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Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions pp 247–266Cite as

The Constitutionalism of Emergency: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Beyond: Multinationalism Behind Asymmetrical Constitutional Arrangements

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 82))

Abstract

This paper explores the difficulties with multinationalism that lead to crises and conflicts; and the variation in effects and responses between traditional types of crises and the crises caused by multinationalism. To overcome impediments associated with the traditional concept, the paper emphasizes the role of constitutional asymmetries in addressing extraordinary circumstances. This is further assessed by examining the effects of multinationalism on constitutional systems. While Bosnia and Herzegovina serves as the starting point and a clear case in support of the theoretical discourse, other constitutional systems are also shown to support the key points.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bjørnskov, C., & Voigt, S. (2016) ‘The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions’. 16/03/2016. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798558.

  2. 2.

    Rossiter, C. (2009). Constitutional Dictatorship, Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies. New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers. Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2). In general, see: Gross, O., & Aoláin, F. N. (2006). Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  3. 3.

    Dyzenhaus, D. (2012). States of Emergency. In M. Rosenfeld, & A. s. Sajó (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  4. 4.

    Burgess, M. (2006a). Comparative federalism, Theory and practice. London: Routledge.

  5. 5.

    Watts, R. L., Relations, Q. s. U. I. o. I., & Studies, Q. s. U. S. o. P. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University.

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Stepan, A. (2004). Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism. In E. L. Gibson (Ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press. Burgess, M. (2006a). Comparative federalism, Theory and practice. London: Routledge.

  8. 8.

    Watts, R. (1999a). The Theoretical and Practical Implications of Asymmetrical Federalism. In R. Agranoff (Ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft.

  9. 9.

    Tarlton, C. D. (1965). Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation (research article). The Journal of Politics, 27(4), 861. See in this volume: Nikos Skoutaris and Elias Dinas, The Paradox of Territorial Autonomy: How Subnational Representation Leads to Secessionist Preferences.

  10. 10.

    Sahadžić, M. (2011). Priroda političkog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini. In D. Banović, & S. Gavrić (Eds.), Država, politika i društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini – Analiza postdejtonskog političkog sistema Sarajevo: University Press, Magistrat izdanja.

  11. 11.

    For practical reasons, this article mainly refers to several states on the European continent, excluding multi-tiered multi-national systems with only one asymmetrical region within the state or with overseas territories, due to their peculiar status.

  12. 12.

    Rossiter, C. (2009). Constitutional Dictatorship, Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies. New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers.

  13. 13.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Rossiter, C. (2009). Constitutional Dictatorship, Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies. New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers. Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2).

  14. 14.

    Finn, J. E. (1990). Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ackerman, B. (2004). The Emergency Constitution. The Yale Law Journal, 113. Dyzenhaus, D. (2012). States of Emergency. In M. Rosenfeld, & A. s. Sajó (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law Oxford: Oxford University Press. See in this volume: Ming-Sung Kuo, From Institutional Sovereignty to Constitutional Mindset: Rethinking the Domestication of the State of Exception in the Age of Normalization.

  15. 15.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  16. 16.

    Bjørnskov, C., & Voigt, S. (2016) ‘The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions’. 16/03/2016. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798558. Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Ferejohn and Pasquino mention ‘the delegation of powers to a president, or to some other constitutional authority, to issue decrees, to censor information, and to suspend legal processes and rights.’ Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2).

  17. 17.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2).

  18. 18.

    For the purpose of this paper, multinationalism is understood as territorially based differences built on linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, and other identities where significant groups with one or more distinct identities claim important political autonomy around these differences. Stepan, A. (2004). Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism. In E. L. Gibson (Ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  19. 19.

    Hueglin, T. O. (2013). Comparing federalism: Variations or distinct models? In A. Benz, & J. Broschek (Eds.), Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also: Elazar, D. J. (2006). Exploring federalism. Tuscaloosa, Ala, University of Alabama Press. However, in reality, the numbers are even higher because contemporary federal arrangements are identifiable in quasi-federal states, regionalized unitary states, and transnational settings. Delmartino, F. (2009). New Dimensions of Asymmetry in (Quasi-) Federal States and in the European Union. In F. Palermo, C. Zwilling, & K. Kössler (Eds.), Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems Bozen/Bolzano: Europäische Akademie Bozen/Accademia Europea Bolzano. Also: Palermo, F. Ibid. Asymmetries in Constitutional Law – An Introduction. Bozen/Bolzan. Sahadžić, M. (2017). Constitutional asymmetry vs. sovereignty and self-determination. sui-generis.

