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Part of the book series: Studies in Computational Intelligence ((SCI,volume 892))

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Abstract

An example is given in which a Bayesian reasoner fails to learn the obvious. That failure calls into question whether Bayesian epistemology is complete and correct as it stands.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    By “Bayesian reasoning” is meant the type of reasoning advocated by epistemic Bayesians, that is by adherents of Bayesian epistemology. (As discussed in [3], epistemic Bayesians are much different from pragmatic Bayesians.) In Bayesian epistemology, one should update one’s beliefs by conditioning them on observations. For more detailed information, see [8, Chap. 2] and [10, Chap. 4], the latter book having been reviewed by me in [2]. For a briefer, less complete account, see my paper [3].

  2. 2.

    Which we will call the Plastic-Yoking Mechanism.

  3. 3.

    Many pragmatic Bayesians would advise this [9, Chap. 6]. For a discussion of the difference between pragmatic Bayesians and epistemic Bayesians, see [3].

  4. 4.

    For explanation and discussion of the log odds ratio, also called the “log cross-product ratio”, see [5, pp. 13–18] or [4, pp. 26–28].

  5. 5.

    Philosophers of science have developed multiple theories of propensity: see [10, Chaps. 6 and 7] and [8, pp. 76–77].

  6. 6.

    An example of a simple model that describes hypothesized natural mechanisms and employs probabilistic propensities is the All-or-None Model of Paired-Associate Learning [6],  [1, Chap. 3] that I discussed in [3].

  7. 7.

    https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/122296/how-to-evaluate-this-integral-relating-to-binomial.

References

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Correspondence to Donald Bamber .

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Bamber, D. (2021). A Bayesian Dilemma. In: Kreinovich, V. (eds) Statistical and Fuzzy Approaches to Data Processing, with Applications to Econometrics and Other Areas. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 892. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45619-1_2

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