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Justifying Creative Autonomy within Copyright Discourse

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Creative Autonomy, Copyright and Popular Music in Nigeria

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Abstract

Here, Gani focusses on the theoretical justification for copyright law. She explores deontological and consequentialist theories, identifying the concept of creative autonomy latent within such arguments. Within deontological theories, she identifies that Locke, Kant and Hegel all refer to the autonomous nature of appropriation, speech and self-determination respectively. Furthermore, the intersections between human rights and intellectual property, acknowledge creative autonomy as a fundamental element within creativity and creative economies. She then examines consequentialist theories on the measurement of utility and identifies creative autonomy as the ‘basic welfare function’ that economists canvass. Accordingly, she argues that the cardinal consequentialist computation of efficiency in copyright law, which balances access to cultural goods with incentives for authors, should necessarily include preserving creative autonomy for authors.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Supra, Sect. 4.2.5.

  2. 2.

    Several sections of this chapter were published as an article with the Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, citation as follows, Gani, MW, “Copyright Theory and a Justificatory Framework for Creative Autonomy in Cultural Industries” (2016) 6 (2) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, pp 154–174.

  3. 3.

    Yu, PK, “Reconceptualising Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework” (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review, pp 1039–1149, p 1042; Helfer, LR, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?” (2003) 5 (1) Minnesota Intellectual Property Review, pp 47–62, p 47.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., p 48.

  5. 5.

    Gordon, W, “A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property”, op. cit., p 1537.

  6. 6.

    Nordenfelt, J, “Human Rights—What They Are and What They Are Not” (1987) 56 Nordic Journal of International Law, pp 3–8, p 3.

  7. 7.

    Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 215.

  8. 8.

    ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’, article 10 of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998.

  9. 9.

    Article 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948.

  10. 10.

    Plesner Joensen v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (2011) ECDR 14; Plesner’s defence relied on article 10 European Convention on Human Rights 1950.

  11. 11.

    Appleby v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 38; Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler v Austria (2007) ECDR 7; Steel v UK (2005) EMLR 15.

  12. 12.

    Appleby v UK, op. cit.

  13. 13.

    Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler v Austria, op. cit.

  14. 14.

    This book defines creative autonomy as “the absence of, or the ability to grapple with external pressure to reflect commercial trends in authorship”, supra Sect. 4.2.5.

  15. 15.

    International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976 (ICESCR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1976; and UDHR 1948.

  16. 16.

    Article 15 (1) (a) and (b) ICESCR 1976.

  17. 17.

    Article 15 (1) (c), ibid.

  18. 18.

    Shaver, L and Sganga, C, “The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human Rights” (2009) 27 (4) Wisconsin International Law Journal, pp 637–662, p 642.

  19. 19.

    Paragraph 3, United Nations Economic and Social Council, General Comment No 17 (2005), 35th Session, Geneva, 7–25 November 2005, available at http://www.bayefsky.com/general/cescr_gen_comment_17_2005.pdf (accessed 25 February 2020); General comments may be used by treaty bodies to elucidate on its provisions, http://www.bayefsky.com/getfile.php/id/48614227/misc/general (25 February 2020).

  20. 20.

    Paragraph 2, United Nations Economic and Social Council, General comment No 17, op. cit.

  21. 21.

    The General Comment takes into account the rights of individual authors as well as joint authors, paragraph 7, ibid.

  22. 22.

    Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 218.

  23. 23.

    Paragraph 12, United Nations Economic and Social Council, General Comment No 17, op. cit.

  24. 24.

    Paragraph 2, ibid.

  25. 25.

    Rigamonti, CP, “Deconstructing Moral Rights” (2006) 47 (2) Harvard International Law Journal, pp 353–412, p 359; Rahmatian, A, Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2011), p 47.

  26. 26.

    Infra, Sect. 5.3.4; it is an essential aspect of civil law systems such as France and Germany, Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 89; it is also present in common law copyright systems, but tends to require assertion in order to be enjoyed, section 77 CDPA 1988 (UK); section 14.1–14.2 Copyright Act 1985 (Canada); in Australia, only individuals, as opposed to corporate bodies, are vested with moral rights, section 190, Part IX Copyright Act 1968 (Australia); Goldstein, P and Hugenholtz, B, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, et al, 2013), p 358.

