Abstract
Michael Devitt argues against direct reference, and in favor of an alternative theory of meaning, in “Against Direct Reference,” “Still against Direct Reference,” and Coming to Our Senses. This paper criticizes Devitt’s theory of meaning and defends direct reference against his most important objection. Devitt’s initial theory of meaning entails, contrary to direct reference, that substitution of co-referring names can fail to preserve truth-value. However, Devitt recognizes that his initial theory does not deal well with Kripke’s puzzle and other hard cases. Devitt then modifies his theory to handle those cases. But his modified theory, when fully developed along the lines that Devitt indicates, entails that proper names can be freely substituted in attitude ascriptions, just as direct reference says. Devitt’s strongest objection to direct reference claims (roughly) that if it were true, then attitude ascriptions would be incapable of explaining behavior. But Devitt’s objection rests on false assumptions about explanation.
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Notes
- 1.
See Braun 1993, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2006, and 2015. I will often follow Devitt in using the term ‘direct reference’ to refer to the theory of direct reference, rather than the phenomenon of direct reference. Though the theory of direct reference comes from Kaplan (1989), Devitt tends to use the term for a somewhat different semantic theory, about which Kaplan has periodically shown some ambivalence, namely the theory that I call ‘Millian Russellianism’ below. I will follow Devitt in using ‘direct reference’ for the latter theory.
- 2.
A qualification: I can safely say that direct-reference theory’s semantic contents are conventional meanings only because I am here ignoring context-sensitive expressions. If an expression is context-sensitive, then its Kaplanian (1989) character is determined by linguistic convention, whereas its semantic content, in a context, is determined by both its character and features of that context, and so is not determined by conventional meaning alone. But if an expression is context-insensitive, then it has the same semantic content in all contexts, and so we can safely speak of its semantic content, full stop, without mentioning context. Moreover, its single semantic content is completely determined by linguistic convention, and so we can say that its (unvarying) semantic content is a conventional meaning.
- 3.
Strictly speaking, the semantic content of a ‘that’-clause should include the semantic content of the complementizer ‘that’ (Salmon 1986), but I ignore this here.
- 4.
Some direct-reference theorists hold that (2) is also scope-ambiguous. On one reading, ‘Ortcutt’ takes wide scope over ‘believes’, and on the other reading, it takes narrow scope. The narrow scope reading might be paraphrased with (2n), and the alleged wide scope reading might be paraphrased with (2w1) and symbolized with (2w2).
(2n) Ralph believes that: Ortcutt is a spy.
(2w1) Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes that he is a spy.
(2w2) λx[Ralph believes that: x is a spy] Ortcutt.
(2n), on the one hand, and (2w1)/(2w2), on the other, differ in semantic content, because they differ in structure. But these semantic contents are logically and necessarily equivalent, so the alleged ambiguity makes no truth-conditional difference to (2). Thus, I ignore the possibility of this ambiguity here. However, this scope-ambiguity may make a difference to the truth-conditions of more complex sentences, such as ‘Alice believes that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy’. See Salmon 1989, 2006.
- 5.
I am generalizing Devitt’s account of singular terms in ‘that’-clauses to a similar view of general terms in ‘that’-clauses. I think he would not object to my extension: see his pp. 149–150. Nothing I say below will turn on the details of Devitt’s views about general terms.
- 6.
There are two issues about (6) and (7) that I shall mention in this note, but not discuss at length. First, some might hold that (6) is true only if the sentence containing ‘he’ that occurs embedded in its attitude ascriptions refers to a “first-person (de se) thought.” Second (and more important), the occurrence of the quantifier ‘for all x’ in (7) binds occurrences of variables both inside and outside the ‘that’-clauses of the attitude ascriptions in (7). The values of those variables appear to be objects, not properties or meanings, and so their values appear not to be Devittian meanings. Therefore, at first glance, the attitude ascriptions in (7) must be construed transparently (more accurately, Shakespeareanly). Devitt says nothing about how the attitude ascriptions in such generalizations could have opaque (non-Shakespearean) readings. Kaplan (1968) presents a Fregean view of quantification into opaque attitude ascriptions. Devitt refers to Kaplan’s paper (143 n. 4), but does not discuss his theory. Perhaps Devitt would be willing to adopt it. Of course, quantifying-in presents no problems for direct reference, and that counts as a point in its favor.