  20. 20.

    Frenkel, M. (1986/2007). Federal Theory. Zuchwil/Switzerland: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations and The Australian National University, Canberra. Popelier, P. (2014). Subnational multilevel constitutionalism. Perspectives on federalism, 6(2), 1–23. Also: Blindenbacher, R., & Watts, R. (2002). Federalism in a Changing World – A Conceptual Framework for the Conference. In R. Blindenbacher, & A. Koller (Eds.), Federalism in a Changing World, Learning from Each Other, Scientific Background, Proceedings and Plenary Speeches of the International Conference on Federalism Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill’s Queen’s University Press.

  21. 21.

    Obinger, H., Leibfried, S., & Castles, F. G. (2005). Federalism and the Welfare State: New World and European Experiences. Cambridge University Press.

  22. 22.

    Stepan, A. (2004). Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism. In E. L. Gibson (Ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  23. 23.

    The literature on comparative federalism makes use of the term ‘asymmetry’ to indicate differences in the status between and among different tiers in the system. De facto or political asymmetry is defined as practices and relationships based on linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, social, economic, political, and other differences between the subnational entities, and between subnational entities and the central level. More specifically, these differences correlate with the size of the population, the size of the territory, and the economic character, resources and wealth, fiscal power and autonomy, electoral system, and party system of the subnational entity. They are the basis for de iure asymmetry. De iure, constitutional, or formal asymmetries are differences embedded in constitutional and legal processes, producing an unequal positioning of subnational entities under the law. More specifically, they correlate with differences in constitutional design and distribution of competences. De iure asymmetries emerge as a result of pressure from a subnational entity that is strong enough to extort the constitutionally entrenched accommodation of differences. Swenden, W. (2006). Federalism and regionalism in Western Europe, A comparative and thematic analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McGarry, J. (2011). Asymmetric Autonomy in the United Kingdom. In M. Weller, & K. Nobs (Eds.), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts Philadelphia, Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press. Watts, R. L. (1999b). Comparing federal systems. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2 ed. Burgess, M. (2006a). Comparative federalism, Theory and practice. London: Routledge. Burgess, M. (2009). The Paradox of Diversity – Asymmetrical Federalism in Comparative Perspective. In F. Palermo, C. Zwilling, & K. Kössler (Eds.), Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems Bozen/Bolzan: Europäische Akademie Bozen/Accademia Europea Bolzano. Popelier, P., & Lemmens, K. (2015a). The Constitution of Belgium, A Contextual Analysis. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Requejo, F. (2011). Decentralization and Federal and Regional Asymmetries in Comparative Politics. In F. Requejo, & K. J. Nagel (Eds.), Federalism Beyond Federations, Asymmetry and Processes of Resymmetrisation in Europe Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate.

  24. 24.

    See in this volume: Nikos Skoutaris and Elias Dinas, The Paradox of Territorial Autonomy: How Subnational Representation Leads to Secessionist Preferences.

  25. 25.

    Weller, M. (2011). Introduction. In M. Weller, & K. Nobbs (Eds.), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts Philadelphia and Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press. McGarry, J. Ibid. Asymmetric Autonomy in the United Kingdom. In M. Weller, & K. Nobs (Eds.) Philadelphia, Oxford.

  26. 26.

    Máiz, R. (2004). Nation and deliberation. In R. Máiz, & F. Requejo (Eds.), Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism London and New York: Frank Cass.

  27. 27.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  28. 28.

    Friedrich, C. J. (1968). Trends of federalism in theory and practice. New York, Washington, London: Praeger.

  29. 29.

    Requejo, F. (2001c). National pluralism and federalism. Four potential scenarios for Spanish plurinational democracy. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2(2), 305–327.

  30. 30.

