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Subjective Experience and Its Neural Basis

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Neuroscience for Psychologists

Abstract

This chapter reviews current perspectives on the neural basis of subjective experience. Its primary focus is on the interaction between two broad dimensions of experience: subjective contents (e.g., the conscious experience of seeing a red ball  or feeling a sharp pain) and the global brain states that modulate the representation of those contents and how they evolve over time (e.g., moods, dreaming, and vigilance). The neural basis of these two aspects of experience will be discussed across multiple levels of description, including large-scale network, neurocomputational, and cellular-level perspectives. When integrated, these perspectives highlight the way that small-scale neuronal circuits may be interconnected so as to implement a hierarchical computational system for inferring the probability that various states of the world (including the body), at various levels of description, have caused the sensory input that has been received. Emotional experience is used to provide an in-depth example of the complex interactions within this type of system that are necessary to account for this phenomenon. The chapter next turns to the role of global brain states in modulating the contents of experience – including mood, sleep/dreaming, and other altered states of consciousness. Global brain states are linked to the broad influence of neuromodulators and the way they can alter neurocomputational inference processes by either amplifying or attenuating the relative influence of prior expectations and sensory input on experience. Different global brain states are then associated with different patterns of modulatory influence on neuronal populations encoding different types of prior expectations at different levels of hierarchical processing. This chapter also briefly considers the potential clinical relevance of understanding the neural basis of what contents do and do not become consciously accessible, and the vulnerabilities of such a system for transitioning into maladaptive states. This chapter ends by highlighting the nascent state of the field of consciousness research and the importance of an interdisciplinary, multilevel approach to understanding this important topic.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In research on consciousness, a related distinction is sometimes made between the transitive and intransitive uses of the term “conscious” (Dehaene and Changeux 2011). The former use corresponds closely to the use of the term “conscious contents” in this chapter (e.g., “I was not conscious of my change in heart rate”). The latter use instead corresponds to the range of “global states” (i.e., as the term is used in this chapter) that range from complete unconsciousness (e.g., “I was unconscious for 3 hours after the accident”) to states of high vigilance/alertness.

  2. 2.

    Adaptive behavior can be understood from a number of vantage points. For example, from an evolutionary perspective, it could be understood as behavior that, on average, promotes the survival of an organism for long enough to reproduce within its ecological niche (i.e., the environment within which its behavioral dispositions were naturally selected for over evolutionary time). From a personal perspective, it could also be viewed as behavior that aids an organism in fulfilling its own needs, goals, and desires. Such vantage points need not always agree, however; thus, the definition of “adaptive” can at times be problematic – with one definition being more appropriate than the other in different contexts (e.g., in the discussion of automatic affective responses below, the evolutionary definition may be more appropriate when the two vantage points disagree).

  3. 3.

    It is important to note that this idea has been (and to some degree remains) controversial. This will be expanded on within the section on “Open Questions” later in the chapter.

  4. 4.

    This could represent an example of metaplasticity – the ability to control the plasticity of other synaptic connections that implement learning.

  5. 5.

    In line with this, there is also relatively strong delta activity during coma.

  6. 6.

    For more details on plasticity mechanisms, see (7 Chap. 7) in this volume.

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Correspondence to Ryan Smith .

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Smith, R. (2021). Subjective Experience and Its Neural Basis. In: Zeise, M.L. (eds) Neuroscience for Psychologists. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47645-8_9

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