The Powers of the Agencies to Collect and Use Location Information

Abstract

The powers of the Agencies to use the disclosed historical and prospective location information are broad and lack transparency to challenge. This is demonstrated by the use of the word ‘security’, the meaning of which is broad, but is accepted by Australian courts as the discretionary realm of the executive branch of government. There appear to be no clear public guidelines on what actions qualify as potential threats to security, thereby placing tech—and politically-savvy climate change and environment protestors, at risk of being inquired into—the government has equated their actions to threats of security. No clear guidelines exist how metadata collections may be initiated at an arm’s length basis, between the Agencies and the government if such cases were to be referred to the Agencies by the government. Telecommunications data is also collected for what may be considered as offences that do not risk national security such as public order offences, theft and a category of miscellaneous offences that are not disclosed. In this manner the collection and use of metadata across all types of offences is indiscriminate, whereas the original motivation for metadata retention and collection were serious crimes that threaten national security, such as terrorist acts. This situation puts climate change protesters at potential risk of their metadata being stored indefinitely and analysed.