Skip to main content

Long-Run Inequality in Communist Countries: Before, During and After

Abstract

This chapter provides comprehensive evidence on the long-run evolution of inequality in former communist countries in comparative perspective. We document a marked U-shaped evolution of income inequality since the beginning of the twentieth century until today. We analyse these trends for three periods, before, during and after communism, and make comparison with non-communist countries. A broad synchronisation of inequality in communist and non-communist countries presents a compelling argument against the “natural” decline of inequality during the development process. Rather, it points to the critical role of policies and institutions in shaping inequality in the long run.

Keywords

  • Income and wealth inequality
  • Comparative development
  • Transition

This chapter draws on Novokmet (2017, 2018), Bukowski and Novokmet (2019), Novokmet et al. (2018ab), Kump and Novokmet (2018), Milanović et al. (2020)

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-50888-3_9
  • Chapter length: 42 pages
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
eBook
USD   229.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • ISBN: 978-3-030-50888-3
  • Instant PDF download
  • Readable on all devices
  • Own it forever
  • Exclusive offer for individuals only
  • Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout
Softcover Book
USD   299.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Hardcover Book
USD   299.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
Fig. 9.1
Fig. 9.2
Fig. 9.3
Fig. 9.4
Fig. 9.5
Fig. 9.6
Fig. 9.7
Fig. 9.8
Fig. 9.9
Fig. 9.10
Fig. 9.11
Fig. 9.12
Fig. 9.13
Fig. 9.14
Fig. 9.15
Fig. 9.16
Fig. 9.17
Fig. 9.18

Notes

  1. 1.

    Recently, research using income tax data to construct top incomes has provided a broad historical perspective of income inequality in the international context (Kuznets 1953; Piketty 2001, 2003, 2014; Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010; Atkinson et al. 2011; Roine and Waldenström 2015).

  2. 2.

    Piketty has attributed the key role in shaping inequality to fiscal institutions and redistributive policies. For example, the introduction of steeply progressive taxation prevented the recovery of top wealth holdings after WWII. The recent rise of inequality has been explained by factors such as changing remuneration social norms, reduced income tax progressivity, stagnant minimum wage and the demise of trade unions. Piketty’s finding has been confirmed in other developed countries (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010; Atkinson et al. 2011; Roine and Waldenström 2015).

  3. 3.

    For example, Nikolić and Novokmet (2017) compare historical inequality trajectories in the former Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, countries at markedly different levels of economic development before the Communist seizure of power after WWII (ibid., T.2). Accordingly, the two countries that had previously displayed notably different inequality levels all of a sudden became characterised by the most egalitarian income distribution in the post-WWII decades.

  4. 4.

    Piketty and Saez (2014, p. 842) note in this respect that “the Kuznets’ overly optimistic theory of a natural decline in income inequality in market economies largely owed its popularity to the Cold War context of the 1950s as a weapon in the ideological fight between the market economy and Socialism”.

  5. 5.

    For example, with the super-rapid (“voucher”) privatisation or shrinking social state, evidenced in declining social transfers or minimum wage and so on.

  6. 6.

    The top shares methodology is used in much of historical distributional research. The methodological approach consists in relating information in tax statistics to reference totals for population and income (Kuznets 1953; Piketty 2001; Atkinson 2007).

  7. 7.

    For details on the Distributional National Accounts (DINA) methodology, see Alvaredo et al. (2016).

  8. 8.

    But shocks to capital income played an important role even before the arrival of communism, corresponding again to Western experience (Piketty 2001). This is suggested by the “structural” decline after WW1 in Central Europe (see Fig. 9.1 the Czech or Polish series; for Germany, see Dell 2007).The post-war situation worldwide opened a new page in the distributional history (e.g. Piketty 2014; Milanović 2016).

  9. 9.

    Broadly covering dividends, interests, business profits, rents, land income and so on.

  10. 10.

    This is revealed from the breakdown of the business income in top shares according to economic branches, which shows that bulk of high business incomes were earned in industry (Novokmet 2018, Fig. 15).

