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Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions pp 41–62Cite as

Judicial Review and Emergencies in Post-Marcos Philippines

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 82))

Abstract

The Philippine Supreme Court aided Ferdinand Marcos by laying the legal scaffolding for his martial law regime. The Court refused to check the President’s power by deferring to the Executive Branch in case of emergencies. When Marcos was ousted in 1986, Filipinos adopted a Constitution that gave the Judiciary the power to review the factual bases of emergency actions. The Supreme Court, however, refuses to use this power. The Court refuses to check the President because of institutional competence constraints, believing that the only issues that can be resolved by the judiciary are those that can be done on the basis of reasoned argument. When courts go beyond this role, they endanger their legitimacy as legal institutions because they act beyond their area of competence. The Philippine case shows that a constitutional directive that empowers the judiciary did not override deference to the executive branch in times of political trauma. As a result of this deference the Supreme Court has dismantled the safeguards in the post-Marcos constitution.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Roosevelt K, Garnett RW (2007) Judicial activism and its critics. u pa l rev 155:112, 114.

  2. 2.

    Rubin EL (1996) The new legal process, the synthesis of discourse, and the microanalysis of institutions. harv l rev 109:1393, 1396.

    The term ‘institutional competence’ can be traced directly to the legal process school of jurisprudence, a school of thought based at Harvard Law School. King JA (2008) Institutional approaches to judicial restraint. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (3):409, 421.

  3. 3.

    Boudreau V (2004) Resisting dictatorship: repression and protest in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press, p 71.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., 73–4.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., 74.

  6. 6.

    Khan PR (1973–1974) The Philippines without democracy. foreign aff 52:612, 619.

  7. 7.

    [1973] 50 SCRA 1. I discuss this case elsewhere. See Gatmaytan-Magno D (2007) Changing constitutions: judicial review and redemption in the Philippines. ucla pacific basin law journal 25:1–24.

  8. 8.

    Tate CN (1995) The Philippines and Southeast Asia. In: Tate CN, Vallinder T (ed) The global expansion of judicial power. New York University Press, p 465.

  9. 9.

    The Court, said one observer, chose to “bend with the wind” and that as long as the Court stayed tractable, the President found reason to keep it open and operational. See Del Carmen RV (1979) Constitutionality and judicial politics. In: Rosenberg DA (ed) Marcos and martial law in the Philippines. Cornell University Press, p 112.

  10. 10.

    Gatmaytan DB (2006) It’s all the rage: popular uprisings and Philippine democracy. pac rim l & pol’y j 15:1.

  11. 11.

    Pottakis A (2014) Departing from the ordinary: the executive prerogative in a state of emergency. european public law 20:191.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., 191–2.

  13. 13.

    Ferejohn J, Pasquino P (2004) The law of the exception: a typology of emergency powers. int’l j const l 2:210.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Criddle EJ, Fox-Decent E (2012) Human rights, emergencies, and the rule of law. hum rts q 34:39, 45.

  16. 16.

    Chowdhury SR (1989) Rule of law in a state of emergency. Pinter Publishers, p 14.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., 15.

  18. 18.

    Criddle EJ, Fox-Decent E (n 15). See also Iyer V (1999) States of emergency: moderating the effects on human rights. dalhousie l. j. 22:125, 128–132.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., 131.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., 57–8. There is a view that veers away from the view that courts should exercise checks on the exercise of emergency powers. See Weinstock L (2009) Towards a structural theory of emergency powers. nyu ann sur am l 65:381–433.

  21. 21.

    Ramraj VV (2011) Emergency powers and constitutional theory. hong kong l j 41:165, 169.

  22. 22.

    Constitution of France 1958, s 16.

  23. 23.

    Constitution of Hungary 2011, s 48 (3).

  24. 24.

    Constitution of Jamaica 1962, s 20 (5).

  25. 25.

    Constitution of Tunisia 2014, s 80.

  26. 26.

    Constitution of Ecuador 2015, s 166.

  27. 27.

    Constitution of Italy 1947, s 13.

  28. 28.

    Constitution of Kenya 2010, s 58 (5).

  29. 29.

    Constitution of Kosovo, s 113 (3).

  30. 30.

    Constitution of Malawi 1994, s 45 (5).

  31. 31.

    Constitution of Slovakia 1992, s 129 (6).

  32. 32.

    Constitution of South Africa 1996, s 37 (3)(a).

  33. 33.

    Constitution of Venezuela 1999, s 339.

  34. 34.

    Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, s 113 (7)(a).

  35. 35.

    Constitution of Burundi 2005, s 115.

  36. 36.

    Constitution of Chad 2005, s 87.

  37. 37.

    Constitution of Comoros 2009, s 12.3.

  38. 38.

    Constitution of Congo 2001, s 84.

  39. 39.

    Constitution of Cote d’Ivoire 2000, s 48.

  40. 40.

    Constitution of Gabon 1997, s 26.

  41. 41.

    Constitution of Guinea 2010, s 90.

  42. 42.

    Constitution of Madagascar 2010, s 61.

  43. 43.

    Constitution of Mali 1992, s 50.

  44. 44.

    Constitution of Mauritania 2012, s 39.

  45. 45.

    Constitution of Morocco 2011, s 59.

  46. 46.

    Constitution of Niger 2010, s 67.

  47. 47.

    Constitution of Chile 2015, s 45.

  48. 48.

    Constitution of Sierra Leone 2008, s 29 (4).

  49. 49.

    Constitution of Sri Lanka 2015, s 154J (2).