    Burgess, M. (2009). The Paradox of Diversity – Asymmetrical Federalism in Comparative Perspective. In F. Palermo, C. Zwilling, & K. Kössler (Eds.), Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems Bozen/Bolzano: Europäische Akademie Bozen/Accademia Europea Bolzano.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    Requejo, F. (2004). Federalism and the quality of democracy in multinational contexts: present shortcomings and possible improvements. In U. M. Amoretti, & N. G. Bermeo (Eds.), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  33. 33.

    Requejo, F. (2001b). Federalism and the Quality of Democracy in Plurinational Contexts: Present Shortcomings and Possible Improvements. Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 2001 Workshop: Centres and Peripheries in a Changing World, 26. Requejo, F. (2001a). Federalism and national groups. International Social Science Journal, 53(167), 41–49.

  34. 34.

    See, for instance: Gellner, E. (1993). Nations and nationalism. Oxford, Blackwell. In addition, see the number of terms Tierney uses to refer to groups in: Tierney, S. (2006). Constitutional law and national pluralism. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

  35. 35.

    Livingston, W. S. (1952). A Note on the Nature of Federalism. Political Science Quarterly, 67(1), 81.

  36. 36.

    For instance, Requejo states that members of these groups recognize themselves based on cultural patterns, the sense of historical distinctiveness, and their willingness to maintain their diverse positions within the political framework. Requejo, F. (2001a). Federalism and national groups. International Social Science Journal, 53(167), 41–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00291. Also, the nationality of these groups may be expressed singularly where groups identify with the central-level nationality; others may identify with both the central-level nationality and their own designated group (whether this overlaps with an internal territorial division or not); and some may only identify with their own designated group (whether this overlaps with an internal territorial division or not, and regardless of their citizenship or central-level nationality). Keating, M. (2002) ‘Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereign Order’. p. 351.

  37. 37.

    To that end, these groups “position themselves in a relational way to the state not as internal ‘minorities’, but rather as polities which are in fact comparable to the state”. Tierney, S. (2006). Constitutional law and national pluralism. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Also: Requejo, F. (2001a). Federalism and national groups. International Social Science Journal, 53(167), 41–49.

  38. 38.

    Watts, R. L., Relations, Q. s. U. I. o. I., & Studies, Q. s. U. S. o. P. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University.

  39. 39.

    Requejo, F. (2004). Federalism and the quality of democracy in multinational contexts: present shortcomings and possible improvements. In U. M. Amoretti, & N. G. Bermeo (Eds.), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  40. 40.

    It is also known as the Dayton Accords, Dayton Agreement, Dayton-Paris Agreement, etc. UN Doc. A/50/790 (1995) and S/1995/999 (1995) from 30/10/1995.

  41. 41.

    It was initialled in Ohio on 21 November and signed in Paris, France on 14 December 1995 in English and French by (at the time) the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and witnessed by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Russian Federations, and the European Union special negotiator.

  42. 42.

    It contains 11 annexes, Annex IV being the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  43. 43.

    Conversi, D. (2002). The Smooth Transition: Spain’s 1978, Constitution and the Nationalities Question. National Identities, 4(3).

  44. 44.

    McGarry, J. (2012a). The United Kingdom’s Experiment in Asymmetric Autonomy and Lessons Learned. In M. Seymour, & A.-G. Gagnon (Eds.), Multinational Federalism: Problems and Prospects Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

  45. 45.

    Benz, A., & Broschek, J. (2013). Federal Dynamics: Introduction. In A. Benz, & J. Broschek (eds.), Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, & the Varieties of Federalism Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  46. 46.

    Popelier, P., & Lemmens, K. (2015a). The Constitution of Belgium, A Contextual Analysis. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Bartole, S. (2012). Internal Ordering in the Unitary State. In M. Rosenfeld, & A. s. Sajó (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  49. 49.

    Rolla, G. The development of asymmetric regionalism and the principle of autonomy in the new constitutional systems: A comparative approach. http://www.crdc.unige.it/docs/articles/rolla6.pdf. Accessed 28/09/2016 2016. Also: Palermo, F. (2015). Autonomy and Asymmetry in the Italian Legal System: The Case of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bolzen. In G. Pola (Ed.), Principles and Practices of Fiscal Autonomy, Experiences, Debates and Prospects: Ashgate.

  50. 50.

