Abstract
I defend the claim that, for Fichte , the absence of poverty as material deprivation (in a sense I specify) must be understood as a condition of possibility of a relation of recognition. This relation between poverty and recognition is different from Honneth ’s view that the absence of poverty is one dimension of a relation of recognition. Honneth develops this view as a reaction to Fraser’s worry that theories of recognition, like Honneth ’s, risk to downplay the material dimensions of justice. I use the debate Redistribution or Recognition ? (2003) between Honneth and Fraser as a frame for my discussion of Fichte . My claim is based on an interpretation of the first part of Fichte ’s Foundations of Natural Right (1796). A relation of recognition, for Fichte , is a relation of right in which “each is to limit his freedom through the concept of the possibility of the other’s freedom, under the condition that the latter likewise limit his freedom through the freedom of the former”. I focus on three passages in the text that support my claim. From the first I gather that the ability (to recognize) of the recognizing party is conditioned upon them not suffering from poverty as material deprivation. From the second I conclude that also the to-be-recognized party must not suffer from poverty, in order to be recognizable. The third passage reveals that Fichte believed that the existence of a relation of right is conditioned upon the respect of an “original right” to bodily inviolability which, in turn, is not respected when one is deprived of the fulfilment of basic material needs. Finally, I discuss whether poverty must continuously be avoided, in order to enable a relation of recognition, and a lack of which basic material goods constitutes the relevant kind of poverty.
Thanks to Daniel Hutton Ferris, Hannah Hübner, Marina Martinez Mateo, Thomas Meyer and Gottfried Schweiger for helpful feedback.
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Notes
- 1.
One could argue that how one conceptualizes the relation between material and cultural dimensions is crucially dependent on which overarching normative concept guides one’s inquiry. For example, Rainer Forst thinks that Nancy Fraser’s and Axel Honneth’s debate about recognition and redistribution (see below) is not only about how to conceptualize this relation but also concerns “whether justice should be what we mainly focus on when we practise critical theory” (Forst 2007: 293). Forst understands Honneth to adopt self-realization, instead, as the guiding normative ideal. I leave this question aside here and will simply refer to the material and cultural concerns of justice in the following.
- 2.
This focus is not self-evident since in the second part of the FNR (in particular § 18 and 19) Fichte in fact deals with the role the state should play with regard to the employment situation of the populace and defends the view that the state should act according to the “principle” that “everyone must be able to live off his labor” (Fichte 2000 [1796/7]: 186). I will briefly come back to this toward the end of the section “Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right (Part I)” and the “Conclusion”.
- 3.
For an overview of the history of and contemporary debates in ‘recognition theory’ see Ikäheimo 2014.
- 4.
Cf. Fraser and Honneth 2003.
- 5.
I do not distinguish between material and redistributive concerns of justice and cultural and recognitive ones respectively.
- 6.
This assumption becomes more plausible if we understand material deprivation in an absolute rather than a relational sense which I will do in the following.
- 7.
I bracket the question what difference it might make whether one is being denied basic material goods by others, one simply does not have access to them (due to a natural catastrophe for example) or if it is one’s own fault not to have them.
- 8.
This definition is meant to be quite traditional in terms of focussing on material goods and not “capabilities” for example (cf. Hick and Burchardt 2016). At the same time, it focusses directly on material goods (not income as a means to accessing them, cf. Kus, Nolan and Whelan 2016: 578) and avoids a relational definition of poverty (often also measured in terms of income) where those are defined as poor who earn relatively little in comparison to their compatriots, for example.
- 9.
A relational understanding of poverty might (like other redistributive concerns like exploitation) lend itself to a reformulation in the terminology of recognition.
- 10.
On the relation between having the concept of right and standing in a relation of right, see Neuhouser 2016: 42. Roughly, having the concept of right involves standing in a relation of right.
- 11.
The English word ‘right’ is a translation from the German Recht and can refer to the meaning of three English words: law, justice and rights (cf. Neuhouser 2000: vii).
- 12.
Formal freedom, for Fichte , means being able to act according to one’s own ends. These ends however need not be rational or moral. If they were, one would not only be formally but also materially free. Cf. Neuhouser 2016: 35.
- 13.
On the concept of personhood, see Neuhouser 2016: 34–40.
- 14.
For a helpful interpretation of §1 see Neuhouser 2001.
- 15.
From the §1 on Fichte simply assumes the finite character of the self-consciousness relevant for his undertaking in the FNR. From § 2 we have learnt that self-consciousness is thought of as consciousness of one’s free efficacy.
- 16.
This division into four conditions roughly follows an interpretation of Neuhouser who distinguishes four tasks Fichte sets himself in the second main division, see Neuhouser 2000: xvii.
- 17.
For the difference between the German terms Leib und Körper, see Borsche and Kaulbach 1986.
- 18.
For Fichte all modes of being, including seemingly passive ones like perceiving an object, are actions (Tätigkeiten).
- 19.
