Abstract
The complex relationship of our Self to our body is discussed in the context of psychological and clinical research. Various cases of dissociation between conscious intentions and the behavior are described. Philosophical problems connected to the concept of Self, such as homunculus paradox, are raised, and theories alternative to the concept of Self as a Central Agent of consciousness are presented, such as Dennett & Kinsbourne’s ‘Multiple Drafts Model’. Psychological experiments are reviewed that aimed at examining of whether consciousness can be comprehended as a ‘pandemonium’ of multiple drafts or it requires a Central Agent (Self) capable of making executive decisions. The theory is proposed of the gradual development of Self in a human individual and illustrated with developmental experiments.
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Notes
- 1.
Dissolving one’s Self shouldn’t be confused with transcending one’s Bubbleverse through faith (see Chap. 15). Unlike transcending, dissolving one’s Self occurs entirely within one’s Bubbleverse.
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Subbotsky, E. (2020). Self in Multiple Universes. In: The Bubble Universe: Psychological Perspectives on Reality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49008-9_6
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