  50. 50.

    Ramraj VV (2011) Emergency powers and constitutional theory. hong kong l j 41:165, 169.

  51. 51.

    See Frankel ME et al (1983) The Philippines: a country in crisis—a report by the lawyers committee for international human rights. columbia human rights law review 15:69–129.

  52. 52.

    McCoy AW (2011) Policing America’s empire: the United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the surveillance state. University of Wisconsin Press, p 403.

  53. 53.

    Ibid.

  54. 54.

    Steinhardt RG (1995) Fulfilling the promise of filartiga: litigating human rights claims against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. yale j int’l l 20:65.

  55. 55.

    Fitzpatrick J (1993) The future of the alien tort claims act of 1789: lessons from in re Marcos human rights litigation. st john’s l rev 67:491, 498–9.

  56. 56.

    This section draws heavily from Gatmaytan DB (2015) Constitutional law in the Philippines: government structure. Lexis Nexis, p 93–95.

  57. 57.

    Bernas JG (2009) The 1987 constitution of the Philippines: a commentary. Rex Publishing, p 773.

  58. 58.

    Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., 917–8.

  60. 60.

    Sanlakas v. Reyes [2004] 466 PHIL 482.

  61. 61.

    Pangalangan RC (2016) Philippine constitutional law: majoritarian courts and elite politics. In: Chen AHY (ed) Constitutionalism in Asia in the early twenty-first century. Cambridge University Press, p 299.

  62. 62.

    Bernas (n 57) p 919.

  63. 63.

    David v. Macapagal-Arroyo [2006] 522 PHIL 705.

  64. 64.

    For a discussion on the impact of these cases, see Lopez CA (1983) Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention in the Philippines: a problem of enforcement. b c third world l j 4:72.

  65. 65.

    Integrated Bar of the Phil. v. Zamora [2000] 392 PHIL 618.

  66. 66.

    Lacson v. Perez [2001] 410 PHIL 78.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    More than 300 junior officers and enlisted men took over the Oakwood Premier in the Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003. They were led by Navy Ltsg. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy Ltsg. James Layug and Marine Capt. Gary Alejano. The soldiers claimed that they simply intended to air their grievances against the government, including graft and corruption in the military. See (2008) Oakwood mutiny backgrounder. GMA News Online. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/33181/news/oakwood-mutiny-backgrounder/story. Accessed 18 June 2006.

  69. 69.

    Sanlakas v. Reyes [2004] 466 PHIL 482.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    In re Lansang v. Garcia [1971] 149 PHIL 547.

  73. 73.

    There the Court held: Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that “(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . . .” It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege “in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion”—or, under Article VII of the Constitution, “imminent danger thereof”—“when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.” For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

  74. 74.

    David v. Macapagal-Arroyo [2006] 522 PHIL 705.

  75. 75.

    In November 2009, a convoy of politicians and their supporters, journalists and lawyers were shot and hacked to death by armed men believed to be working for the Ampatuans, a political dynasty that controls the province. The victims were on their way to file certificates of candidacy to challenge the Ampatuans’ governorship which had always been unchallenged. See Conde C (2009) The making of a massacre in the Philippines. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/world/asia/11iht-massacre.html. Accessed 18 June 2016.

  76. 76.

    Ampatuan v. Puno [2011] 666 PHIL 225.

  77. 77.

    Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo [2012] 684 PHIL 526.

  78. 78.

    Bernas JG (2009) The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: a commentary. Rex Publishing, p 919.

  79. 79.

    Posner EA, Vermeule A (2008) Accommodating emergencies. stan l rev 56:605, 606–7.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Brisbin RA Jr (2005) The judiciary and the separation of powers. In: Hill KL, McGuire KT (eds) The judicial branch. Oxford University Press 2005, p 112.

  82. 82.

    Korematsu v. United States [1941] 323 U.S. 214.

  83. 83.

    Dyzenhaus D (2008) Introduction: legality in a time of emergency. windsor rev legal & soc issues 24:1.

  84. 84.

    Deeks AS (2013) The observer effect: national security legislation, executive policy changes, and judicial deference. fordham l rev 82:827.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., 830.

  86. 86.

    Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr. [2016] 779 SCRA 241.

  87. 87.

    Ibid.

  88. 88.

    Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. [2014] 721 SCRA 146.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Lawson G (2007) Ordinary powers in extraordinary times: common sense in times of crisis. B U L Rev 87:289, 291.

  91. 91.

    Nzelibe J (2004) The uniqueness of foreign affairs. iowa l rev 89:941.

  92. 92.

    Pangalangan RC (2010) Political emergencies in the Philippines: changing labels and the unchanging need for legitimacy. In: Ramraj VV, Thiruvengadam AK (eds) Emergency powers in Asia: exploring the limits of legality. Cambridge University Press, p 431.

  93. 93.

    Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo [2012] 684 PHIL 526.

  94. 94.

    Ginsburg T (2003) Judicial review in new democracies: constitutional courts in Asian cases. Cambridge University Press, p 247.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., 261.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., 261.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., 105.

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Alyanna Perez and Marianne Vitug, and Smantha Mendiola, for their research assistance.

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  1. College of Law, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines

    Dante B. Gatmaytan

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  1. School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

    Richard Albert

  2. Harry Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel

    Yaniv Roznai

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Gatmaytan, D.B. (2020). Judicial Review and Emergencies in Post-Marcos Philippines. In: Albert, R., Roznai, Y. (eds) Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 82. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49000-3_4

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