  27. 27.

    Paragraph 12, United Nations Economic and Social Council, General Comment No 17, op. cit.

  28. 28.

    Article 1 (a) the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005, hereafter referred to as “the UNESCO Convention”.

  29. 29.

    Article 4 (3), ibid.

  30. 30.

    Article 2 (1), ibid.

  31. 31.

    Article 2 (1), ibid.

  32. 32.

    Article 1 (f), ibid.

  33. 33.

    Article 8 (1), ibid.

  34. 34.

    Article 8 (2), ibid.

  35. 35.

    Supra, Sect. 4.5.3.

  36. 36.

    Supra, Sect. 1.7.2; Sternberg, RJ and Lubart, TI, “The Concept of Creativity: Prospects and Paradigms”, in Sternberg, RJ (ed), Handbook of Creativity, op. cit., p 10.

  37. 37.

    Supra, Sect. 5.2.

  38. 38.

    Veitch, S, et al, Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts (Routledge-Cavendish, London and New York, 2007), p 27.

  39. 39.

    Johnson, RN, “Deontological Ethics”, Supplement to the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Macmillan, available at http://web.missouri.edu/~johnsonrn/deon.html (accessed 15 July 2011); Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2008), p 52.

  40. 40.

    Zalta, EN (ed), “The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy”, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-deontological/ (accessed 25 February 2020); Gordon, W, “A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property”, op. cit., p 1539.

  41. 41.

    Infra, Sect. 5.4.

  42. 42.

    Rahmatian, A, Copyright and Creativity: the Making of Property Rights in Creative Works, op. cit., p 69.

  43. 43.

    Rose, M, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993), p 5; Rahmatian, A, Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works, op. cit., p 69; Hughes, J, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 (2) Georgetown Law Review, pp 287–366, p 296.

  44. 44.

    Damstedt, BG, “Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine” (2003) 112 (5) The Yale Law Journal, pp 1179–1222, p 1179; be that as it may, there are aspects of Locke’s argument, particularly his caveats, that appear to have consequentialist bearings, and which have been cited as the foundation for the US constitutional position on intellectual property, Hughes, J, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property”, op. cit., p 288; article 1, section 8, clause 8, US Constitution.

  45. 45.

    Merges, RP, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, Cambridge et al, 2011), p 32.

  46. 46.

    Lessig, L, “Recrafting a Public Domain” (2006) 18 Yale Law Journal of Law and the Humanities, pp 56–83, p 57; Davis, J, Intellectual Property Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008), p 6.

  47. 47.

    Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government; in the Former, the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and His Followers are Detected and Overthrown; the Latter is an Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government (Lawbook Exchange ed, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, Clark, NJ, 2010), p 185.

  48. 48.

    Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government, op. cit., p 185; Rose, M, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright, op. cit., p 5.

  49. 49.

    Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government, op. cit., p 186.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., p 189.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., p 188.

  52. 52.

    Merges, RP, Justifying Intellectual Property, op. cit., p 43.

  53. 53.

    Gosseries, A, et al (eds), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, Chippenham et al, 2008), p 37; here, criticism of Locke has been stated thus: ‘even if labour can be owned and mixed in objects, why would that be a reason for a person to gain ownership over the un-owned resource rather than to lose her ownership over her labour?’; however this argument appears to omit Locke’s assertion that God had richly given things to men to “enjoy”, and that appropriation is essentially for the purpose of use.

  54. 54.

    Merges, RP, Justifying Intellectual Property, op. cit., p 15 and p 43.

  55. 55.

    Supra, Sect. 4.2.5.

  56. 56.

    “Kant and Deontology” (2007), available at http://py111.wordpress.com/2007/10/26/kant-and-deontology/ (accessed 25 February 2020).

  57. 57.

    Kant, I, “Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books” (1785), available at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/fne/essay3.html (accessed 25 February 2020); Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 56; Frith, S and Marshall L (eds), Music and Copyright (2nd ed, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004), p 31.

  58. 58.

    Kant, I, “Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books”, op. cit.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.; on the basis of the principal- agent relationship, therefore, since the author’s express consent for publication does not alter his property rights in the book, presumed consent by unauthorised copyists can in no way negate the author’s rights to the book and to the proceeds from them.

