Abstract
If one major driver of the polarization that shuts down discourse is constructing negative stories around and privileging distinct rather than shared social identities, then we need to take a closer look at the social and epistemic power dynamics at play in such discourse. We need to scrutinize the social and epistemic factors that lead to the silencing of groups marginalized specifically due to their social identities. This chapter begins by considering Miranda Fricker’s claim that epistemic injustice is a central vice that implicitly functions to silence marginalized groups, as well as her claim that the way to counter this vice is through the epistemic virtues of testimonial and hermeneutic justice. Drawing on critiques of Fricker’s work (like those by Elizabeth Anderson) as well as Gadamer’s account of openness, I defend openness as a key virtue for promoting discursive equality, one that applies to the individual but that has repercussions for attenuating structural inequalities. I end the chapter appealing to Dewey’s account of democracy to demonstrate the central role civic dialogue can play in cultivating the civic habits and virtues necessary for fostering a more just democracy.
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Notes
- 1.
See McPhail (2004).
- 2.
- 3.
In fact, he goes on to say that these two virtues would in fact be “undermined by a belief in the virtue of epistemic justice” (246).
- 4.
On the proximity of open-mindedness and intellectual humility see Alfono et al., and Sarrouf et al. On the importance of open-mindedness for civic discourse see Haidt (2012).
- 5.
For example, Jason Baehr offers this definition: “An open-minded person is characteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint” (2011, 152). Baehr earlier had articulated what such transcending looks like: “setting aside or loosening his grip on his belief” so as to get beyond “familiar or default ways of thinking” in order to imagine something different (149); he also describes it as letting go of “a privileged cognitive standpoint” (150).
- 6.
See Battaly (forthcoming) where she argues that sometimes we need to accept that close-mindedness is a virtue.
- 7.
For a recent powerful example of just this experience, see Saslow (2018).
- 8.
See Lukianoff and Haidt (2015).
- 9.
For more on the necessity of affinity groups as a precursor to intergroup dialogue see McPhail (2004).
- 10.
As depicted in the documentary Dawnland available here: https://upstanderproject.org/dawnland
- 11.
For a helpful defense of the claim that open-mindedness does not mean “civility” see Walsh (2007), passim 53.
- 12.
Anderson’s first point draws on the work of M. Gilbert. Anderson writes, “structural remedies may be viewed as virtue-based remedies for collective agents. Nearly any type of mental state that individuals have can also be manifested by collectives (Gilbert 2000)” (168). Anderson goes on to explain: “When the members of an organization jointly commit themselves to operating according to institutionalized principles that are designed to achieve testimonial justice, such as giving hearers enough time to make unbiased assessments, this is what it is for the organization itself to be testimonially just” (168). An example here could be a hiring committee that, even though all its individual members are explicitly committed to a fair and just hiring practice, needs to implement some specific practices to ensure that the individual members do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, gender, race, religion, ability, and so on. As individuals, they might not display instances of testimonial injustice, but coming together as a hiring committee might entail following certain unjust practices (particularly those originating in a prior period that was marked by a variety of unjust practices). Introducing certain guidelines for their practices as a committee (blinding CVs and writing samples, reading letters of recommendation only after an initial selection has been made, etc.) would remedy this. Anderson’s point is that an epistemically virtuous individual may still get caught up in unjust social practices.
- 13.
Regarding the first, Anderson discusses education and how there is simply not equal education opportunities for all in our country. Because some social identity groups do not have access to adequate education, they can appear less intelligent and their views are disregarded for that reason. Educational structural inequality is what promotes and sustains hermeneutical injustice in such cases. Given what has been said about dialogue thus far, I see it has potential for improving understanding within a community that can then foster good will to start making necessary changes. Granted, dialogue is no guarantee for change, but particularly in communities that lack the will, dialogue can help motivate people to work toward change. In terms of ethnocentrism, Anderson discusses research and empirical studies on in-group/out-group biases, but since I have spent some time on this topic in the previous chapter, I will not do so further except to reiterate that dialogue is among those practices that can diminish the effect of such bias.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
Dewey uses the non-gender-neutral term “common man.” In what follows, I change his language to gender-inclusive terms.
- 17.
In his article, while Barker calls mutual understanding a civic virtue of justice, he never adequately defines what he means by “mutual understanding” beyond naming it a habit.
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Barthold, L.S. (2020). The Virtue of Dialogue. In: Overcoming Polarization in the Public Square. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45586-6_6
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