Abstract
In this chapter I focus in the subject of knowledge or knowing in design. First, I explore the advance of design research over the last four decades, noting the field’s shift from a science to a practice orientation. Here, particular emphasis is placed on the work of Donald Schön and his concept of an epistemology of practice, a concept which is largely underpinned by Dewey’s philosophy. This leads directly in to a discussion of the recent emergence of research involving practice in design—in other words, research involving practice. At this point, I hone in on some recent methodological formalizations of such an approach, putting forward the argument that these lack a sufficient epistemological justification. As a response, I turn to look at Dewey’s theory of inquiry. Examining the theory, it is shown to offer the beginnings of an epistemological justification for design research involving practice through its articulation the role of practice in research, as well as the practice-research relationship. By outlining and contextualizing the theory of inquiry, a general point of reference is established for the remaining chapters.
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Notes
- 1.
Inquiry would cover the idea of applying intelligent practice, or design, in the pursuit of desirable values (see Chap. 2).
- 2.
Those who hold a general philosophical understanding will be aware that epistemological issues directly link to issues relating to ontology (i.e., the study of being) and metaphysics (i.e., the study of existence). It is the notion of truth—i.e., what constitutes accurate knowledge of the world—that ultimately requires that the latter aspects, i. e., ontology and metaphysics, be given due consideration.
- 3.
Dewey uses this word to characterize some traditional philosophic conceptions of experience as a distortion of what ‘really is’ (LW 1, p. 5).
- 4.
Standard contextualizations of such major philosophic positions are, of course, available from innumerable sources. A brief, accessible and useful overview of how they fit within the development of Western epistemology can be found in von Glasersfeld (1995).
- 5.
In Logic: A Theory of Inquiry, published in 1938 when Dewey was 78 years old, he stated the term knowledge suffered from ‘ambiguity’ and that, set apart from inquiry, ‘its meaning is so empty that any content or filling may be arbitrarily poured in’. Its only solid meaning, he believed, was as the conclusion which satisfactorily closes inquiry (see LW 12, pp. 15–16).
- 6.
In “Thinking about Design: An Historical Perspective” Buchanan offers two key examples of the dialectical approach in design. The first is the educational program at Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm (HfG Ulm) which sought to ‘to overcome the dichotomy between theory and practice’ by exploring ways of applying theory in ‘addressing the problems of action in industrial culture’ (2009, p. 427). The second example is the work of Christopher Alexander, who is seen to propose a method of synthesis linking form and context in architectural design (ibid, p. 440–441).
- 7.
This is highlighted by Nigel Cross in “Designerly Ways of Knowing: Design Discipline versus Design Science”. For a detailed account see Cross (2001).
- 8.
Further outlining this dual aspect, Buchanan divides design inquiry into two separate lines of investigation. The first is referred to as rhetorical inquiry. This is so called on the basis that it focuses on the communicative and imaginative power of the designer (Buchanan 2007, p. 58). For a more detailed outline of design inquiry as rhetorical inquiry, see Buchanan’s “Design and the new Rhetoric: Productive Arts in the Philosophy of Culture” (2001a). The second line of investigation is referred to as productive science (or poetics). Here the discipline of making is examined, with a focus on products and their use. On a fundamental level, an interest in human experience in relation to design is seen to link rhetorical inquiry and productive science (Buchanan 2007, p. 58).
- 9.
While Jones and Alexander formed an English contingent, Rittel was based in Ulm in Germany. Archer, however, straddled both camps, working in England and Germany.
- 10.
Perhaps one of the design methods movement’s key legacies may found in Horst Rittel’s account of problem solving (Rittel 1972). Here, reflecting on the failure of rational approaches in certain planning situations, Rittel coined what is now a famous distinction between ‘tame’ and ‘wicked problems’. Tame problems can be easily controlled and manipulated. Wicked problems, on the other hand, are too complex to yield to easy definitions or straightforward resolutions (p. 392). This distinction is useful on the basis that it highlights the intractability of certain problems and, as such, still draws attention in design literature (e.g., Coyne 2005).
- 11.
On this account, design is seen to connect a series of diverse activities, including: formulating responses to problems, developing possible solutions to problems; representing through drawings, sketches and models; evaluating; and, finally, reflecting in the process, as well as beyond (Lawson 2008/1980, p. 291). Lawson explicitly references Schön’s work, as he highlights the aspect of ‘reflecting’.
- 12.
Working with Kees Dorst, Nigel Cross explored the interrelation of design problems and solutions, providing evidence that designers gradually work and rework their definitions of problems as they work towards a design solution (see Dorst and Cross 2001).
