Abstract
Poverty cannot be adequately conceptualised without a metric or informational basis allowing for interpersonal comparisons that determine what being poor is and who is poorer. A metric provides a criterion to select the information that is relevant to process comparisons, which implies that some pieces of information are considered in the evaluation, whereas others are excluded. As a consequence of this normative selection, some social circumstances may be captured in the evaluation of poverty, while others may not, which makes such selection relevant.
My position is that Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability metric is the most suitable one given its comprehensiveness. The capability metric not only accounts for dimensions such as income, housing or health but also aspects of recognition such as the self-assurance we obtain in intimate relationships, in the relations we establish with state institutions or with our partners in social life. In particular, I defend that the capability metric includes Honneth ’s practical relations-to-self of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem that provide individuals with enough self-reliance to participate in social life.
Based on these aspects of recognition and taking the capability concept as a metric of poverty, I intend to conceptualise a specific kind of poverty: civic poverty, which I define as a blockage to the development of basic capabilities that allow individuals to participate in decision-making processes. Civic poverty can be considered as a kind of poverty that negatively affects agency since the undermining of the capabilities to raise claims, exchange arguments and justify one’s position hinders the condition of being an agent. As a result, civic poverty prevents certain social groups and their claims from being visible, insofar as they cannot have their voices heard.
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Notes
- 1.
These normative discussions are part of the debate known as ‘equality of what?’, which has been articulated through the contributions of Dworkin (2000a), Daniels (1990), Cohen (1989), Sen (1992), Rawls (1982) and Roemer (1986), among others. The specific discussion regarding whether we should adopt primary goods or capabilities can be seen in Brighouse and Robeyns (2010).
- 2.
- 3.
I argue that it is a low threshold because I am referring to a very basic sense of pursuing a life plan and justifying positions and claims. This does not imply that the life plan be extremely complex and effectively realised, but that it can simply be pursued, partially realised or reformulated. Besides, this does not imply that individuals exercise complex and sophisticated justifications of their positions either, but only that they can offer a reason to support their beliefs or actions. Understood in this very basic sense, pursuing a life plan and justifying positions and claims is possible for a large portion of the world’s population, even poor and excluded groups.
- 4.
Bohman (1997: 333-7) introduces the concept of political poverty. I prefer the notion of civic poverty because it is more comprehensive and can explain public participation beyond political participation.
- 5.
Young provides a detailed account of this kind of exclusion by introducing a very broad conception of political communication, in which she distinguishes three forms of communication: greetings, rhetoric, and narrative, in addition to presenting arguments as a way to obtain democratic inclusion. (Young 2000: ch. 2).
- 6.
By normative friction I refer to the uneasiness and discomfort within the set of beliefs that articulate and guide individuals’ action, which is a type of cognitive dissonance specific to the field of practical life. The friction arises when the coherence in the set of beliefs and values that guide the agent’s practical life is broken, causing enough uneasiness to move agents to try to restore such coherence. In turn, this results in cognitive strain, (Stanovich 2011; Zajonc 2001) which leads them to take some distance from their beliefs and to reflect in depth, so as to reject the one that generates the dissonance or to integrate it by modifying or adjusting the set of beliefs with which they identify. (Festinger 1962: 18-24) This implies different instances of interpersonal and intrapersonal justification, in which the agent exchanges reasons with others or reflects on their current beliefs.
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Pereira, G. (2020). Civic Poverty and Recognition. In: Schweiger, G. (eds) Poverty, Inequality and the Critical Theory of Recognition. Philosophy and Poverty, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45795-2_4
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