  11. 11.

    The Czech Lands are Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and formed the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia and since 1993 the Czech Republic.

  12. 12.

    First, Poland was still dominantly an agrarian economy before WWII and markedly less industrialised than Czechoslovakia, or even Hungary. Second, Poland was characterised by large land concentration in the hands of nobility, especially “Prussian Poland”, which, like the Czech Lands, experienced a rapid development of commercial agriculture. Bukowski and Novokmet (2019) find that the “agricultural revolution” in Prussian Poland in the two decades preceding WW1 was accompanied by a notable increase in top incomes, which were almost exclusively concentrated in the countryside.

  13. 13.

    For example, Czechoslovakia succumbed to the “gold orthodoxy” and adhered relatively longer to the French-led Gold bloc, while it managed to free itself from the consequent deflation by rather late devaluations in 1934 and 1936 (Eichengreen 1992).

  14. 14.

    In contrast to Czech Lands, top incomes in Slovakia rose during the Great Depression, probably as a result of the rising urban-rural gap (see Novokmet 2018, T.21)

  15. 15.

    Rough estimates indicate that cartels controlled more than half of the industrial output in Poland in the 1930s (Landau 1978). The Czechoslovak industry had shown substantial cartelisation before, but only after the introduction of compulsory cartelisation in 1933, it became the dominant feature.

  16. 16.

    There is rich historical evidence pointing to a marked enrichment of particular layers of society, in the first place of large industrialists who collaborated with the Nazi regime. In addition, wartime often offered various means for rapid and spectacular enrichment, for example, the infamous process of “Ariyanisation” through which Jewish property was confiscated Novokmet (2018, Table 2).

  17. 17.

    Lampe and Jackson (1982, p. 240) comment that “previous economic centres suffered … for being far from the seat of political power”.

  18. 18.

    This is a plausible feature of “industrial laggards”. Namely, a relative backwardness of CEE in the nineteenth century entailed significant state intervention in promoting industrialisation (acting as Gerschenkron’s “substitutes for prerequisites”), and here banks especially had a prominent role in pooling funds, thereby promoting cartelisation to minimise risk (Hilferding 1923; Rudolph 1976), which lead to oligopolistic structures in the heavy industry, engineering, banking and finance, and so on (Teichova 1974 ).

  19. 19.

    Similarly, Handbuch der Millionäre suggests that most of the German millionaires before WWI were large landowners (Baten and Schulz 2005). Yet, it should be mentioned that big landed wealth had already been under the attack notably with the land reforms implemented after WW1 in the newly formed “nation” states of Central Eastern Europe.

  20. 20.

    Other authors have pointed to similar trends elsewhere: for example, the abolishment of zaibatsu or the land reforms in Japan (Moriguchi and Saez 2008), nationalisations in France (e.g. of Renault in 1946, see Piketty 2001), etc.

  21. 21.

    Moreover because, as said above, there was an important reduction in capital income inequality in Western countries during the twentieth century.

  22. 22.

    For example, even the expansion of education, which is typically seen as one of the key economic mechanisms determining the wage distribution, could be seen as driven by the political domain.

  23. 23.

    Flakierski (1992, p. 12) notes that “the socialist state had to reconcile the need for economic efficiency with ethical considerations of social justice in the field of distribution, which obviously was not easy”.

  24. 24.

    The long-term evidence on the wage distribution by percentile ranks is obtained from employer surveys. Comparable and exhaustive surveys were introduced in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and in CEE countries in the 1950s. Bergson (1942, 1944) is the seminal assessment of inequality of earnings in the Soviet Union in 1928 and 1934. Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) extensively analysed employer surveys in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union since the 1950s until the late 1980s. Flakierski looked in detail at evidence for Poland and Hungary (1986), former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (1989). We extend their analysis back to the pre-communist period.

  25. 25.

    This striking development has been confirmed by Brainerd (1998), Flemming and Micklewright (2000) and so on.

  26. 26.

