Consistent with the finding of Love’s review (2011), each of these case studies reveal populations in transition, characterised by obvious accelerated decline post-disaster event. Patterns of residents staying, leaving or returning have shown a strong correlation with the level of residential damage at the localised geographical level. While the historical context and demographic circumstances were variable for each case study pre-event, there have been a number of socio-demographic factors and issues evident within the recovery process. Population movement during recovery and reconstruction has not been homogenous spatially, temporally or socially. Changes in gender profiles, age structure, race and ethnicity, employment, income, livelihoods, insurance coverage, housing affordability, rebuilding and redevelopment, service provision and rehabilitation of the surrounding environment each have implications on measures of vulnerability and resilience to future events that should be taken into account in planning decision making.
Sub-national population estimates for Christchurch city in 2012 revealed a population decline of about 13,500 (3.6%) compared to pre-earthquake estimates, although the greater Christchurch region experienced a growth of 2.6% (Statistics New Zealand 2012; Statistics New Zealand 2014a, b). The net migration loss from the city was partly offset by natural increase yet there were some observed differences in both gender and age groups (Statistics New Zealand 2012; Newell et al. 2012). In the two years after the earthquake, there was a significant loss of women from the workforce, fewer young adults and a net outflow of children and their parents. The population continued to age with an increase in the number of people over 50, also indicating this cohort was less likely to have left Christchurch than people of other age groups. A significant number of those displaced by damage and destruction to the housing stock relocated in proximate suburban regions with the 2013 census showing a large increase in the percentage of workers now commuting to the city for employment. There was however an 81.1% increase in the number of unoccupied dwellings as a consequence of the earthquake, many of these “red-stickered” as unsafe for occupation (Statistics New Zealand 2014a).
In Greater Christchurch construction replaced manufacturing as the industry sector with the highest proportion of employment after the quakes, as the inflow of workers and extensive rebuilding activity helped the economy remain reasonably resilient. Retail and tourism were hit hardest, but insurance helped to buffer the economic impact (Parker and Steenkamp 2012). Reflecting the extensive level of destruction, there was a marked decrease in the number of workers in central Christchurch City. However with offsets in the south-west and near the airport there was no long-term change in overall employment rates between 2006 and 2013 censuses (Statistics New Zealand 2014a). Gawith (2011) lists many social, emotional, psychological, traumatic, economic and financial impacts, as well as a loss of places and community. Relocation was thus not just physical necessity but about moving forward. Greater Christchurch strategic planning was in place pre-earthquake, based on performance criteria that stressed sustainability (Swaffield 2012). Although recovery and rebuilding have been slow there is an optimism about the future of Christchurch. There is not an alternative central place in that region of New Zealand.
Even prior to the impact and devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, the core city of New Orleans was a poor community associated with high levels of poverty, crime, illiteracy, inadequate basic services including health care and education, substandard housing stock and a lack economic opportunities. Sastry (2009) identified that 23% of the New Orleans population was below the poverty line, with a 35% poverty rate amongst African-Americans. Rental rates were high, with lower than national average rates of home ownership. The distribution of predominantly African-American and more socially and economically disadvantaged people were concentrated in low-lying areas that took the brunt of floods. There were consequently high levels of permanent displacement of people and many uninsured losses following Hurricane Katrina. The principally poor population lacked the finances or resources to rebuild (Zaninetti and Colten 2012). Raising houses on stilts was seen by planners as too expensive for a poor population.
The recovery process in New Orleans has further embedded distinct geographical patterns of social vulnerability. Zaninetti and Colten (2012) highlight a change in the city’s ethnic landscape with differentiation in population distribution on class and racial lines. The city and metro area became more ethnically diverse; as African-American and white non-Hispanic populations declined in overall number, there was an increase in Hispanic and Asian residents (Plyer 2015). This was also an ageing population with a noticeable growth in the proportion of residents aged 65 and older. With the business and tourist centres relatively undamaged by the flooding, there has been a significant increase in property values and consequently the historic downtown has revealed gentrification and relative affluence. Recovery in other areas has reflected a temporal redistribution of population in clusters of settlements associated with less flood-prone neighbourhoods, the level of damage and extent of rebuilding.
The worst flooded areas have been characterised by depopulation with abandoned properties and blight rather than spatial contraction of the city and infrastructure. In 2012, vacancy still represented a loss of over 11% of the city, particularly a shrinkage of the metropolitan area (Zaninetti and Colten 2012). Population growth and relocation in New Orleans has moved from below sea level towards higher ground (vertical migration). Exposure to flood has been reduced since Katrina through population redistribution, but population loss has also reduced the tax base and capacity of the city to provide services and infrastructure. High demand and high rental costs for viable dwellings have made much of post-Katrina housing unaffordable. The reality of post-Katrina New Orleans is the emergence of unequal and disparate cities—the downtown cultural and business areas which have recovered, middle-class neighbourhoods which reflect variable degrees of redevelopment and recovery, and the disadvantaged areas (Olshansky 2006).
