Abstract
In their disputes on names (concepts) and actualities, the classical scholars from the pre-Qin and the early Han era still proceeded from the realist understanding of reality as objective external world or external form of things. In Xuanxue discourses of the Wei-Jin period, however, we encounter studies dealing with the inherent structural patterns of meaning. Its members modified the ancient disputes on the relation between names (concepts) and actualities into investigations of the relation between language and meaning or intention. In doing so, Xuanxue theoreticians created and developed an entirely new philosophical discipline. This was one of the most important theoretical shifts in the history of traditional Chinese thought. The present chapter will show how and why the Xuanxue treatises on the relation between language and meaning represent the basis of the specific Chinese structural semantics.
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- 1.
Even though in most Western sources, the term wu 無 is often translated as non-being or nothingness (see Chai 2014: 663ff), I regard such translations as risky and possibly misleading (especially for readers who are solely trained in Western philosophy and possess little or no background knowledge about the basic paradigms of Chinese philosophy), for in Western philosophy, these terms have certain connotations that cannot be found in Chinese thought.
- 2.
Qingtan refers to a practice of philosophical, often abstract, discussion that was performed in public, displaying aesthetic skill, which brought about a type of “celebrity scholar” atmosphere. However, these conversations did not refer to superficially and pleasantly passing the time in tête-à-tête. Such debates had to include specific content, linked to the “three texts of profundity” (san xuan 三玄), these being the Daodejing 道德經, Zhuangzi 莊子, and Yijing 易經 (Classic of Changes). They had to be conducted in a specific manner, which had nothing to do with a bookish or pedantic fashion. In these metaphysical conversations, one had to make a point subtly in conversation and be witty at the same time. This implied that scholars engaged in qingtan had to state their arguments aptly and elegantly by using only a few simple phrases. Later, this kind of stylishness developed into a search for elegance in conversation. Flatness of conversation and rude expressions were inexcusable. Only a person whose speech could meet these standards in content, manner, and style could be called a mingshi. See Mou 1983: 227.
- 3.
In classical Chinese logic, the sentential or linguistic structure was a system that served as a basic tool for defining the relation between actuality and its conceptual understanding and naming, respectively. Hence the term ming could appear in two semantic connotations. The first, which mainly occurred in logical discourses, is a connotation of name (as a linguistic mark), and the second, found particularly in semantic and epistemological works, represents a concept. See, for instance, Zhang Dainian: “The term ‘ming’ had a dual meaning: terms and concepts 名有兩層意義, 一指名詞, 一指概念.” Zhang 2003: 118.
- 4.
This school of thought is usually translated as the “School of Names” in Western Sinology. Because it is impossible to use this compound in the adjective form or for denoting its adherents, I prefer to use the term “Nomenalist School.”
- 5.
According to David Chai, the elevation of the you/wu dyad from epistemology to ontology is one of the most important and lasting contributions of Wang Bi’s meontology. Chai 2010: 90.
- 6.
This holism of all particularities has been most clearly expressed by Zhu Xi in his Zhuzi Yulei 朱子語類. In the first part of the “liqi 理氣” chapter, he wrote: “The structural coherence is oneness, but it can be divided into particularities. Regarding the unity of everything that exists, there is only one coherent structure. But in the concrete mundane world, every single thing has its own coherent structure 理一分殊。合天地萬物而言, 只是一箇理; 及在人, 則又各自有一箇理.” Li 1986: 2. These “particular structures” are not merely “substructures” of a greater (or entire) structure; in other words, they are not understood merely as parts of the whole. Precisely because of the fact that each structure represents a coherent arrangement, which bears in itself the basic model of oneness (or taiji 太極), the taiji oneness as such manifests itself in every particular, as well as in the greatest possible structure. In fact, the very nature of such a model of holism is the basic precondition of that which makes these structures mutually compatible and creates the “structural coherence.”
- 7.
Tang Junyi writes: “言之所本在名, 意之所及恆在理, 而不必在物.” See Tang 1955: 66.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
See Tang Junyi 1955: 67.
- 10.
Because his commentary on Laozi’s Daodejing was central to his own philosophy, Wang Bi adopted Laozi’s view on the impossibility of denoting (conceptualizing) the eternal, or genuine Dao. He interpreted this foundational prologue as follows: “The Dao that can be expressed in language and the name that can be named both either point to a (concrete) matter or create a form. Neither of these is constant (or universal). This is why Dao can neither be expressed in language nor defined with a name 可道之道, 可名之名, 指事造形, 非其常也。故不可道, 不可名也.” Lou 1999: 1.
- 11.