    This decline is gauged from available data on the distribution among wage earners in industry, though these are a good predictor for all sectors. The comparison of decile ratios in periods when both estimates of the distribution for all workers and wage earners are available suggests that the distribution for industrial wage earners is representative of developments in the earnings distribution before WWII (Bergson 1984, p. 1077; evidence for Poland).

  27. 27.

    It is true that a more significant reduction in earnings inequality occurred between 1980 and 1982—coinciding thus with the emergence of the Solidarity movement—yet it was short-lived, and earnings dispersion increased again after 1982. Moreover, there is considerable doubt about the data quality during the 1980s, given the prevalent economic turmoil (Flakierski 1986).

  28. 28.

    The difference between today and interwar Poland is more compressed upper- and lower-tail inequalities. Thus, while in 1929, P10 was barely 37% of median wage, in 2016 it is 54. On the other hand, P90 was 235% of median wage, while today is 205%.

  29. 29.

    The data for Warsaw refers to the distribution of weekly wage among manual workers in medium-sized and large establishment.

  30. 30.

    Landau (1933, p. 120) notes that a strong fall in wages had first occurred in small industry, while “in big industry the process was checked by collective contract”. However, Landau adds that a major fall in wages eventually occurred in big industry after 1932. This plausibly contributed to a fall of upper-tail inequality, as indicated by the development of P90/P50 for manual workers in Warsaw.

  31. 31.

    Evidence on the wage distribution for Czechoslovakia in the late 1920s/1930s and the late 1940s is based on insurance statistics. The evolution of the P90 ratio suggests that a significant narrowing of upper-tail inequality had already occurred before the communist coup of 1948. Maňák (1967) documented the first post-war wage regulation implemented in December 1945 (Večerník 1991), though the true “wage revolution” took place between 1948 and 1953, with a dramatic decline in wage inequality.

  32. 32.

    Although, as said, there are doubts about the reliability of data during this period of inflation and widespread shortages, a large part of the decline should be directly attributed to the demand of Solidarity from the Gdansk Agreement (Flakierski 1991).

  33. 33.

    Phelps Brown (1977, p. 81) succinctly explains that “most of the white-collar occupations are distinguished from the manual by the level of education required by entrants, and the graduations of their pay are fairly closely associated with gradations of that level”.

    The white-collar premium has proved robust proxy for earnings inequality, but the two groups should not be assumed as uniform “classes”. For example, historical evidence on the “labour aristocracy” suggests a heterogeneity within the class of manual workers, Hobsbawm or Gray). See also Fig. 9.11a.

  34. 34.

    Arguably, the much sharper post-war reduction in skill gap in Czechoslovakia and Poland compared to the USSR should be related to the timing of the communist accession.

  35. 35.

    Kalecki (1964) summarised this development as follows: “a white-collar worker, who in pre-war Poland belonged to the privileged class compared to the manual worker, in 1960 earned on average little more than the manual worker”.

  36. 36.

    Although the white-collar premium had been lower in the interwar Czechoslovakia than in Poland, it was nonetheless substantial by international standards. In Czechoslovakia, skills were not in limited supply. Actually, the Czech Lands had one of the highest educational attainments in Europe at the time (Teichova 1988).

  37. 37.

    According to Kocka, the collar division was finally “institutionalised” in Germany with a legal separation of insurance schemes for white-collar and manual workers. An equivalent development had taken place in Imperial Austria (ibid., p. 466), and the separate insurance schemes persisted into the new nation states in Central Eastern Europe that emerged from the German Empire and Austria-Hungary.

  38. 38.

    The First Republic, in particular, is frequently seen as the golden age for salaried workers and civil servants, and often these are identified with the ascendant Czech bourgeoisie (Teichova 1988).

  39. 39.

