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How International Human Rights Law Potentially Applies to Development NGOs in a Post-Mass Atrocity Context Working in Partnership with/as Proxies of States

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Abstract

This chapter examines how international human rights law potentially applies to development NGOs working as proxies for governments in the provision of social services. It details the intricate relationship NGOs have with states and how increasingly they act as implementing agents of the state globally, and therefore have corresponding human rights responsibilities. It explores the power and resources that NGOs have and the extent to which they can influence development policy and implementation in a way that either advances the respect and fulfillment of human rights or violates and denies them. It uses the framework David Karp creates for the human rights responsibilities of corporations and illustrates how this can apply to NGOs. It shows that many reputable NGOs, such as Oxfam and Save the Children, have exhibited problematic human rights policies and practices. It argues that they need to be held to account and their policies and practices urgently improved. It further provides evidence that NGOs cannot rely exclusively on self-regulation because it is insufficient to ensure the respect and fulfillment of human rights.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Clapham (supra note 25 in Chap. 3) 1.

  2. 2.

    Karp, (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 13. See also note 26 in Chap. 1.

  3. 3.

    Eric de Brabandere, ‘Non-State Actors and Human Rights: Corporate Responsibility and the Attempts to Formalize the Role of Corporations’ in Participants in the International Legal System (eds) Jean d’Aspremont (Routledge 2011) 268.

  4. 4.

    Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006). 460.

  5. 5.

    August Reinisch, in Philip Alston (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005). 82.

    http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Reinisch (see note 5 in this chapter) 71.

  8. 8.

    International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx

  9. 9.

    Alston, See note 2 in Chap. 1.

  10. 10.

    Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999).

  11. 11.

    Risse, Roppe, and Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance Cambridge University Press (2013).

  12. 12.

    Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 98.

  13. 13.

    World Vision Rwanda Annual Report 2013. http://www.wvi.org/rwanda/publication/world-vision-rwanda-2014-annual-report

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 29.

  16. 16.

    Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 3.

  17. 17.

    Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 120.

  18. 18.

    Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 30.

  19. 19.

    Karp himself acknowledges these limitations. Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 90–92.

  20. 20.

    Karp (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 135–36.

  21. 21.

    Karp supra (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 3. 

  22. 22.

    Karp supra (see note 29 in Chap. 1) 92–93.

  23. 23.

    Kolstad (see note 63 in Chap. 3) 280.

  24. 24.

    Scott (see note 44 of Chap. 3) 212.

  25. 25.

    Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguin Toft, Essentials of International Relations WW Norton (2016) 249.

  26. 26.

    Supra note 24, this chapter, p 251.

  27. 27.

    Dulcie Lee, ‘How Much Government Aid Does a Charity Like Oxfam Actually Get?’ The New Statesman (2018).

    https://www.newstatesman.com/2018/02/how-much-government-aid-does-charity-oxfam-actually-get

  28. 28.

    Sean O’Neill, ‘Oxford Scandal: Staff Still Offering Aid For Sex, Report Claims’ The Times (2019).

    https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/oxfam-scandal-staff-still-offering-aid-for-sex-report-claims-pbx32xctw

    Rebecca Ratcliffe, ‘Oxfam Failed to Report Child Abuse Claims in Haiti, Inquiry Finds’ The Guardian (2019) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/11/oxfam-abuse-claims-haiti-charity-commission-report

    Deborah Doane, ‘Oxfam’s ‘Hypocrisy’ Is Not Unique: The Aid System is Built On a Power Imbalance’ The Guardian (2019).

    https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/12/oxfam-hypocrisy-not-unique-aid-system-built-on-power-imbalance

  29. 29.

    Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, ‘Oxfam Failed Horribly On Abuse. But I Plan To Deliver Radical Change’ The Guardian (2019).

    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/14/oxfam-abuse-power-safeguarding

    Oxfam Independent Commission Final Report (2019).

    https://independentcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Oxfam_IC_Final_Report-EN.pdf

    UK Government Charity Inquiry (2019).

    https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charity-inquiry-oxfam-gb

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Karen McVeigh, ‘Aid Agencies Accused of Failure to Make Good on Oxfam Abuse Scandal Pledges’ The Guardian (2019).

    https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/18/aid-agencies-accused-of-failure-to-make-good-on-oxfam-abuse-scandal-pledges

    The regulator said that when it looked at the wider issue of safeguarding in Oxfam it found ‘systemic weaknesses.’ It said this was largely down to the charity not adequately resourcing its safeguarding function. The Commission said that Oxfam’s safeguarding team was overstretched and unable to carry out much preventative work. It says it engaged with Oxfam about this between 2015 and 2017 but the charity did not meet promises to increase resources for safeguarding. Oxfam has since made a significant investment in its safeguarding team and provided training across the organization. An independent HR review, carried out for Oxfam in 2017, highlighted weaknesses and made 40 recommendations to strengthen the culture, 35 of which are in the process of being taken forward. Oxfam told the Commission it has completed 28 of these recommendations.

    See more at: https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/oxfam-inquiry-report-published.html#sthash.pL2RjhTD.dpuf

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Audrey Gillan, ‘Sex Abuse Work Tarnish Work of Aid Agencies in Africa’ The Guardian (2002) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/apr/20/voluntarysector

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Doane (See note 28 in this chapter).

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

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Schimmel, N. (2020). How International Human Rights Law Potentially Applies to Development NGOs in a Post-Mass Atrocity Context Working in Partnership with/as Proxies of States. In: Advancing International Human Rights Law Responsibilities of Development NGOs. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50270-6_4

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