See, for instance, his problematization of differences and similarities in regard to the agenda of naming: “The winter sun is Yin, but in summer it is Yang, even if it is far away. They all seem different if you look at them closely, but they seem to be the same when viewed from afar. If we do not comprehend these differences in detail, we will not be able to understand the theory of namelessness 冬日為陰, 而朝書遠與夏日同為陽, 皆異於進, 而同於遠也。詳此異同, 而後無名之論可知矣.” Chen 2006: 301. For more, see Paul D’Ambrosio’s chapter in this Companion.
- 12.
He even went so far as to dismiss the importance of names altogether. D’Ambrosio 2016: 128.
- 13.
See chapter 26 “waiwu 外物.”
- 14.
Of course, the task of forgetting is anything but easy (see, for instance, Chai 2019b: 148).
- 15.
See Tze-Ki Hon’s chapter in this Companion for more.
- 16.
I have certain reservations regarding such comparisons of philosophical terms that are rooted in quite different referential frameworks. Hence, it is difficult for me to adopt the view in which the Chinese “root and branch” can be directly compared to the Western notions of metaphysics and phenomena. However, regardless of such questions, it is certainly true that Wang Bi’s postulations about the relation between words, meanings, and symbols have had a great impact upon the development of Chinese aesthetics, particularly the shaping of the category of “visuality” (yixiang 意象).
- 17.
However, this equation is only a conditional one. The Xuanxue philosophers understood this relation in a similar way as the classical Daoists, who saw wu, for instance, as “the milieu within which Dao moves and to which it turns in order to realize its onto-cosmological creativity.” Chai 2019a: 9. We must not fall into the trap of thinking (as He Yan did in his too literary interpretation of Laozi—see Chai 2010: 91–92) of wu just as one of the many possible names of Dao. See Eric Nelson’s chapter in this Companion for more on Wang Bi and nothingness.
- 18.
“All under heaven and everything that exists is born from presence, and presence is born from absence 天下萬物生於有, 有生於無.” Lou 1999: 110.
- 19.
Sometimes, Wang describes this absence with a (somehow more concrete) compound xuwu 虛無 (void), and at times, he even replaces is by the term xu 虛 (emptiness).
- 20.
These two beautiful translations for the Chinese words xu and jing have been adopted from Chai 2014: 663.
- 21.
I denote all binary pairs that serve as a model of complementary interaction between contrasting antipodes (e.g., yinyang 陰陽, benmo 本末, liqi 理氣, tiyong 體用, etc.) binary categories (duili fanchou 對立範疇).
- 22.
See the contribution by Chris Fraser in this Contribution for more.
- 23.
I cannot, therefore, agree with Wing-Tsit Chan’s interpretation, for he wrote: “In other words, while Wang Bi emphasizes non-being, Guo Xiang emphasizes being.” Chan 1963: 317.
- 24.
In recent years, the Chinese concept of li has been increasingly translated with the term “pattern” as suggested by A.C. Graham. Even though this translation is much more suitable than “principle,” the formal connotations of “pattern” also include repetition or recurrence. This is problematic because li mainly expresses a relational structural network in the sense of the way things fit together, while no particular part or even principle ever repeats. See Ziporyn 2012: 29, 31, and 36. Although the term “pattern” is starting to morph in English so that many scholars now use it to mean simply “arrangement,” I tend to be cautious because of the implications of its more formal meaning. I thus understand it in terms of a structural coherence.
- 25.
Graham’s translation of the “On Names and Actualities” (mingshi lun 名實論) chapter of the Mohist Canon.
- 26.
“Spontaneity was commonly associated with the teachings of the Laozi and Zhuangzi, while moral endeavor, the ‘teaching of names’ concerned with the ordering of society, was associated with Confucianism, which had been the dominant official ideology throughout most of the Han dynasty.” Ziporyn 2015: 399.
- 27.
Fu Gu (209–255 CE) was an intellectual opponent of He Yan and Xiahou Xuan 夏侯玄 (209–254 CE) in that he believed a person’s talents were an expression of their character (cai xing tong 才性同) and not part of their inborn nature (xing wu benti 性無本體). Wang Can (177–217 CE) was the great uncle of Wang Bi.
- 28.
Here, we could mention numerous definitions of the structural order of language as seen in the Mozi, Xunzi, Guanzi, etc.
- 29.
See, for instance, Lin 2016: 2.
- 30.
Or, the metaphysical coherent structure.
- 31.
- 32.
For instance, the relations between identity and difference or the relations between absence and presence.
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Rošker, J.S. (2020). The Metaphysical Style and Structural Coherence of Names in Xuanxue. In: Chai, D. (eds) Dao Companion to Xuanxue 玄學 (Neo-Daoism). Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49228-1_3
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