Abstract
This chapter discusses how meanings arise in the Nyāya theory of perception in terms of direct perception, involving both the “mode of appearance” in which an “object” or a “thing” or a “state of affairs” appears to the perceiver and a “mode of presentation” in which the perceived appearance generates an “embodied sense” in the perceiver, an indirect perception which produces an “analytical meaning” by further analyzing the perceived item in terms of tools like inference, et cetera, the resulting cognition evoking its associated “emotions” and “affects” in the perceiver which, in turn, produces a “dispositional tendency” in the perceiver to goad her to act in a way that seeks to neutralize those effects. In the above modality, the “mode of appearance” consists of three concepts: necessary relations which involves a combination between elements that adds something more to the combination that a mere assembly, universals which involves merged forms of “actions” which have been repeatedly observed by the perceiver, and a limitor which restricts meanings to desired levels; “mode of presentation” which involves an embodied sense produced by the perceiver’s position of view; and an “analytical meaning” which consists of indirect means of cognition like inference, postulation, comparison, absence, and the testimony of a reliable person in the Indian tradition—all of which together evoke an associated “affective mode” in the perceiver involving emotions and a dispositional tendency. These principles have been applied to analyze some real images as well as the practices of continuity and montage in cinema. The inclusion of these aspects within perception makes the Indian theory one of the most enriching theories of perception in the world. Toward the end, a comparison between Saussure, Lacan, and Nyāya theories of signification and their use in decoding generic conventions of cinema have been provided.
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Notes
- 1.
Hiriyanna, Outlines, 225.
- 2.
Ibid., 228.
- 3.
Puligandla, Fundamentals, 187.
- 4.
Hiriyanna, Outlines, 228.
- 5.
D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical Study of the Advaita Theory of Knowledge (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972): Footnote 1, 34.
- 6.
Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4, quoted in Matilal, Perception, 228.
- 7.
Matilal, Perception, 228.
- 8.
Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, “Epistemology”, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. II: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Up to Gaṅgeśa (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977): 53–67, 58, emphasis added.
- 9.
Potter and Bhattacharyya, “Epistemology”, 59.
- 10.
Jonardon Ganeri, Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999): 69.
- 11.
Potter and Bhattacharyya, “Epistemology”, 58.
- 12.
Matilal, The Word and the World, 138–9, modified.
- 13.
Potter and Bhattacharyya, “Relations”, Encyclopedia, Vol. II, 55.
- 14.
Amita Chatterjee, “Embodiment and Nyāya Philosophy”, Seminar on “The Philosophical Contributions of Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharya”, University of Calcutta, December 12, 2011: 1–13, 5.
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 65.
- 17.
Ibid., 66.
- 18.
Paul Schweitzer, “Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sāṅkhya-Yoga Philosophy”, in Indian Philosophy: A Collection of Readings, Vol. 3: Metaphysics, Ed. R. W. Perrett (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000): 327–41, 331, emphasis added.
- 19.
Hiriyanna, Outlines, 230.
- 20.
Ibid., 334.
- 21.
Potter, “Substance”, Encyclopedia, Vol. II, 91, emphasis added.
- 22.
Kumar Kishore Mandal, A Comparative Study of the Concepts of Space and Time in Indian Thought (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1968): 101, 104.
- 23.
Potter, “Substance”, 92.
- 24.
Gerald James Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, Eds. “Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition”, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. IV, Gen. Ed. Karl H. Potter (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987): 79.
- 25.
Larson and Bhattacharya, “Sāṃkhya”, 79.
- 26.
Dasgupta, A History, Vol. 1, Footnote 1, 472, modified.
- 27.
Dasgupta, A History, Vol. 1, 4720.
- 28.
Ibid., 472–3.
- 29.
Ibid., 153.
- 30.
Ibid., Footnote 1, 153.
- 31.
Dasgupta, A History, Vol. 1, Footnote 1, 153.
- 32.
Matilal, Perception, 3640.
- 33.
Ibid.
- 34.
Ibid., 365.
- 35.
Ibid.
- 36.
OERD defines “perception” as “the ability of the mind to refer to sensory perception of an external object as its cause”.
- 37.
Joseph and Barbara Anderson, “The Case for an Ecological Metatheory”, in Post-theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, Eds. David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996): 347–67, 353.
- 38.
Helmholtz’s rule is compressed and rephrased from his Treatise on Physiological Optic, Vol. 3, trans. and ed. J. P. C. Southall (Rochester, New York: The Optical Society of America, 1924–1925): 4–13, quoted in Julian Hochberg and Virginia Brooks, “Movies in the Mind’s Eye”, in Post-theory, 368–87, 373, original emphasis.
- 39.