    Communists shared a suspicion of the “reliability” of intellectuals with the Nazis and saw the intelligentsia as natural enemies. During the occupation of Poland and Czech Lands, the Nazis pursued policies discriminating white-collar workers. Largely in consequence of the intelligentsia’s pronounced role as the backbone of national consciousness—which had in part underlaid their higher social status during the interwar era—intelligentsia suffered the most during WWII (Gella 1989). Snyder (2011) argues that both the Nazi and Soviet occupational forces especially targeted the Polish intelligentsia during their respective invasions following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. One mournful illustration is the fate of two brilliant interwar economists, the pioneers of the statistical investigation of economic and social inequality, Ludwyk Landau and Jan Wisniewski. The first was murdered by the Gestapo, while the second ended his life in Katyn.

  40. 40.

    For example, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) kept a strong anti-intellectual stance until the very end of its rule (Grzymala-Busse 2002, p. 31).

  41. 41.

    Phelps Brown (1977, p. 66) writes: “As far back as the 1840s, John Stuart Mill thought that the spread of literacy would have brought down the relative pay of clerks had it not been for the traditional valuation of their status; and the effective reason for the comparatively low position of clerical pay in the Soviet structure may be that this tradition was destroyed by revolution, so that market forces could take the effect that continued to be denied them by customary attitudes in the West”.

  42. 42.

    To quote Bergson (1944, p. 209): “in view of the pressure of the Soviet five-year program for industrial expansion, the abandonment of egalitarianism in 1931 is not difficult to explain on other grounds”.

  43. 43.

    As noted, comprehensive enterprise surveys carried out in socialist countries allow us to chart the wage distribution over the longer time span (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992; Atkinson 2008; Rutkowski 2001).

  44. 44.

    Keane and Prasad (2006) find that earnings dispersion in Poland took place within both the public and private sectors, and thus within-sector inequalities were the dominant force behind the overall de-levelling trend.

  45. 45.

    The P90/50 ratio jumped over 300% in 2001 and then saw a gradual decline attain levels around 250% in 2015. The P10/50 ratio fell to less than 15% in 1995 and then continually increased to 40% in 2015.

  46. 46.

    Keane and Prasad (2002) have argued that this provided the general political support for market reforms and enterprise restructuring in Poland.

  47. 47.

    Unfortunately, the tax data on high-income individuals used to correct the top of the income distribution in Russia and China do not allow us to distinguish different income sources at the top of the income distribution.

  48. 48.

    However, it should be mentioned that business income includes both return to physical and human (entrepreneurial) capital.

  49. 49.

    In particular, the fact the holders of top capital incomes tend to be foreigners rather than domestic residents contributes to lower top income shares in countries like the Czech Republic or Hungary (Fig. 9.17b).

