Abstract
In this chapter, I argue that the exemplar-based approach motivates a new functional approach to scientific progress, which makes a better account of the progress in the history of genetics. First of all, motivated by the exemplar-based approach, I propose a new functional approach to scientific progress, in which scientific progress is defined in terms of usefulness of problem-defining and problem-solving. Secondly, I further develop a functional account of the progress in early genetics. Thirdly, I argue that the new functional approach well resolves the problems of the traditional functional approach. Fourthly, I highlight the advantages of my new functional account over the epistemic and semantic accounts and dismiss some potential objections to my account.
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Notes
- 1.
The phenomenon of atavism was explained by DT5 in the sense that some gemmules were in the dormant state and remained undeveloped in many generations.
- 2.
The plant species displaying the Mendelian ratio in the hybridization experiment included Agrostemma Githago, Amarantus caudatus, Aster Tripolium, Calliopsis tinetoria, Chelidonium majus, Chrysanthemum eoronarium, Clarhia pulchella, Corepis tinctoria, Datura Tabula, Hyosoyamus niger, Linaria vulgaris, Lychnis diurna, Lychnis vespertina, Oenothera Lamarckiana, Papaver somniferum Mephisto, Solanum nigrum, Trifolium pratense, Veronica longifolia, Viola cornuta, and Zea Mays.
- 3.
Another representative of the functional approach is proposed and developed by Imre Lakatos. According to Lakatos (1978, 33–34), a research programme is progressive if it generates novel and well corroborated predictions. In this section, I focus on the Kuhn-Laudan functional approach, so I shall not delve into a detailed discussion on Lakatos’ account.
- 4.
Though Kuhn’s criterion of puzzle-solving is distinct from Laudan’s, Bird’s thought experiment is applicable to Kuhn’s approach by assuming that the paradigmatic solution relies on a false universal generalization.
- 5.
Laudan distinguishes two types of scientific problems that are designed to be solved: empirical problems and conceptual problems. For Laudan (1977, 14–17), anything about the natural world in need of explanation is in the realm of empirical problems. Why heavy objects fall towards the earth is an empirical problem. In contrast, conceptual problems are all theory-dependent. What is absolute space is a conceptual problem.
- 6.
For an exemplar -based explanation of the problem of the long neglect, see Chap. 7.
- 7.
The problem of counter-intuition shall be discussed in Sect. 6.5.
- 8.
For Kuhn (1970b), puzzles are defined (or even pre-defined) relative to disciplinary matrices which assure the existence of their solutions. For Laudan (1977), empirical problems consist of unsolved problems, solved problems, and anomalous problems, He says little on how unsolved problems and solved problems are defined, and claims that anomalous problems often are generated by new observations.
- 9.
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) famously rejects this distinction by arguing that know-how is reducible to know-that. Whether there is a genuine distinction between know-that and know-how, my point still holds. Science does not only tell us something theoretical which can be formulated in the propositions, but also tell us something practical, whether which can be reformulated in the propositions or not.
- 10.
It should be highlighted that the notion of usefulness can be explicated by the contextualist theory of truth does not imply that my functional approach assumes a contextualist theory of truth. It does not eliminate the possibility that it can also be explicated by other theories of truth.
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Shan, Y. (2020). A Functional Account of the Progress in Early Genetics. In: Doing Integrated History and Philosophy of Science: A Case Study of the Origin of Genetics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 320. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50617-9_6
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