Anderson and Anderson, “Ecological Metatheory”, 352–3.
- 40.
Anderson and Anderson, “Ecological Metatheory”, 349–50.
- 41.
Ibid., 357.
- 42.
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and Stuart M. Anstis, “The Perception of Apparent Motion”, Scientific American, Vol. 254 No. 6 (1986): 102–9, 109, quoted in Anderson and Anderson, “Ecological Metatheory”, 359.
- 43.
Anderson and Anderson, “Ecological Metatheory”, 360–1.
- 44.
Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1976): 20, quoted in Anderson and Anderson, “Ecological Metatheory”, 362.
- 45.
Anderson and Anderson, “Ecological Metatheory”, 365.
- 46.
Matilal, Perception, 365–6.
- 47.
For a detailed description of the scientific discoveries, see Julian Hochberg and Virginia Brooks, “Movies in the Mind’s Eye”.
- 48.
Hochberg and Brooks, “Movies in the Mind’s Eye”, 373.
- 49.
In Indian psychology, ‘instincts’ are merged forms of desires that have been frequently repeated in time. In this sense, ‘instincts’ are forms of pure potentiality which get activated on the slightest clue. While OERD describes ‘instincts’ as an ‘innate impulsion’, the Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (Ed. Charles Rycroft, London: Penguin, 1972) describes ‘instincts’ as ‘a biologically determined drive to action’, 73.
- 50.
While these three instincts have often been mentioned also as the “will-to-live,” “will-to-continue,” and “will-to-power” in both the orthodox and heterodox Indian schools, it is only the Jaina theory which specifically mentions the third instinct as the “acquisitive instinct” (parigrahasamjñā) which captures its underlying motivation perfectly rather than the Buddhist mention of it as the “thirst for wealth and power” (vibhāva-trṣṇā) or the “desire for wealth” (vittaiṣṇā) as Bṛhadāraṇya Upaniṣad says. See Jadunath Sinha, Indian Psychology, Vol. II (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986): 98–9.
- 51.
Sinha notes: “All desires for the satisfaction of organic needs – thirst, hunger, sex, etc. – constitute bodily desires. The desires for power, fame, wealth, enjoyment, etc., constitute social desires. The desire for knowledge constitutes an intellectual desire. All these desires are non-self desires (anātma vāsanā). The desire for the apprehension of the ‘self’ (paramātma vāsanā) is different from these empirical desires which only arises when all desires for external objects (bāhya vāsanā) have been extinguished for the self while it remains fixed only on the inner ‘self’. It is only in such a state that the intuition of ‘self’ dawns in a person.” Ibid., 98, modified.
- 52.
Matilal, Perception, 132, modified.
- 53.
Matilal, The Character of Logic in India, Eds. Jonardon Ganeri and Heeramon Tiwari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 145.
- 54.
Ibid.
- 55.
Puligandla, Fundamentals, 170–1.
- 56.
Hiriyanna, Outlines, 239, modified, emphasis added.
- 57.
Matilal, “Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School”, in Metaphysics, Vol. 3: Indian Philosophy: A Collection of Readings, Ed. Roy Perret (New York: Garland Publishing, 1916): 41–7, 42.
- 58.
Matilal, “Introduction”, Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: Exploratory Essays in Current Theories of Meaning and Reference, Eds. B. K. Matilal and J. L. Shaw (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1985): 1–37, 28.
- 59.
S. Bhattacharya, “Abstraction, Analysis and Universals: The Navya-Nyāya Theory”, in Analytical Philosophy, 189–202, 190, modified.
- 60.
Jonardon Ganeri, The Age of Lost Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 169.
- 61.
Dasgupta, A History, Footnote 1, 216.
- 62.
Dasgupta notes: “Praśastapāda says that bhāvanā is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to knowledge, sorrow, and intoxication, by which things seen, heard, and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (like seeing a camel in South India), repetition (as in studies, arts, etc.), and intensity of interest, the saṁskāra becomes particularly strong.” Dasgupta, A History, Footnote 1, 316.
- 63.
Nyāya gives an enumerative list of a huge number of causes that revives memory. Dasgupta notes: “The causes of recollection on the part of the self are given as follows: 1) attention, 2) context, 3) repetition, 4) sign, 5) association, 6) likeness, 7) association of the possessor and the possessed like master and servant, 8) separation, 9) simpler employment, 10) opposition, 11) excess, 12) that from which anything can be had, 13) cover and the covered, 14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that which caused them, 15) fear, 16) entreaty, 17) actions such as the chariot reminding the charioteer, 18) affection and 19) merit and demerit.” Dasgupta, A History, 300.
- 64.