- 7.
The proposal is also rather un-Devittian in another respect. In note 80, p. 233, Devitt says “I assume that there are no good semantic objections to this mixing of languages [in ‘Londres is pretty’]. ‘Londres is pretty’ has speaker meanings that are as unobjectionable as any. Its participation in the conventions of both French and English may be offensive to the Académie française but nevertheless yields straightforward conventional meanings.”
- 8.
More evidence in favor of direct reference comes from the ways in which speakers use simple demonstratives in attitude ascriptions. Devitt discusses some of this evidence on pp. 220–223.
- 9.
(16) does not give a necessary condition for ┌P because Q┐. The sentence ‘This planar figure is a square because it is an equilateral four-side figure with four right-angled vertices’ can be true in a context, even though its right-hand sentence does not describe a cause of an event described by its left-hand sentence. A similar point holds for ‘Alice should give to UNICEF because UNICEF helps people in need’.
- 10.
I am here assuming that when Devitt speaks of one attitude ascription following from another, he is speaking of one attitude ascription in English following from another attitude ascription in English. If Devitt is instead speaking of one ascription following from another in merely possible languages, then his remarks imply that Shakespearean attitude ascriptions of ordinary English explain behavior whenever non-Shakespearean ascriptions in a (merely possible) language do. Suppose there are merely possible languages that contain both direct-reference-style Shakespearean ascriptions and non-Shakespearean ascriptions that ascribe modes of reference. In such a language, every true Shakespearean ascription follows from (is necessitated by) some true non-Shakespearean ascription. But if direct reference is true, then attitude ascriptions of ordinary English are synonymous with the Shakespearean attitude ascriptions of the possible language we are considering. But if this is so, then ordinary English attitude ascriptions always explain behavior, even if direct reference is true of ordinary English.
- 11.
Devitt presents a related argument, in a semi-formal format, on p. 75 of Devitt 2012.
-
1.
A name in a t[hat]-clause of an apparently opaque attitude ascription conveys information about a mode of referring to the name’s bearer.
-
2.
A name’s mode of referring to its bearer is causal not descriptive.
-
3.
Apparently opaque attitude ascriptions explain behavior in virtue of what they convey.
-
4.
So, the causal mode [explains behavior and hence] is the name’s meaning.
My explication of the argument that Devitt gives on p. 78 provides some justification for line (1) above, based on his remarks about explanation on p. 78. My explication also extends the earlier argument so that it explicitly draws a conclusion about direct reference. I think this is consistent with Devitt’s intentions. But even if it is not, the argument I present in the main text is Devittian in spirit and worth considering seriously.
-
1.
- 12.
I mention ideal explanations in the article that Devitt quotes. But my notion of an ideal explanation is Railton’s, which is very different from the ideal explanations of classic DN theory. See Sect. 10.7.2 above: an ideal Railtonian explanation of an event is a sequence of propositions that describes the entire causal history of that event, along with all of the covering laws involved in that causal history. No human being has ever provided an ideal Railtonian explanation. Railton’s notion of an ideal explanation is also the only notion of a complete explanation that one can derive from his theory.
- 13.
Thanks to Andrea Bianchi for creating and editing this volume, and for inviting me to contribute to it. Thanks to Panu Raatikainen for help with translating from English to Finnish. Thanks, finally, to Michael Devitt for his comments on this chapter.
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Braun, D. (2020). Still for Direct Reference. In: Bianchi, A. (eds) Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 142. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_10
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