  62. 62.

    Frith, S and Marshall, L, Music and Copyright, op. cit., p 33; Dames, KM, “Intellectual Property, Copyright’s Purpose and Principal Justification” (2010) 27 (9) Information Today, pp 18–19, p 18.

  63. 63.

    Treiger-Bar-Am, K, “Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship”, available at http://vipo-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/kant-on-copyright.pdf, p 1067 (accessed 20 July 2011).

  64. 64.

    Treiger-Bar-Am, K, “Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship”, op.cit., p 1070.

  65. 65.

    Kant, I, “Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books”, op. cit., par 18–19.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Henrich, D, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p 302.

  68. 68.

    Netanel, N, “Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: a Normative Evaluation” (1993) 24 (2) Rutgers Law Journal, pp 347–442, p 359.

  69. 69.

    Frith, S and Marshall, L, op. cit., p 32.

  70. 70.

    Hegel, GWF, Philosophy of Right (Translated with notes by TM Knox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1942), par 4.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., par 6.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., par 8.

  73. 73.

    Waldron, J, The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), p 345.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., par 54.

  75. 75.

    Supra, Sect. 5.3.1.

  76. 76.

    Frith, S and Marshall, L, Music and Copyright, op. cit., p 32.

  77. 77.

    Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 58.

  78. 78.

    Hegel, GWF, Philosophy of Right, op. cit., par 65 and par 66.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., par 7.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., par 54.

  81. 81.

    Supra, Sect. 5.2.

  82. 82.

    Supra, Sect. 4.2.5.

  83. 83.

    Moral rights are discussed further, infra, Sect. 6.4.

  84. 84.

    Infra, Sect. 9.3.

  85. 85.

    Rigamonti, CP, “Deconstructing Moral Rights” (2006) 47 (2) Harvard International Law Journal, pp 353–412, p 359; Waelde, C and De Souza, L, “Moral Rights and the Internet: Squaring the Circle”, op. cit., p 266; Rahmatian, A, Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works, op. cit., p 47.

  86. 86.

    Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 89; the French concept of droit d’auteur is based on an ‘individual’s spiritual creation’, Davies, G and Rauscher auf Weeg, HH, op. cit., p 10.

  87. 87.

    Dames, KM, op. cit., p 18.

  88. 88.

    It is evident in the copyright laws of the UK, Canada and Australia; section 77 CDPA 1988 (UK); section 14.1–14.2 Copyright Act 1985 (Canada); in Australia only individuals, as opposed to corporate bodies, are vested with moral rights, section 190, Part IX Copyright Act 1968 (Australia); Goldstein, P and Hugenholtz, B, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, et al, 2013), p 358.

  89. 89.

    Supnik, P and Faulder, S (eds), op. cit., p 183; Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 89; Article 6 bis (1) Berne Convention 1886.

  90. 90.

    Article 6 bis Berne Convention 1886; moral rights were added to the Berne Convention during the 1928 Rome revision and it has been argued that this served to shift the focus of copyright law back to the role of the author, Vetrone, AV, The Legal and Moral Rights of all Artists, op. cit., pp 21–22; two further moral rights exist in French law which are the right to disclose a work and the right to recall a work from being publicly displayed, Dutfield, G, and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 90; Schulenberg, R, op. cit., p 417; Hansmann, H and Santilli, M, “Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis”, op. cit., p 96.

  91. 91.

    Nigerian copyright law is historically derived from British copyright law, which provides that moral rights shall exist in a work for the duration of copyright subsistence in that work, section 86 CDPA 1988 (UK).

  92. 92.

    It appears that moral rights may not be an inherent feature of common law copyright, however, principles similar to moral rights may be found in common law torts and contracts such as passing off, Asein, JO, Nigerian Copyright Law and Practice, op. cit., p 138; regarding the adoption of moral rights in the US, for instance, ‘Congress stated that then- existing federal and state legislation and common law protections in the United States already offered a “rough equivalence” to the protection of article 6 bis through a patchwork of unfair competition, copyright, contract, defamation and privacy law’, Davies G, and Garnett, K, Moral Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010), p 858; Shyllon F, Intellectual Property Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p 63; Rigamonti, CP, “Deconstructing Moral Rights”, op. cit., p 353; Waelde, C and De Souza, L, “Moral Rights and the Internet: Squaring the Circle”, op. cit., p 266; moral rights may not have enjoyed simultaneous international application as the US did not join the Berne Convention until 1988 in opposition to the provision on moral rights in article 6 bis. Thus, moral rights for authors in the US appear to be determined by the laws at state level, except for the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, a federal statute that recognizes the moral rights of attribution and integrity for visual artists; sections 101, 102, 106(a), 107, 601, VARA 1990; Hansmann, H and Santilli, M, “Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis”, op. cit., p 97.