References

  • Adam, J. (1984). Employment/Wage Policies in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary Since 1950. Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2016). Distributional National Accounts (DINA) Guidelines: Concepts and Methods Used in WID World. WID.World Working Paper 2016/02.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B. (2007). Measuring Top Incomes: Methodological Issues. In A. B. Atkinson & T. Piketty (Eds.), Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between Continental European and English-Speaking Countries (pp. 18–42). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B. (2008). The Changing Distribution of Earnings in OECD Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B. (2015). Inequality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B., & Micklewright, J. (1992). Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Distribution of Income. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B., & Piketty, T. (2007). Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between Continental European and English-Speaking Countries (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B., & Piketty, T. (2010). Top Incomes: A Global Perspective (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2011). Top Incomes in the Long Run of History. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(1), 3–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, R. E. (2016). The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, R., & Forslid, R. (2020). Globotics and development: When manufacturing is jobless and services are tradable (No. w26731). National Bureau of Economic Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baten, J., & Schulz, R. (2005). Making Profits in Wartime: Corporate Profits, Inequality, and GDP in Germany During the First World War I. Economic History Review, LVIII, 1, 34–56.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Berglof, E., & Bolton, P. (2002). The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture in Transition. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 77–100.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Bergson, A. (1942). Distribution of the Earnings Bill Among Industrial Workers in the Soviet Union March, 1928, October, 1934. Journal of Political Economy, 50(2), 227–249.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergson, A. (1944). The Structure of Soviet Wages–a Study in Socialist Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergson, A. (1984). Income Inequality under Soviet Socialism. Journal of Economic Literature, 22, 1052–1099.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beskid, L. (1964). Płace realne na jednego zatrudnionego pracownika w 1960 r. w porównaniu z 1937 r. Przegląd Statystyczny, vol. 11/3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brainerd, E. (1998). Winners and Losers in Russia’s Economic Transition. American Economic Review, 88, 1094–1116.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bukowski, P., & Novokmet, F. (2019). Between Communism and Capitalism: Long-Term Inequality in Poland, 1892–2015, WID.World Working Paper 2019/08.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dell, F. (2007). Top Income in Germany Throughout the Twentieth Century: 1891–1998. In A. B. Atkinson & T. Piketty (Eds.), Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between Continental European and English-Speaking Countries (pp. 365–425). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen, B. J. (1992). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flakierski, H. (1986). Economic Reform & Income Distribution: A Case Study of Hungary and Poland. Armonk, New York/London: M.E Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flakierski, H. (1991). Social Policies in the 1980s in Poland: A Discussion of New Approaches. In Economic Reforms and Welfare Systems in the USSR, Poland and Hungary (pp. 85–109). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Flakierski, H. (1992). Income Inequalities in the Former Soviet Union and Its Republics. International Journal of Sociology, 22(3), i–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flemming, J. S., & Micklewright, J. (2000). Income Distribution, Economic Systems and Transition. In Handbook of Income Distribution (Vol. 1, pp. 843–918). New York: Elsevier.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Gella, A. (1989). Development of Class Structure in Eastern Europe: Poland and her Southern Neighbors. SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldin, C., & Katz, L. (2008). The Race between Technology and Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldin, C., & Margo, R. A. (1992). The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-century. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), 1–34.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Grzymala-Busse, A. M. (2002). Redeeming the Communist Past. The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Hilferding, R. (1923). Das finanzkapital (vol. 3). Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalecki, M. (1964). A Comparison of Manual and White-Collar Worker Incomes with the Pre-War Period. In Collected Works of Michal Kalecki: Volume IV: Socialism: Economic Growth and Efficiency of Investment (vol. 4). 1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keane, M. P., & Prasad, E. S. (2002). Inequality, Transfers, and Growth: New Evidence from the Economic Transition in Poland. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 324–341.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Keane, M. P., & Prasad, E. S. (2006). Changes in the Structure of Earnings during the Polish Transition. Journal of Development Economics, vol., 80(2), 389–427.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Kocka, J. (1981). Capitalism and Bureaucracy in German Industrialization before 1914. The Economic History Review, 34(3), 453–468.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Kopczuk, W., Saez, E., & Song, J. (2010). Earnings Inequality and Mobility in the United States: Evidence from Social Security Data Since 1937. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 91–128.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Kump, N., & Novokmet, F. (2018). After ‘Self-management’: Top Incomes in Croatia and Slovenia, 1960–2015. WID.World Working Paper 2018/8.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuznets, S. (1953). Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality. American Economic Review, 45, 1–28.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lampe, J., & Jackson, M. (1982). Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landau, L. (1933). Płace w Polsce w związku z rozwojem gospodarczym. Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Spolecznych.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landau, Z. (1978). The Extent of Cartelization of Industries in Poland, 1918–1939. Acta Poloniae Historica, 38, 147–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindert, P. H., & Williamson, J. G. (2016). Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality since 1700. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Lydall, H. (1968). The structure of earnings. Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machonin, P. (Ed.). (1969). Československá společnost: Sociologická analýza sociální stratifikace. Epocha.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maňák, J. (1967). Problematika odměňování české inteligence v letech 1945—1948 (Příspěvek k objasnění počátků nivelizace). Sociologický Časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 3, 529–540.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mavridis, D., & Mosberger, P. (2017). Income Inequality and Incentives the Quasi-natural Experiment of Hungary, 1914–2008. WID. World Working Paper Series, (2017/17).

