Abstract
This chapter demarcates a rational decision-making process of economic agents in neoclassical theory. On the contrary to the previous chapter, it is argued that general neoclassical approach can still be, despite widely discussed weaknesses, a viable tool to understand principal issues of economic distribution. In the light of the current trends in economic research, the chapter also discusses limits of behavioural approach. It is claimed that fragmental insights of behavioural research, which are increasingly gaining greater importance in economics over time, are of little help in comprehending general market principles and their link to economic inequality.
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Notes
- 1.
Compare with Sen (1993) who reached similar conclusion but out of neoclassical paradigm.
- 2.
It is obvious that any theoretical model is unable to provide detailed explanation of a multitude of all stochastic particularities. By “any particular fact” we understand any fact that is explainable as a systemic in a sense it derives from the natural propensity of men in a given system.
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Maialeh, R. (2020). Who Are Agents in Agent-Based Economic Models?. In: Dynamic Models and Inequality. Contributions to Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46313-7_4
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