- 13.
Cross has gone on to argue, that ‘designerly ways of knowing’ or design knowledge, may be seen to find expression in design processes (i.e., designers’ ways of working) as well as design’s products (i.e., the outcomes of design) (1999a, p. 5).
- 14.
As a means of differentiating between these three types it may be noted that in moving from exploratory experiments through to hypothesis testing, the practitioner is seen to hold an increasing sense of clarity and purpose. They have ‘framed’ their purposes.
- 15.
Dorst wryly comments that apart from a ‘stubborn’ few, the design science agenda is no longer (2016, p. 2669)
- 16.
At the same time, the remit of the United Kingdom’s Research Excellence Framework (REF) was expanded to include the evaluation of such outputs as ideas, images, performances and artifacts, alongside the more traditional journal papers and books (see HEFCE 1992).
- 17.
While Henkel’s work refers to academia in general, this is seen as particularly applicable to the field of design in the period immediately following the reorganization of the higher education sector in various countries and emergence of doctorates in design.
- 18.
Key conferences held at the time included: The Ohio Conference on Doctoral Education in Design held in Pittsburgh in 1998 (see Buchanan et al. 1998); the Foundations for the Future: Doctoral Education in Design conference held in La Clusaz, France 2000. (see Durling and Friedman 2000); and the Doctoral Education in Design conference held in Tsukuba, Japan in 2003 (see Durling and Sugiyama 2003).
- 19.
Aalto gained doctoral rights in 1983–4 but only allowed for doctorates involving practice from 1998–9 onwards.
- 20.
It does not seem incidental that Frayling’s paper emerged just after the 1992 reorganization of the UK’s higher education sector.
- 21.
The origin of this categorization has been attributed to Bruce Archer, who is said to have used the associated terminology at the Royal College of Art since the 1960s (Pedgley and Wormald, 2007 p. 72).
- 22.
Or, perhaps, one might argue it is because of such objections/opposition that the general interest in practice–based and practice–led approaches continued to grow over the following decade.
- 23.
As has been noted, Koskinen et al. (2011) propose that design research, as a broad category, takes reference from three main research and (consequently) epistemological traditions; namely the natural sciences, the social sciences and art.
- 24.
Alluding to his metaphysical perspective, Dewey is keen to stress a continuity between these traits and the situation. Thus, it is not just the inquirer who is disturbed, troubled, confused and so on, but also the situation (LW 12, p. 110).
- 25.
Interestingly, Dewey acknowledges the fluidity of problems and notes how, as things in themselves, they also require ‘progressive inquiry’ (ibid, p. 112, italics in original).
- 26.
In an example, he speaks of a fire alarm sounding. If we are to survive, there are a number of things we must determine rapidly, e.g., where the fire is, the position of the aisles and exists. Alongside this, he notes, there will be other less fixed features, such as the movement and behaviors of the crowd. Only by taking all of this into account will we be able to begin to consider a solution to our immediate dilemma.
- 27.
Dewey’s exact phrase is the ‘meaning contents’ of an idea (see LW 12, p. 115).
- 28.
Interestingly, this is the only point in The Logic that Dewey discusses knowledge as having a direct meaning within inquiry.
- 29.
Equally, following Dewey’s definition of inquiry, it would also seem likely that the inquirer(s) would be in a position to claim that the original indeterminate situation has become so ‘determinate’ such that there is no further need for experimentation.
- 30.
It is often overlooked that Dewey did not directly link truth and warranted assertability. Rather he introduces the concept as a replacement for knowledge and belief. Ultimately, warranted assertability removes the question of truth as a correspondence with reality. Instead, the question becomes: Does the evidence stack up?
- 31.
Dewey’s rejection of a notion of knowledge as a ‘mirror of nature’ was highlighted by Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979).
- 32.
This theory has been set out in the last chapter.
- 33.
- 34.
Schön also talks of experimental ‘transactions’; which on his account refers to the ‘interaction of the knower and known’ (1983, p. 361). Here, again he acknowledges his debt to Dewey, who devised the concept in partnership with a sometime co–author, Arthur Bentley. For a detailed outline of the concept see The Knowing and the Known (in particular LW 16, pp. 96–109).
- 35.
More particularly, this can be set out as the full breath of our experiences, the progressive way in which habitual behaviors take form and the way in which ideals play a role in action (Shapiro 2010, p. 312–317).
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Dixon, B.S. (2020). Knowing in Making. In: Dewey and Design. Design Research Foundations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47471-3_3
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