While continued population stagnation and decline in both Innisfail and Cassowary Coast reflect an established demographic trend, patterns over the last ten years have been underscored by significant reduction in standards of living. During the period 2001 to 2006, incomes grew faster than rents and mortgage repayments, but in the second half of the decade post-Cyclone Larry and accompanying the global recession and Cyclone Yasi, the reverse has been the case with housing costs increasing at much higher rates than household income, generating concerns regarding affordability (Boon et al. 2013). As redevelopment and rebuilding post-disaster resulted in an increase in housing approvals and the overall number of available dwellings, vacancy rates have also escalated.
Despite the influx of trades, technicians and the temporary construction boom associated with cyclone recovery, young people and families have continued to move to larger cities seeking education and employment opportunities. Numbers of youth and residents aged 25–44 declined by 1.8% with a distinct decline (10%) in couples with children and family household compositions. Reflecting an aging population the percentage of residents aged over 55 is increasing (see Chap. 2 for comparison on disaster-induced aging). The median age in Innisfail has subsequently increased by 7.2 years to 42.4 between the 2005 and 2011 censuses (QGSO 2017). With net population loss, there has been a reduction in both business and job prospects in the Innisfail township.
Growth and decline in coastal Queensland, including the Cassowary Shire remain heavily influenced by resource exploitation. Tropical fruits and sugar cane have declined in terms of relative commodity prices. Farmers are ageing, and the families of many have left the area to seek qualifications and off-farm careers. On top of these longer term trends, hazard events are major drivers of community change. The Cassowary Coast has 9.4% of its population Indigenous and experiences high population mobility, with 44% of the population of the local government area in the lowest Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) quintile. Similar to the Maori of Christchurch (Gawith 2011), aboriginal farm workers and banana packers in Cassowary Shire found themselves put out of work following Larry and Yasi, returning to their home communities on Cape York Peninsula between 400 and 1000 km to the north.
Many other seasonal farm workers in the region were backpacker tourists who also lost opportunities in the shire and ceased to travel in this area. Tourism was hard hit generally, with resorts going out of business or into “moth balls”, or operating part time, seasonally or for booked events. For many potential tourists, the stigma and perception of a disaster afflicted environment, and infrastructure preserved well beyond its useful life—the tourism industry has been slow to recover. Within this context of recurrent cyclones, flooding and coastal hazards, population loss and economic insecurity the Cassowary Coast Regional Council has continued to pursue a strategic planning direction of growth based on recognition of Innisfail as the major regional activity centre, supported by value added agriculture and tourism (AECOM 2012).
6.5.1 Planning Approaches
While population adjustment is fundamental to human response to disasters, population redistribution is a part of adaptation. In the aftermath of a disaster event, there are significant concerns regarding the prospect of sustained population exodus from a town or city. Task forces consisting of government representatives, planners, non-government organisations, industry and community members are often established to develop strategic approaches to arrest further population flight and facilitate reconstruction, resettlement and recovery. Strategies may be protective, defensive, offensive, opportunistic, or landscape and urban design oriented with different resource orientations (Lima and Eischeid 2017).
Planning for effective post-disaster recovery requires all scales and levels of government and a vision and openness to imagine a radically different, new community or city. Similarly, it is necessary to recognise patterns of demographic change and transition that may represent short, medium or even longer term population loss (King et al. 2016). There is a need for data and resource sharing and extensive communication. Recovery has to involve the diaspora population and planning for recovery needs funding (Olshansky 2006). Rather than traditional planning premised on anticipated future growth and development, post-disaster recovery should be prepared to plan-to-scale or right sizing for greater resilience and sustainability. Hollander et al. (2009) identify a number of strategies for “shrinking cities” or depopulated areas including de-densification, use of vacant land and underused property, green urbanism and environmental improvement, historic preservation and redistribution of access and resources aimed at enhancing equity, liveability, safety and sustainability. A number of these strategies are evidenced in the case studies.
Primary responsibility for planning for the recovery and revitalisation of Christchurch was given to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). The main objective of this group was to strategically manage issues of centralisation, land use and infrastructure in the recovery process with an appreciation of potential future seismic activity and climate change considerations including floods, storms and sea-level rise (Miles et al. 2014). Given the high levels of damage and destruction in the CBD precinct, the vision was based on decentralisation and changes in the peri-urban landscape (CERA 2015). This process imagined a greener, more compact, more accessible and safer central business district dominated by low-rise buildings. Further to this was the plan for a green frame or buffer around the CBD that would blend in with the Avon River, to be developed as a corridor of parkland through the city—emphasising ecological restoration and environmentally sensitive transport, including a new light rail network, and connectivity of city through recreational pedestrian boardwalks and cycle lanes.