Patrick Colm Hogan, “Toward a Cognitive Science of Poetics: Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, and the Theory of Literature”, College Literature, Vol. 23 No. 1: Comparative Poetics: Non-Western Traditions of Literary Theory (February, 1996): 164–78, 173, modified.
- 65.
Ibid., 173–4.
- 66.
Ibid., 175.
- 67.
Matilal, Perception, 418.
- 68.
Mentioned by Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyay in “The Concept of Upādhi in Nyāya Logic”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. V No. 1 (1971): 146–66, 153.
- 69.
Matilal, Perception, 418.
- 70.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 58, modified.
- 71.
Matilal, Perception, 419.
- 72.
Potter, “Relations”, in Encyclopedia, Vol. II: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 47–68, 55.
- 73.
Matilal, Perception, 351.
- 74.
Ibid., 352.
- 75.
Ganeri, Semantic Powers, 145.
- 76.
Matilal, Perception, 18.
- 77.
Bhattacharyya and Potter, “Introduction”, in Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, 35.
- 78.
Ganeri, Semantic Powers, 3.
- 79.
Rabindra Nath Tagore, Religion of Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), quoted in Chatterjee, “Embodiment and Nyāya Philosophy”, 3–4, original emphasis. Prof. Chatterjee has been kind enough to draw my attention to it.
- 80.
Matilal, The Word, 51; Achyutananda Dash, “Śabdabodha, Cognitive Priority and the Odd Stories of Prakāratāvāda and Samsargatāvāda”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 27 (1999): 325–76, 332.
- 81.
Dash, “Śabdabodha”, 332.
- 82.
Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Encyclopedia: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Gaṅgeśa to Raghunath Śiromaṇi, Vol. VI, reprint (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2001): 26.
- 83.
Amita Chatterjee, “Navya-Nyāya Language as a Medium of Science”, unpublished article, 1–33, 29–30.
- 84.
Ibid.
- 85.
Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (Basic Books, 1999): 17, modified.
- 86.
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006): 2, emphasis added.
- 87.
Ibid.
- 88.
Ibid., 17, emphasis added.
- 89.
Ibid., 52, emphasis added.
- 90.
Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, 80–2.
- 91.
Potter, Encyclopedia, Vol. II, 109.
- 92.
Matilal, The Character of Logic, 146.
- 93.
Chatterjee, “Navya-Nyāya Language”, 18.
- 94.
Jan Gonda, Eye and Gaze in the Veda (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1969): 19.
- 95.
Stella Kramrische, The Hindu Temple, Vol. 1, reprint (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1946): 136.
- 96.
Hiriyanna, Outlines, 248, emphasis added.
- 97.
Ibid., 248–9, modified.
- 98.
Matilal, Perception, 252–3.
- 99.
Ibid., 372.
- 100.
Matilal, Perception, 289.
- 101.
Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000): 162.
- 102.
Donato Totaro, “Deleuzian Film Analysis: The Skin of the Film”, Off-Screen, Vol. 6 No. 6 (June 2002), accessed online in June 2016.
- 103.
Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002): XIII, quoted in Claire Perkins, “This Time It Is Personal”, Book Review, Senses of Cinema, Issue 33 (October 2004), accessed online on June 2016.
- 104.
Perkins, “This Time It Is Personal”.
- 105.
Marks, Touch, 2, quoted in Perkins, “This Time It Is Personal”.
- 106.
Perkins, “This Time It Is Personal”.
- 107.
Ibid.
- 108.
Ibid.
- 109.
David M. Lowe mentions “‘Hierarchy of Sensing”, in The History of Bourgeois Perception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982): 2, quoted in Totaro, “Deleuzian Film Analysis”.
- 110.
Totaro, “Deleuzian Film Analysis”.
- 111.
Ibid.
- 112.
Ibid.
- 113.
Totaro, “Deleuzian Film Analysis”.
- 114.
Quoted by Totaro above.
- 115.
Murray Smith, “Imagining from the Inside”, in Film Theory and Philosophy, 417.
- 116.
Smith, “Imagining from the Inside”, 412.
- 117.
Noël Carroll, “Prospects for Film Theory: A Personal Assessment”, in Post-theory, 37–68, 50.
- 118.
See Smith’s detailed discussion of POV in “Imagining from Inside,” 417–24, where he raises various points without reaching any definitive conclusion.
- 119.
Not all classical Indian theories subscribe to all of them. For example, some of them hold that some of the processes are equivalent to “inference”. Thus, for Nyāya, “postulation” is nothing but “inference” and “absence” is part of “perception.”
- 120.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 31, modified.
- 121.
Matilal, The Word and the World, 29.
- 122.
Puligandla, Fundamentals, 334.
- 123.
Ingalls in Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka, 4.7aL, FN 3, 710.