    See in this volume: Nasia Hadjigeorgiou and Nikolas Kyriakou, Entrenching hegemony in Cyprus: The doctrine of necessity and the principle of bicommunality.

  51. 51.

    Piattoni, S. (2010). The Theory of Multi-level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges. OUP Oxford.

  52. 52.

    Tierney, S. (2006). Constitutional law and national pluralism. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

  53. 53.

    McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (2012). Territorial pluralism: its forms, flaws, and virtues. In F. Requejo, & M. C. Badia (Eds.), Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism: Theory and Cases Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

  54. 54.

    Swenden, W. (2006). Federalism and regionalism in Western Europe, A comparative and thematic analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McGarry, J. (2007). Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States. Ethnopolitics, 6(1), 105–116.

  55. 55.

    Burgess, M. (2009). The Paradox of Diversity – Asymmetrical Federalism in Comparative Perspective. In F. Palermo, C. Zwilling, & K. Kössler (Eds.), Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems Bozen/Bolzan: Europäische Akademie Bozen/Accademia Europea Bolzano.

  56. 56.

    Basta Fleiner, L. R., & Gaudreault-DesBiens, J.-F. (2013). Federalism and autonomy. In M. Tushnet, T. Fleiner, & C. Saunders (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law London and New York: Routledge.

  57. 57.

    Requejo, F. (2001c). National pluralism and federalism. Four potential scenarios for Spanish plurinational democracy. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2(2), 305–327. https://doi.org/10.1080/1570585018458764.

  58. 58.

    Fossas, E. (2001). National Plurality and Equality. In F. Requejo (Ed.), Democracy and National Pluralism London and New York: Routledge.

  59. 59.

    McGarry, J. (2007). Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States. Ethnopolitics, 6(1), 105–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050701232983.

  60. 60.

    Agranoff, R. (1999). Accommodating diversity: asymmetry in federal states. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

  61. 61.

    McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (2012). Territorial pluralism: its forms, flaws, and virtues. In F. Requejo, & M. C. Badia (Eds.), Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism: Theory and Cases Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

  62. 62.

    Sahadžić, M. (2011). Priroda političkog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini. In D. Banović, & S. Gavrić (Eds.), Država, politika i društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini – Analiza postdejtonskog političkog sistema Sarajevo: University Press, Magistrat izdanja.

  63. 63.

    Seizović, Z. (2014a). Constituent Peoples and Constitutional Changes. Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga. Also: Seizović, Z. (2014b). Političko pravni uzroci nacionalne mobilizacije i dekonstitucionalizacije u Bosni i Hercegovini. Paradigma Bosna, juče, danas, sutra Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga.

  64. 64.

    Sahadžić, M. (2013). Ustav Hercegovačko-Neretvanskog kantona o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i “Ostalim”: o postuliranju krepke (ne)konstitutivne (ne)ravnoteže nauštrb “Ostalih” i ustavnopravnom perverzitetu u Hercegovačko-Neretvanskom kantonu. Sarajevo: Centar za političke studije.

  65. 65.

    Basarić, H. (2015) ‘Pregled finansija lokalne samouprave u BiH’ Z. Ivančić. Sarajevo.

  66. 66.

    Peeters, P. (2007). Multinational federations: reflections on the Belgian federal state. In M. Burgess, & J. Pinder (Eds.), Multiantional Federations London: Routledge. Dumont, H., Lagasse, N., Van Der Hulst, M., & Van Drooghenbroeck, S. (2005). Kingdom of Belgium. In A. Majeed, R. L. Watts, & D. M. Brown (Eds.), Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston, London and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

  67. 67.

    Popelier, P., & Lemmens, K. (2015b). The Constitution of Belgium. a contextual analysis. Oxford, Hart Publishing.

  68. 68.

    Basta Fleiner, L. R., & Gaudreault-DesBiens, J.-F. (2013). Federalism and autonomy. In M. Tushnet, T. Fleiner, & C. Saunders (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law London and New York: Routledge.

  69. 69.