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayer, A. J. (1981). The persistence of the old regime: Europe to the Great War. Taylor & Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  • McAuley, A. (1979). Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality. University of Wisconsin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanović, B. (1998). Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanović, B. (2016). Global Inequality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanović, B. (2019). Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanović, B., & Ersado, L. (2012). Reform and Inequality During the Transition: An Analysis Using Panel Household Survey Data, 1990–2005. In Economies in Transition (pp. 84–108). Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanović, B., Novokmet, F., & Yang, L. (2020). From Workers to Capitalists in Less than Two Generations: A Study of Chinese Urban Elite Transformation between 1988 and 2013. WID. world working paper 2019/10.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitra, P., & Yemtsov, R. (2006). Increasing Inequality in Transition Economies: Is There More to Come?. The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4007.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrisson, C. (2000). Historical perspectives on income distribution: the case of Europe. In A. B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (Eds.). Handbook of income distribution, 1, 217–260.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moriguchi, C., & Saez, E. (2008). The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1886–2005: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4), 713–734.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Nikolić, S., & Novokmet, F. (2018). Inequality in Eastern Europe, 1890–1950: Evidence from Dynamic Social Tables. mimeo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Novokmet, F. (2017). Between Communism and Capitalism: Essays on the Evolution of Income and Wealth Inequality in Eastern Europe 1890–2015 (Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, and Russia). PhDdiss. Paris School of Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Novokmet, F. (2018). The Long-run Evolution of Inequality in the Czech Lands, 1898–2015. WID.World Working Paper Series No 2018/06.

    Google Scholar 

  • Novokmet, F., Piketty, T., & Zucman, G. (2018a). From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia 1905–2016. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 16(2), 189–223.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Novokmet, F., Piketty, T., Yang, L., & Zucman, G. (2018b). From Communism to Capitalism: Private versus Public Property and Inequality in China and Russia. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 108, 109–113.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Olšovský, R. (1961). Přehled hospodářského vývoje Československa v letech 1918–1945. Státní nakl. politické literatury.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phelps Brown, H. (1977). The Inequality of Pay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phelps Brown, H. (1988). Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T. (2001). Les hauts revenus en France au XXe siècle. Hachette.

    Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T. (2003). Income Inequality in France, 1901–1998. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1004–1042.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T. (2006). The Kuznets Curve: Yesterday and Tomorrow. In Understanding Poverty (pp. 63–72). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the 21st Century. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T., Postel-Vinay, G., & Rosenthal, J. L. (2006). Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy: Paris and France, 1807–1994. American Economic Review, 96(1), 236–256.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2003). Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 1–41.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2014). Inequality in the Long Run. Science, 344, 838–843.

    Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T., Yang, L., & Zucman, G. (2019). Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978–2015. American Economic Review, 109(7), 2469–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T., & Zucman, G. (2014). Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries,1700–2010. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3), 1255–1310.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Redor, D. (1992). Wage Inequalities in East and West. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roine, J., & Waldenström, D. (2015). Long-Run Trends in the Distribution of Income and Wealth. In A. B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution (Vol. 2). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudolph, R. (1976). Banking and Industrialization in Austria-Hungary. The Role of Banks in the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rutkowski, J. (2001). Earnings Inequality in Transition Economies of Central Europe: Trends and Patterns During the 1990s. World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0117.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sant’Anna, A. A. (2015). A Spectre has Haunted the West: Did Socialism Discipline Income Inequality? MPRA Paper

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, T. (2011). Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Teichova, A. (1974). An Economic Background to Munich: International Business and Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938. London: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Teichova, A. (1988). The Czechoslovak Economy 1918–1980. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tinbergen, J. (1974). Substitution of Graduate by Other Labour. Kyklos, 27(2), 217–226.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Večerník, J. (1991). Earning Distribution in Czechoslovakia: Intertemporal Changes and International Comparison. European Sociological Review, 7(3), 237–252.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Zwass, A. (1999). Incomplete Revolutions: The Successes and Failures of Capitalist Transition Strategies in Post-Communist Economies. ME Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Filip Novokmet .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Novokmet, F. (2021). Long-Run Inequality in Communist Countries: Before, During and After. In: Douarin, E., Havrylyshyn, O. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Comparative Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50888-3_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50888-3_9

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-50887-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-50888-3

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)