  93. 93.

    In departure from common law traditions, moral rights under Nigerian copyright law exist in perpetuity, sections 12 (2) Copyright Act 2004 (Nigeria).

  94. 94.

    Shyllon F, Intellectual Property Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p 63; Asein, JO, Nigerian Copyright Law and Practice, op. cit., p 139.

  95. 95.

    Section 12 (1) (a) Copyright Act 2004 (Nigeria).

  96. 96.

    Section 12 (1) (b) Copyright Act 2004 (Nigeria).

  97. 97.

    Article 6 bis (1) Berne Convention 1886.

  98. 98.

    The relationship between creative autonomy and authorial personality were identified in Kant and Hegel’s theories, supra, Sects. 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.

  99. 99.

    This may be argued on the basis of droit de suite (resale royalty right) which does not directly apply to the issue at hand; the droit de suite right may have been introduced with the intention of providing benefits to artists and authors of manuscripts when the value of their works appreciate; however the right has been criticized as being capable of altering the negotiating platform of young artists and authors, as their publishers and marketers may be wary of retrospective claims being made against them, Towse, R, “Copyrights and Artists: A View from Cultural Economics” (2006) 20 (4) Journal of Economic Surveys, pp 567–585, p 572.

  100. 100.

    Supra, Sect. 1.2.2.

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    Supra, Sect. 5.3.1; Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government, op. cit., p 189.

  103. 103.

    Waldron, J, The Right to Private Property, op. cit., p 343.

  104. 104.

    Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 52.

  105. 105.

    HC Deb 05 February 1841, vol 56, col 341–360, col 346, sir Macaulay’s reasoning that ‘we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated…’, is of consequential nature; Plant also makes consequentialist arguments in conceptualizing the fate of book production in the absence of copyright law, and making assertions as to what legislative processes on copyright law must consider, Plant, A, “The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books” (1934) 2 Economica, pp 167–195, p 168.

  106. 106.

    Ramello, GB and Silva, F, “New Directions in Copyright Law and Economics” (2007) 3 (3) Review of Law and Economics, pp 643–647, p 643; Jehoram, HC, “Critical Reflections on the Economic Importance of Copyright” (1989) 20 (4) IIC International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright, pp 485–497, p 485.

  107. 107.

    Frith, S and Marshall, L, op. cit., p 66; “value added” refers to the contribution of a given industry to the Gross Domestic Product of a country, Price, T, The Economic Importance of Copyright (Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property, London, 1993), p 4.

  108. 108.

    Callahan, M, The Trouble with Music, op. cit., p 199.

  109. 109.

    Scherer, FM, Quarter Notes and Bank Notes (Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2004), p 155.

  110. 110.

    Posner, RA, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory” (1979) 8 (1) Journal of Legal Studies, pp 103–140, p 105.

  111. 111.

    Parekh, B (ed), Jeremy Bentham: Ten Critical Essays (Frank Cass, London, 1974), p 1; Scanlon, T, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” (1982) 103 (110) Utilitarianism and Beyond, pp 267–286, p 267; this may be described as a subjective foundation.

  112. 112.

    Parekh, B (ed), op cit., p 1; Viner, J, “Bentham and JS Mill: The Utilitarian Background” (1949) 39 (2) The American Economic Review, pp 360–382, p 363.

  113. 113.

    Smart, JJC and Williams, B, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press, London, 1973), p 9; Glover, J (ed), Utilitarianism and its Critics (Macmillan, New York, 1990), p 10.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., p 10 and p 93.

  115. 115.

    Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (Dent, London, 1910), p 6.

  116. 116.

    Ibid., p 2.