- 124.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 153, modified.
- 125.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 83.
- 126.
Buddhists originally conceived the above two forms of perception viz. indeterminate or nirvikalpa and determinate or savikalpa perception in their theory.
- 127.
Etymologically the English word “symbol” originates from the Greek sumbállein where the prefix sun means ‘together’ and bállein means ‘throw’, together generating the meaning ‘throwing or putting things together’ (Bloomsbury Dictionary of Word Origin).
- 128.
Matilal, Perception, 388.
- 129.
The word kāku is derived from the verbal root kāka which means ‘to be greedy’ for something. It signifies that the very intonation of a word in an expectant or non-expectant tone seeks (is greedy for) a meaning over and above its ordinary meaning. Ingalls in Dhvanyāloka, 3.38L, 617.
- 130.
Matilal, The Word and the World, 25–6.
- 131.
Ibid., 25.
- 132.
Matilal, The Word and the World, 24.
- 133.
Ibid., 106; Matilal, Perception, 393.
- 134.
Matilal, Perception, 393.
- 135.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 91.
- 136.
Umāsvati, Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, 1.6, quoted in Ganeri, Philosophy, 134.
- 137.
Siddhasena, Nyāyāvatāra, 29, quoted in Ganeri, Philosophy, 134.
- 138.
Quoted in Ganeri, Philosophy, 134.
- 139.
Ibid.
- 140.
Ibid.
- 141.
Quoted in Ganeri, Philosophy, 134, modified.
- 142.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 91.
- 143.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 91–2.
- 144.
Ganeri, Philosophy, 138.
- 145.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 92, modified.
- 146.
Hiriyanna, Outlines, 253, modified.
- 147.
Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 142–3, modified.
- 148.
Vance Kepley Jr. “The Kuleshov Workshop”, Journal of Theory on Image and Sound, Vol. 4 No. 1 (1986): 5–23, 21.
- 149.
Matilal, Perception, 351–2.
- 150.
S. M. Eisenstein, “Beyond the Shot”, in Eisenstein Writings Volume 1 1922–1934, Trans. and Ed. Richard Taylor (London: BFI, 1988): 138–50, 143–4.
- 151.
Ibid., 144–5.
- 152.
Eisenstein, “The Dramaturgy of Film Form (The Dialectical Approach to Film Form)”, in Eisenstein Writings Volume 1, 161–80, 163, original emphasis.
- 153.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, Trans. Alphonso Lingis, Ed. Claude Lefort (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968): 155, emphasis added.
- 154.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and the Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
- 155.
These conclusions are culled from a book review of Philosophy in the Flesh, The New York Times on the Web, accessed online in June, 2016.
- 156.
Review of Lakoff and Johnsons’ Philosophy in the Flesh, Web accessed in June, 2016.
- 157.
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 5–6, modified; OERD defines “metaphor” as “The application of a name or a descriptive term or phrase to an object or an action to which it is imaginatively but not literally applicable”.
- 158.
“Review of Lakoff & Johnson”, accessed from the Web, June 2016.
- 159.
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 4.
- 160.
Dr. Ben Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre: Film Noir and the Master Signifier”, Published on 21 April 2017 in Academia.edu, accessed in September 2017, 1–10, 7; Ben Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 5.
- 161.
Internet access of “Psychoanalysis—What Is Master-Signifer?”, Philosophy Stack Exchange, Uploaded on the Internet on 29 August 2017.
- 162.
Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 5.
- 163.
Ibid., 5–6, modified, emphasis added.
- 164.
S. M. Eisenstein, Selected Works: Volume 1: 1922–34, Ed. and Trans. Richard Taylor (London: BFI Publishing, 1988): 74 quoted in Cinemas of the Mind: A Critical History of Film Theory, Ed. Nicolas Tredell (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2002): 50.
- 165.
Nicolas Tredell, Ed., Cinemas of the Mind: A Critical History of Film Theory (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2002): 50.
- 166.
The whole interview can be obtained from the address gmullik@hotmail.com.
- 167.
Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 4.
- 168.
Ben Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”.
- 169.
Geoff Mayer quoted in Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 4.
- 170.
Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 4.
- 171.
Steve Neale quoted in Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 4.
- 172.
Richard Martin quoted in Tyrer “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 6.
- 173.
Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 6.
- 174.
Ibid., 8.
- 175.
Žižek quoted by Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 10.
- 176.
Tyrer, “Towards a Lacanian Theory of Genre”, 7.
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Mullik, G. (2020). Nyāya Theory of Perception or Pratyakṣa: Classical Indian Theories of “Meaning” and Their Relation to Cinema. In: Explorations in Cinema through Classical Indian Theories. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45611-5_4
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