Priority activities within the initial recovery framework included restoration of critical infrastructure (particularly water and sewerage) and the residential land use hazard assessments for resettlement, relocation and rebuilding (Miles et al. 2014). Specific designations were informed by the changes in building codes and regulations, where code changes required different structural requirements for houses, especially for foundations. Recommendations also advocated lower urban density with dispersed and mixed use environments in neighbourhood centres (Chang et al. 2014; Swaffield 2012). Subsequent to the demolition and removal of damaged buildings in the CBD, many vacant gaps and gravel quadrants were creatively inhabited by both temporary and permanent art installations, cultural activities, entertainment, open space, recreation and public areas including weekly street markets and even a retail mall made from shipping containers.
Five years after the 2011 quake, formal planning and ideas progressively transitioned from recovery to regeneration with the new Master Plan focused on urban renewal and development (CERA 2015). This plan promotes a vibrant, attractive, resilient city, with abundant open space and themed districts supporting restaurants, small shops and cafes, music, sports and recreation to stimulate business growth and economic activity. Restoration and maintenance of iconic historic buildings has been similarly supported to reinvigorate tourism and help re-establish a sense of place for residents. Despite the extensive rhetoric of building back residential dwellings and commercial premises more sustainably utilising green options, there was no legislation to enforce building “green” and insurance payments limited owners to like-for-like (with due consideration to new codes) (Miles et al. 2014). Businesses, services and populations have progressively returned to a revitalised more resilient region but the new strategic direction still appears to be dominated by top-down leadership and planning directives rather than a participatory process with consideration of resident aspirations (Chang et al. 2014). A subsequent earthquake affecting Christchurch in February 2016 recorded limited physical damage in the city, but the extent of psychological impact on an already traumatised and recovering community has yet to be fully appreciated.
Even prior to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, the parish of New Orleans lacked a strong history of traditional urban planning practice (Collins 2015). In the destruction and confusion post-event residents and displaced populations were confronted with a diversity of highly conflicting proposals ranging from campaigns to build back “bigger and better” to complete abandonment of the city (Olshansky 2006). Given the historical, cultural and symbolic significance of New Orleans, it was imperative for the community to rebuild and recover. The simultaneous emergence of differing city wide and neighbourhood plans from organisations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), and various not for profit community groups did little to address the immediate demand for permanent dwellings, basic services and critical infrastructure (Collins 2015). Kates et al. (2006) observed very slow and inadequate reconstruction and recovery processes that were influenced by race, class and government incompetence.
Integral to any effective plan for population return and resettlement was the resolution of the complexities and conflicts regarding a comprehensive land use and zoning process. Ehrenfeucht and Nelson (2011) identified a range of strategies relating to targeted investment and consolidation; restoration of the natural protective wetlands and environmental quality, alternatives for underused areas; mechanisms to maintain or reintegrate abandoned parcels; plans for infrastructure and service provision, and interventions to address issues of social inequality. However most lacked wholesale community and political support, sufficient funding and resources and activities were highly sporadic and ad hoc.
The recovery of New Orleans was primarily resident driven, but the rebuilding of houses and reconstruction of levees achieved replacement rather than building better structures that reduce future disaster risks. Increased physical vulnerability of New Orleans to flood risk is seen by Zaninetti and Colten (2012) as “maladaptive evolution caused by planning” (p. 680). Collins (2015) suggests that the first five years post-Katrina were focused almost entirely on recovery, the next five years were taken up with resolving the complex zoning processes with the eventual development and adoption of The Plan for the twenty-first Century, (commonly referred to as the Master Plan); a City Charter-mandated planning framework that shapes New Orleans’ physical, social, environmental and economic future. This master plan reflects the values and priorities of liveability, opportunity and sustainability that emerged through a participatory community decision making process (Collins 2015). However, it fails to adequately address vulnerability and hazard resilience.
In terms of population size and the scale of destruction to buildings, infrastructure and services, recovery for Innisfail and the Cassowary Coast post-cyclone events was significantly smaller and less resource intensive than either the Christchurch and New Orleans case studies. However for the community and residents of this region, effective planning strategies were equally as significant to lifestyle, livelihoods, economic viability and decisions to persevere or migrate to other locations. Following Cyclone Larry, the Operation Recovery Task Force was established through the Queensland Government to coordinate basic needs, rebuilding and planning priorities (Queensland Government 2007). After Cyclone Yasi, this responsibility was delegated to the Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA).
In both cases, regional planning strategies were aimed at protecting the character of local townships, limiting exposure to natural hazards, establishing long-term economic stability and maximising infrastructure and transport provision efficiencies (AECOM 2012). Equally, provision was made to protect, maintain and sustain the region’s unique natural assets and environment through biodiversity conservation and coastal protection. Specific initiatives identified in the master plan for Innisfail included the intensification and renewal of its CBD within the existing footprint, the development of greenfield sites within the urban footprint, the inclusion of open space for public, cultural and community amenity, in fill development and increased density for established industrial zones, and industry sector reform based on diversification opportunities, value added agriculture and technological innovation (AECOM 2012). While statistical population trends suggest small yet continued net out migration the Cassowary Coast Planning Scheme 2015 anticipates population growth, tourism and expanded industry development within the region.