I leave open what kind of activity this is. I think it is uncontroversial that for Fichte this could be the uttering of a phrase that A understands (cf. Fichte 2000 [1796/7]: 38). It could potentially though be any kind of bodily movement of B that A can identify as determined by B’s will or even only as not-determined by natural laws or an organization principle. Cf. the discussion of the third condition below.
- 20.
This is a very simple description of the division of labour between the higher and lower organ. It is not completely clear to me how Fichte exactly conceives of this division of labour. In some passages in § 6 it seems that the higher and lower organ are both (in some way) engaged in free reciprocal interaction and it is not the case that the higher organ is exclusively responsible for this type of interaction. For the purposes of this chapter, I will work with the assumption that the higher organ is necessarily involved in free reciprocal interaction.
- 21.
The distinction between higher and lower organ relates to another distinction Fichte makes between finer and solid matter that I will only briefly mention here (Fichte 2000 [1796/7]: 64 f.). Both kinds of matter must, for Fichte, exist in the empirical world, in order for the body to be able to interact with it both causally and in free reciprocal interaction (and so ultimately for the concept of right to be applicable). Finer matter is the medium through which free reciprocal interaction takes place and solid matter is the medium through which ‘causal interaction’ takes place. With regard to finer matter/free reciprocal interaction Fichte seems to be saying something like this: If it is possible that I am influenced but not forced by an outer impulse (summons by another free being), this impulse must be transported via finer matter. Fichte mentions air and light as finer matters (Fichte 2000 [1796/7]: 71). I think one can roughly make sense of Fichte’s thoughts in the following way: If B, for example, says something to A, the movement of her tongue creates sounds via the finer matter air that reach A without forcing her to react in a certain way. If there was only solid matter between A and B, all movements of B would directly impact A’s body.
- 22.
Although Fichte ultimately argues that cognitively recognizing a human being as such entails also normatively recognizing them (see below and footnote 23) it is important that Fichte here starts off with the merely cognitive question. This is less confusing in the German text, since in German Anerkennung or anerkennen only refers to the normative dimension of the English ‘recognition’/‘to recognize’ and does not include the merely cognitive meaning. On the semantics of ‘recognition’/‘to recognize’ (in contrast to Anerkennung/anerkennen) see Meyer und Neuhann 2019.
- 23.
- 24.
Although Fichte ’s aim here is only to demonstrate that one of the four conditions for the concept of right to be applicable is fulfilled, namely, that it is possible to distinguish humans from things, he thereby also provides a further justification for the relation of right. The concept of equality – and more precisely equal freedom – is a normative concept and only this concept is adequate to grasp the appearance of a human body. Therefore, by explaining how we recognize (in the cognitive sense) others as our equals, Fichte shows that this involves recognizing (in the normative sense) them as equals.
- 25.
According to Neuhouser’s interpretation, the content of Part II (“Applied Natural Right”) of the FNR that I do not take into account in this chapter can be seen as a continuation of the third main division (Neuhouser 2000: xii).
- 26.
“An original right […] is a mere fiction, but one that must necessarily be created for the sake of a science of right.” (Fichte 2000 [1796/7]: 102)
- 27.
For this reading see, among other passages, Fichte ’s description of the “relation”of “original right” (Fichte 2000 [1796/7]: 103).
- 28.
In German law this legal instrument is called Rechtfertigender Notstand.
- 29.
This temporal description is in tension with a strictly transcendental reading of Fichte ’s argument. I do not discuss Fichte’s method in this chapter.
- 30.
See the sections “The original right to bodily inviolability” and “One-time or continuous securing of the absence of poverty?” for further discussion of the issue in which sense Fichte really means that one loses one’s status as a person if one is not recognized as such.
- 31.
I am referring to § 7 Proof that the concept of right can be applied through the propositions established which is the final paragraph of the second main division and therein section II.
- 32.
By “influence upon a being capable of reason” Fichte refers to his definition of “free reciprocal interaction” (see above, esp. my reconstruction of the second theorem of the first main division).
- 33.
It would need more work to spell out what ‘potential self-consciousness’ refers to in the empirical world. It could, for example, refer to the reproductive ability of adult human beings or a new-born baby.
- 34.
A question I neglect here is how, in Fichte ’s view, one is related to the satisfaction of one’s own basic material needs. Would Fichte think that a hunger strike is inconsistent, for example?
- 35.
This absolute threshold must, however, be determined context-specifically (see Lack of which material goods constitutes poverty?).
- 36.
Cf. Arendt 2017 [1966–67]: 63.
- 37.
This understanding of poverty is close enough to the one of poverty as material deprivation.
- 38.
- 39.
Cf. for example Bernstein 1986.
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Neuhann, E. (2020). Fichte ’s Concept of Recognition and Poverty as Material Deprivation. In: Schweiger, G. (eds) Poverty, Inequality and the Critical Theory of Recognition. Philosophy and Poverty, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45795-2_2
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