  117. 117.

    Glover, J (ed), Utilitarianism and its Critics, op. cit., p 15.

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    He thus asserts that the pains that come with intelligence are to be more desired than whatever gains or satisfaction may be found in folly, Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government, op. cit., p 9.

  120. 120.

    Smart, JJC and Williams, B, Utilitarianism: for and Against, op. cit., p 79; Viner, J, “Bentham and JS Mill: The Utilitarian Background”, op. cit., p 365.

  121. 121.

    Glover, J (ed), Utilitarianism and its Critics, op. cit., p 21.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., p 22.

  123. 123.

    Kelly, A, “Gross National Happiness in Bhutan: the Big Idea from a Tiny State that Could Change the World” (December 1, 2012), The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/01/bhutan-wealth-happiness-counts (accessed 25 February 2020).

  124. 124.

    Di Tella, R and MacCulloch, R, “Gross National Happiness as an Answer to the Easterlin Paradox?” (2008) 86 (1) Journal of Development Economics, pp 22–42, p 38.

  125. 125.

    Ibid.

  126. 126.

    Posner, RA, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory”, op. cit., p 114; the efforts of Bentham to create a model for the measurement of happiness were reportedly widely criticised, Viner, J, “Bentham and JS Mill: The Utilitarian Background”, op. cit., p 367.

  127. 127.

    Posner, RA, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory”, op. cit., pp 112–113.

  128. 128.

    Merges, RP, Justifying Intellectual Property, op. cit., p 2.

  129. 129.

    Watt, R, Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2000), p 119.

  130. 130.

    Ibid., p 123; Callahan, M, The Trouble with Music, op. cit., p 199.

  131. 131.

    Infra, Sect. 5.4.3.

  132. 132.

    Yen, AC, “The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods” (1991) 52 (5) Ohio State Law Journal, pp 1343–1378, p 1366.

  133. 133.

    Viner, J, “Bentham and JS Mill: The Utilitarian Background”, op. cit., p 374.

  134. 134.

    Supra, Sect. 5.4.1.

  135. 135.

    Tarascio, VJ, Pareto’s Methodological Approach to Economics: A Study in the History of Some Scientific Aspects of Economic Thought (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1968), p 104.

  136. 136.

    Ibid., p 79 and p 82.

  137. 137.

    Gifford, A, Jr and Santoni, GJ, Public Economics: Politicians, Property Rights and Exchange (The Dryden Press, Illinois, 1979), p 21.

  138. 138.

    Tarascio, VJ, Pareto’s Methodological Approach to Economics: A Study in the History of Some Scientific Aspects of Economic Thought, op. cit., p 82.

  139. 139.

    Cirillo, R, The Economics of Vilfredo Pareto (Frank Cass, London, 1979), p 46.

  140. 140.

    Dutfield, G and Suthersanen, U, Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 49.

  141. 141.

    Cirillo, R, The Economics of Vilfredo Pareto, op. cit., p 51.

  142. 142.

    This argument cites the theories of Bergson which required ‘a set of explicit value judgments’, and Arrow, who argued that the social function must be consistent and must be established by a democratic process, ibid., p 52.

  143. 143.

    Supra, Sect. 5.2.

  144. 144.

    Stringham, E, “Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central Planning” (2001) 4 (2) The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, pp 41–50, p 42.

  145. 145.

    Zerbe, RO Jr, Bauman, Y, et al, “An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-Cost Analysis” (2006) 58 (3) Ecological Economics, pp 449–461, p 450.

  146. 146.

    Stringham, E, “Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central Planning”, op. cit., p 42.

  147. 147.

    Zerbe, RO Jr, Bauman, Y, et al, “An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-Cost Analysis”, op. cit., p 4.

  148. 148.

    Frith, S and Marshall, L, Music and Copyright, op. cit., p 61.

  149. 149.

    Coase, RH, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 (1) Journal of Law and Economics, pp 1–44, p 4.

  150. 150.

    Ibid, p10.

  151. 151.

    Katz, AW, Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law (Foundation Press, New York, 1998), p 4.

  152. 152.

    Coase, RH, “The Problem of Social Cost”, op. cit., p 15.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., p 16.

  154. 154.

