Abstract
Why is it good to have a language? Many reasons, but one reason above all others: a shared language is a wonderful way of transmitting information. We will see how this simple, ‘Moorean’ observation tells us what to say about reference for proper names, two-dimensionalism, and the internalism–externalism debate. Throughout, the discussion will presume that we language users are natural parts of the natural world.
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Notes
- 1.
See, e.g., Jackson (2011).
- 2.
For discussion and references, see, e.g., Schellenberg (2013).
- 3.
As it turned out, information in the wide sense that encompasses misinformation. More on this below.
- 4.
Calling this a description theory can mislead, because the crucial point is that the thing has to have a certain property. However, this feature of the word is responsible for the word being a good word for describing. Of course, there is the question as to how “flat” (in English) gets to be such that it applies to something just if that thing has the property. A popular answer – to which I and many are broadly sympathetic, an answer that goes back to Locke at least – is that we have beliefs to the effect that things are flat, and we speakers of English have adopted the convention of using “flat” to pass on this belief. Incidentally, some seem to mean by a description theory for “W”, the view that when we use “W” we consult a description that is in some sense before our minds. This is not what is meant here.
- 5.
Of course, the name that appears in some current sentence need not be the name originally assigned. The “brick” that carries information may evolve over time and often changes when sentences are translated.
- 6.
What an experience tells one is the information delivered by having an experience. This means that, given the inclusive sense in which we are using “information”, we are using “tells” in a correspondingly inclusive sense, one on which, e.g., when something looks to be moving, what the experience tells one is that it is moving even if in fact it’s an illusion. The same goes for “teaches” etc.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
What about worlds where the chair I am looking does not exist, is the sentence true at those worlds? We could finesse this question by conducting our discussion using “Anything that is the actual chair I am looking at is made of wood”.
- 10.
And maybe the sentence should be read as “Any water = H2O”.
- 11.
I hope I have always been alert to the difference between words and the world they are about, but I am sure I am indebted to reading Devitt (1984).
- 12.
- 13.
I footnote the usual caveat. Maybe water’s being H2O is “philosophers’ science”, but the point could be made with less controversial examples.
- 14.
Lewis (1994: 423–425).
- 15.
As he says, it is an undoubted fact that “folk theory is ‘wide’” (Devitt 1985: 218).
- 16.
Were I a brain in a vat, or someone who has contracted out some of their “brain-mind work” to the cloud, we’d have to phrase the issue differently, of course.
- 17.
Thanks to the many who have discussed these issues with me over the years, with special thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell, David Chalmers, David Lewis, Alex Sandgren and Daniel Stoljar.
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Jackson, F. (2020). Language from a Naturalistic Perspective. In: Bianchi, A. (eds) Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 142. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_8
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