26 March 1988, 6.

  35. 35.

    SOA, CSA, Box 399, Protokol 23-go soveshchaniya tekhnicheskikh direktorov aviatransportnykh predpriyatiy – uchastnikov Berlinskogo soglasheniya [Protocol of the 23rd Meeting of General Directors of the Air Transport Enterprises of the Berlin Agreement], April 1988.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    SOA, CSA, Box 399, Protokol 24-ogo soveshchaniya generlnykh direktorov aviatransportnykh predpriyatiy – uchastnikov Berlinskogo soglasheniya [Protocol of the 24th Meeting of General Directors of the Air Transport Enterprises of the Berlin Agreement], May 1989.

  38. 38.

    Cf. Joanna Filipczyk, ‘LOT: Connecting East and West in Poland’, in Hans-Liudger Dienel and Peter Lyth (eds.), Flying the Flag: European Commercial Air Transport Since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 202–3, but see also: ‘LOT Orders Boeing 767s’, Flight International, 19 November 1988, 17 and ‘UNblocING THE EAST’, Flight International, 29 July 1989, 41.

  39. 39.

    Cf. See also ‘Eastern Bloc Nations Seek Western-Built Transport to Meet Growing Demand’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 November 1989, 104.

  40. 40.

    SOA, CSA, Box 405, Informace o záměrech [Information on Intentions], undated. See also ‘Malev Considers Fleet Replacement’, Flight International, 18 July 1987, 8; ‘West’s East European Market Hopes Fade’, Flight International, 6 February 1988, 8; ‘TNT Launches Hungarian Venture’, Flight International, 5 November 1988, 3; ‘West Goes East’, Flight International, 10 December 1988, 15 and ‘UNblocING THE EAST’, Flight International, 29 July 1989, 40–1 as well as ‘Malev Takes Delivery of Western Transports, Reviews Fleet Needs’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 January 1989, 111 and 115.

  41. 41.

    Cf. ‘Airframe Manufacturers Seek Sales Opportunities in Eastern Bloc’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 February 1988, 112–3 and ‘Range, Payload Capabilities Prompted Poland to Order Three 767ER Aircraft’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 November 1988.

  42. 42.

    SOA, CSA, Box 405, Informace o záměrech [Information on Intentions], undated. See also ‘Interflug May Fly Airbuses’, Flight International, 26 September 1987, 5; ‘Cocom Approves Airbus Sale’, Flight International, 25 June 1988; ‘East Goes West’, Flight International, 18 February 1989, 39–41 and ‘A320 Performance Improves’, Flight International, 26 August 1989, 9.

  43. 43.

    SOA, CSA, Box 405, Koncepce rozvoje ČSA v období 9.5LP [CSA’s Development Programme for the Period of the 9th Five Year Plan], October 1989.

  44. 44.

    At the time, Czechoslovakia was still denied the ‘most favoured nation’ treatment by the US which radically diminished Boeing’s chances for security (export clearance from concerned departments in Washington) and economic (Prague desired to achieve a balance of payments in mutual trade which was hardly forthcoming) reasons. Cf. NACR, UV CSR/CR-RZP, Usnesení vlády ČSSR č. 154/11.5.185 + podklady [Decision of the Government of the CSSR no. 154/11.5.185 Including Background Papers], various dates. But see also ‘Changes at Czechoslovak Airlines to Increase Responsibility, Freedom’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 February 1989, 121–3 and ‘Crossing the Wall’, Flight International, 20 December 1989–2 January 1990, 32–3.

  45. 45.

    A background paper prepared for the above-mentioned meeting of the Czechoslovak government by the Federal Ministry of Transportation and Communications stated that an offshore company to own the aircraft would be settled ad hoc by the banking consortium. Hence, in all likeliness, it was the banks which, in fact, were the end owners of the transports. Cf. NACR, UV CSR/CR-RZP, Usnesení vlády [Decision of the Government]: Příloha II [Annex II], undated, and NACR, FMDS, Box 27, folder 13.820/89-220, Zpráva o jednání [Record of the Negotiations], 31 August 1989.

  46. 46.

    Cf. ‘Lufthansa Will Maintain Interflug Airbuses’, Flight International, 20 August 1988, 34; ‘UNblocING THE EAST’, Flight International, 29 July 1989, 41 and ‘Crossing the Wall’, Flight International, 20 December 1989–2 January 1990, 33.

  47. 47.

    Cf. Gordon and Rigmant, OKB Tupolev, 284–90.

  48. 48.

    Cf. NACR, UV CSR/CR-RZP, Usnesení vlády [Decision of the Government]: Informace k návrhu usnesení vlády ČSSR [Information (financial evaluation) relating to the proposal for decision of the Government], 6 May 1989, but see also ‘Market Place: Interflug’, Flight International, 12 September 1987, 6 or ‘West’s East European Market Hopes Fade’, Flight International, 6 February 1988, 8.

  49. 49.

    Cf. ‘Rolls-Powered Ilyshin Mooted’, Flight International, 19 November 1988, 17 as well as ‘Perestroika Spurs Aeroflot to Begin Major Changes in Business Operations’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 5 June 1989, 84–7 and ‘Aeroflot Sings Letter of Intent to Purchase Five Airbus A310-300’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 November 1989, 18. See also Jones, ‘The Rise and Fall of Aeroflot’, in Higham, Greenwood and Hardesty (eds.), Russian Aviation and Air Power, 266.

  50. 50.

    Cf. ‘Soviets in Expanded Leasing Talks’, Flight International, 9–15 May 1990, 66.

  51. 51.

    SOA, CSA, Box 399, Protokol 25-ogo soveshchaniya tekhnicheskikh direktorov aviatransportnykh predpriyatiy – uchastnikov Berlinskogo soglasheniya [Protocol of the 25th Meeting of Technical Directors of Air Transport Enterprises of the Berlin Agreement], June 1990.

  52. 52.

    Cf. ‘Aeroflot Admits “Severe Problems”’, Flight International, 3–9 October 1990, 9 and Jones, ‘The Rise and Fall of Aeroflot’, in Higham, Greenwood and Hardesty (eds.), Russian Aviation and Air Power, 266–8.

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    Peter Svik

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Svik, P. (2020). Bloc Aviation Under Late Socialism. In: Civil Aviation and the Globalization of the Cold War. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51603-1_8

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