    Rolla, G. The development of asymmetric regionalism and the principle of autonomy in the new constitutional systems: A comparative approach. http://www.crdc.unige.it/docs/articles/rolla6.pdf. Accessed 28/09/2016 2016. Also: Palermo, F. (2015). Autonomy and Asymmetry in the Italian Legal System: The Case of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bolzen. In G. Pola (Ed.), Principles and Practices of Fiscal Autonomy, Experiences, Debates and Prospects: Ashgate.

  70. 70.

    Bartole, S. (2012). Internal Ordering in the Unitary State. In M. Rosenfeld, & A. s. Sajó (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  71. 71.

    Requejo, F. (2001d). Political liberalism in multinational states: the legitimacy of plural and asymmetrical federalism. In A.-G. Gagnon, & J. Tully (Eds.), Multinational Democracies New York: Cambridge University Press. See also: Moreno, L. (1999). Asymmetry in Spain: Federalism in Making? In R. Agranoff (Ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Agranoff, R. (1994). Asymmetrical and Symmetrical Federalism in Spain, An Examination of Intergovernmental Policy. In B. de Villiers (Ed.), Evaluating Federal Systems Dordrecht, Boston and London: Juta & Company. Moreno, L. Ibid. Ethnoterritorial Concurrence and Imperfect Federalism in Spain. In B. De Villiers (Ed.).

  72. 72.

    Keating, M. (2001). So many nations, so few states: territory and nationalism in the global era. In A.-G. Gagnon, & J. Tully (Eds.), Multinational Democracies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  73. 73.

    McGarry, J. (2007). Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States. Ethnopolitics, 6(1), 105–116.

  74. 74.

    McGarry, J. (2012b). The United Kingdom’s Experiment in Asymmetric Autonomy and the Lessons Learned. In M. Seymore, & A.-G. Gagnon (Eds.), Multinational Federalism: Problems and Prospects: Palgrave Macmillan.

  75. 75.

    Requejo, F. (2001d). Political liberalism in multinational states: the legitimacy of plural and asymmetrical federalism. In A.-G. Gagnon, & J. Tully (Eds.), Multinational Democracies New York: Cambridge University Press.

  76. 76.

    McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (2012). Territorial pluralism: its forms, flaws, and virtues. In F. Requejo, & M. C. Badia (Eds.), Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism: Theory and Cases Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

  77. 77.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  78. 78.

    See in this volume: Ming-Sung Kuo, From Institutional Sovereignty to Constitutional Mindset: Rethinking the Domestication of the State of Exception in the Age of Normalization.

  79. 79.

    Scheuerman, W. E. (Ed.) (1996). The Rule of Law under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neuermann and Otto Kirchheimer (Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism) (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press).

  80. 80.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  81. 81.

    Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2).

  82. 82.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  83. 83.

    Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(2).

  84. 84.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  85. 85.

    Bermeo, N. G. (2004). Conclusion: The Merits of Federalism. In U. M. Amoretti, & N. G. Bermeo (Eds.), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  86. 86.

    Gross, O. (2011). Constitutions and emergency regimes. In T. Ginsburg, & R. Dixon (Eds.), Comparative constitutional law Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.

  87. 87.

    Similar in: Burgess, M. (2006b). Comparative federalism. theory and practice. London, Routledge.

  88. 88.

    Frankenberg, G. (2012). Democracy. In M. Rosenfeld, & A. s. Sajó (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bjørnskov, C., & Voigt, S. (2016) ‘The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions’. 16/03/2016. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798558.

  89. 89.

    Schmitt, C. (2005). Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  90. 90.

    Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2012). Types of Multi-level Governance In H. Enderlein, S. Wälti, & M. Zürn (Eds.), Handbook on Multi-Level Governance: Edward Elgar Publishing.

  91. 91.

    Stepan, A. (2004). Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism. In E. L. Gibson (Ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.

  92. 92.

    Sahadžić, M. (2017). Constitutional asymmetry vs. sovereignty and self-determination. sui-generis (50).

  93. 93.

    Keating, M. (2002) ‘Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereign Order’. p. 351.

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  1. Government and Law Research Group, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium

    Maja Sahadžić

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    Yaniv Roznai

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Sahadžić, M. (2020). The Constitutionalism of Emergency: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Beyond: Multinationalism Behind Asymmetrical Constitutional Arrangements. In: Albert, R., Roznai, Y. (eds) Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 82. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49000-3_16

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