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The Evolution of Exaptation, and How Exaptation Survived Dennett’s Criticism

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Understanding Innovation Through Exaptation

Part of the book series: The Frontiers Collection ((FRONTCOLL))

Abstract

The concept of exaptation is one of the most original contributions given by the late palaeontologist Stephen J. Gould to evolutionary thinking. Exaptation was the focus of many of his theoretical contributions to and critiques of the ‘Modern Synthesis’. It is only normal, then, that the concept has been at the centre of heated debates for more than 20 years. Our aim in this chapter is to offer an updated view on the matter in light of the most recent evolutionary literature. We will first reconstruct the theoretical background that led Gould to develop the idea of exaptation, showing the deep implications it has for the philosophy of biology. Then, we will focus on the paradigmatic critiques moved by philosopher Daniel Dennett in his Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. After having provided an explanation of the philosophical reasons that led Dennett to hold such a position, we will confront it from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. On the one hand, our aim will be that of showing that exaptation has been fruitful for empirical researches in evolutionary biology and that its force is being more and more strengthened by recent developments in many fields of research (from palaeontology to evo-devo). On the other, we will analyse Dennett’s last book, From Bacteria to Bach and Back, in order to show that Dennett himself, implicitly, has come to accept more than a few conceptual implications that were closely tied to the ‘view from Harvard’ offered since the beginning by S. J. Gould and his co-authors.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Henceforth: DDI.

  2. 2.

    Henceforth: BB.

  3. 3.

    For a more recent take on the matter, cfr. Godfrey-Smith (2017): The Subject as Cause and Effect of Evolution.

  4. 4.

    Cfr., for example, Lewontin (1983b), Eldredge (1983) (in response to the target article by Dennett), Gould (1992), Dennett (1992), Gould (1997a, b), Dennett (1997); then the reader can find an explicit rejection of Gould’s position in most of Dennett’s books, notably, Dennett (1987), Dennett (1995), Dennett (2017).

  5. 5.

    Cfr., for example, his reply to P. Churchland (Dennett 1991b), and his critique of Harris’ position (Dennett 2017: 394, fn. 368).

  6. 6.

    The theorical position presented in the book received a few critiques not only from Gould (Gould 1997a, b): cfr., for example, the review by Orr and Dennett’s reply: Orr (1996b, c); Dennett (1996); Orr (1996a) and also Alhouse (1998). For a defence of Dennett’s position see Carroll (2004).

  7. 7.

    It should be noticed that the authors here are critical of the concept of ‘meme’ as presented by Dawkins and explicitly link their work to Lewontin (1983a); they are also critical of a ‘first problem-then solution’ model of natural selection advocated as prime agent, and of the gene as ‘recipe’ to build something (Avital and Jablonka 2000: 68–78).

  8. 8.

    Due to their plasticity and the fact that their development continues for almost two-thirds after birth, an ‘alphabetized’ brain that has grown up in a certain technological environment can be proved to be biologically different from a brain that did not (cfr. Dehaene et al. 2015): this very capacity of the brain can be seen as the source of numerous ‘neural exaptations’ or neural recycling that start from the technological niche and act upon it.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Biology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy

    Telmo Pievani & Filippo Sanguettoli

Authors
  1. Telmo Pievani
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  2. Filippo Sanguettoli
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Correspondence to Telmo Pievani .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Environmental Science and Policy, Center for Complexity and Biosystems, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Caterina AM La Porta

  2. Department of Physics, Center for Complexity and Biosystems, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Stefano Zapperi

  3. Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Luciano Pilotti

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Pievani, T., Sanguettoli, F. (2020). The Evolution of Exaptation, and How Exaptation Survived Dennett’s Criticism. In: La Porta, C., Zapperi, S., Pilotti, L. (eds) Understanding Innovation Through Exaptation. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45784-6_1

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