    Cirillo, R, The Economics of Vilfredo Pareto, op. cit., p 51.

  155. 155.

    Negus, K, and Pickering, M, Creativity, Communication and Cultural Value (Sage, London and Thousand Oaks, et al, 2004), p 3; before copyright laws were established, the Medici family owned a vast collection of paintings, manuscripts, sculptures and other artworks, http://leonart.over-blog.com/pages/The_art_collection_of_Lorenzo_de_Medici-1975107.html (accessed 25 February 2020); William Shakespeare, is also said to have enjoyed the royal patronage of Queen Elizabeth and King James1, Brown, H, Shakespeare’s Patrons & Other Essays (JM Dent & Sons, London, 1912); while evidence shows that manuscripts and artworks were produced before the establishment of copyright law, the role of patrons in connection with cultural works may serve as evidence that creative endeavour may often require incentivisation. However, as Plant argues, it must be noted that this is not always the case. He argues that there are authors who would be willing to pay for their works to be published without any anxieties about profits or rewards, Plant, A, “The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books”, op. cit., p 168.

  156. 156.

    Macaulay agrees that copyright, as opposed to patronage, is the more ideal way for remunerating literary creative effort in order to ensure its continuity; but he considered copyright as an inevitable monopoly, and all monopolies as evil. He argued that ‘for the sake of the good, we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good’, HC Deb 5 February 1841, vol 56, col 348.

  157. 157.

    Raven, F, “Copyright and Public Goods: An Argument for Thin Copyright Protection” (2005) 8 (3) A Journal of Media and Culture, par 3.

  158. 158.

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  159. 159.

    Landes, WM and Posner, RA, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p 11.

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    Davies, G and Rauscher auf Weeg, HH, Challenges to Copyright and Related Rights in the European Community (ESC Publishing Limited, Oxford, 1983), p 13; Landes, WM and Posner, RA, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 71.

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    Liebowitz, SJ and Watt, R, “How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music? Copyright and its Alternatives” (2006) 20 (4) Journal of Economic Surveys, pp 513–545, p 513.

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    Twentieth Century Music Corp v Aiken [1975] 422 US, 151 at p 156; Schulenberg, R, Legal Aspects of the Music Industry (Billboard Books, New York, 2005), p 494.

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  167. 167.

    Gosseries, A, et al (eds), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, Chippenham and Eastbourne, et al, 2008), p 15.

  168. 168.

    Ibid., p 96.

  169. 169.

    Dames, KM, “Intellectual Property, Copyright’s Purpose and Principal Justification”, op. cit., p 19.

  170. 170.

    Boldrin, M and Levine, DK, “Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?” (2009) 5 (3) Review of Law and Economics, pp 991–1025, p 995.

  171. 171.

    This curious trend was observed in the pre- copyright era careers of Gioachino Rossini and Gaetano Donizetti, and later, in the careers of Robert Schumann and Verdi, during which time copyright law had been introduced, Scherer, FM, “The Emergence of Musical Copyright in Europe from 1709 to 1850” (2008) 5 (2) Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, pp 3–18, p 10.

  172. 172.

    Supra, Sect. 4.5.1.

  173. 173.

    Landes, WM and Posner, RA, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p 71; it has been argued that the attitude of the US Supreme Court to copyright matters maintains the position that the copyright system is geared more towards social welfare than the reward of creators, Gordon, WJ, “An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: the Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory” (1989) 41 (1) Stanford Law Review, pp 1343–1469, p 1437; United States v Paramount Pictures 334 US 131 (1948); Mazer v Stein 347 US 201 (1954).

  174. 174.

    Boldrin, M and Levine, DK, “Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?” op. cit., p 991.

  175. 175.

    Ibid.

  176. 176.

    Davies, G and Rauscher auf Weeg, HH, Challenges to Copyright and Related Rights in the European Community, op. cit., p 13.

  177. 177.

    Supra, Sect. 4.3.1.

  178. 178.

    Goldstein, P and Hugenholtz, B, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, et al, 2013), p 18.

  179. 179.

    Supra, Sect. 4.5.1.

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Gani, M.W. (2020). Justifying Creative Autonomy within Copyright Discourse. In: Creative Autonomy, Copyright and Popular Music in Nigeria. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48694-5_5

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